British politicians realised that a strong Germany would make a good trading partner for Britain, and also that a healthy economy would prevent the rise of extremist parties, either communists or fascists. J.M Keynes, in ‘The Economic Consequences of the Peace,’ argued that if Germany was revitalised the world economy would benefit from strong trading links, and this in turn would help to stabilise relationships between the trading countries as they rely on each other, and would therefore make conflict less desirable. For this reason, it seemed logical to attempt to let Germany rebuild their economy by lessening the pressure on them from reparation payments.
It became obvious that the Treaty had not achieved British Foreign policy aims when this lead to a great deal of unrest within Germany from 1919 – 1922. Returning soldiers formed armed gangs, the ‘Freikorps,’ who roamed the streets attacking citizens, and in March 1920 they attempted to seize power. The Spartacus revolt in January 1919 also saw an attempted revolution. There were many murders, including Government ministers, one of whom had signed the Armistice. Extremist political groups were set up including the German Worker’s Party, which Adolf Hitler took over in 1921. His support was based upon the hatred that many Germans felt for the Treaty of Versailles. This would have evoked fear in the minds of British politicians, encouraging them to relax the Treaty in the hope that the unrest and instability in Germany would also relax, as this also threatened Britain.
British politicians traditionally held the view that Eastern Europe fell under Germany’s sphere of influence. Chamberlain wanted to turn Germany Eastwards to act as a bulwark against communist Russia. They also recognised that there were a number of German speaking people outside Germany who would one day want to be part of the Reich. Therefore it was felt that the Terms of the Treaty that took away 13% of German territory was somewhat unnecessary and was by no means a permanent arrangement. It was realised that Germany had been unfairly treated with regards to the policy of self- determination. Union with Austria was prohibited and German populations were placed as minority groups within other states. This left these new states potentially de- stabilised and open to future attack from a resentful Germany.
Germany had agreed to the armistice based on Wilson’s 14 points, so when the final agreement was made, they felt cheated. The USA, led by Woodrow Wilson, had no great desire to punish the Germans, and the 14 points were a blueprint of a fair peace settlement. This encouraged the majority of politicians to desire to make adjustments to the treaty so it looked more favourably on Germany. Immediately this undermined the Treaty, as it was obviously not seen as a final word, but a start of further negotiations. These further negotiations came in the form of the Lacarno Treaty.
In the early 1920’s 23 summit conferences were held in which British representatives urged the French to relax provisions. This disagreement between the two countries exemplifies much of this period, and the conflicting policies held by each state were seen in their views of reparations and security and also their policy of ‘surely neutrality’ after the occupation of the Ruhr. Although this does show Britain’s attempt to relax provisions, this was largely unsuccessful as French leaders feared strengthening Germany. This disagreement was extended when French troops occupied German cities when Germany violated disarmament clauses. Britain made it clear that they opposed this action, and they were also reluctant to sign a security treaty with France. This, in a way indicated to Germany that Britain were prepared to relax the Treaty, and also that they did not agree with the views of the French. This was reinforced in 1922 when Britain proposed a cancellation of reparations and war debt payments to America. However, this, quite predictably was not received well by the Americans, French and also in London. This does show the efforts of Britain, but they came to nothing as it was rejected by the other victorious powers. It can be concluded her that as much as Britain were willing to soften the impact on Germany, little could be secured without the support of the other powers, so Britain’s attempts here were in effect, worthless.
The Dawes plan was a program designed to alleviate the burden of reparations imposed on Germany. As a result of the committee, more reasonable amounts of reparations were set, and Germany was provided with foreign loans, mainly from the United States, to help Germany meet its payment schedule. The German parliament, after relying on the support of the Social Democrats, and by splitting the main nationalist group, signed the Dawes plan on August 27th 1924. Under the plan, French and Belgian troops, who had occupied Germany’s industrial Ruhr region since 1923 to ensure that reparations were paid, withdrew in 1925. These concessions show a relax in the strict terms of the Treaty towards Germany. However, it was not a complete reversal as, in return, the Germans had to pledge some of their assets, such as revenues from the state railway system to fund reparations. The German national bank also had to submit to external controls. In 1929 the Dawes plan was replaced by the Young Plan, which reduced the amount of German reparations, again showing a willingness to move away from the terms of the settlement.
However, although Britain did attempt to soften the impact for Germany, they also had to consider their relationship with France, who was not so sympathetic towards Germany for a number of reasons. They were very conscious of their weakness and felt threatened by Germany’s strength. They had also lost as many as 1,5000,000 people, and hundreds of thousands were wounded, which was considerably more than Britain. For these reasons it was essential to them that the terms be adhered to so as to protect them. Therefore, this may have restricted the actions of the British in their attempt to soften the effect on Germany as much as they would have liked. However, the British and Americans did pressurise the French leaders to abandon their hopes of detaching the West bank of the Rhine from Germany, either annexing it to France or creating an independent buffer state. This shows that the protests of the French did not significantly influence the actions of the British and American leaders, as they decided to keep troops on the left bank for 15 years. Balfour felt that France’s obsession with security was “intolerably foolish…they are so dreadfully afraid of being swallowed up by the tiger that they spend all their time poking it.” (Farmer. A. Britain: foreign and imperial Affairs 1919-39.)
It must also be noted that public opinion in Britain was largely against the Germans, the public having a hatred for them due to their horrendous losses during the First World War. There was a wish for them to compensate for ‘all damage done to the civilian population of the allies.’ Propaganda during the war had also lead to this hatred for the German population, increasing the want of revenge, and punishment. A slogan often used in relation to the Treaty of Versailles by the British public was “squeeze them till the pips squeak!” This firmly suggests that the public did not favour reversing or softening the terms of the settlement too much, as this would undo the progress made.
