like circumstances.’ Other commentators have noted that rule-utilitarianism can be incorporated
into act-utilitarianism when the latter has been properly considered, and the differences between
the two do not overtly affect utilitarian theory. Smart also notes the idea of negative
utilitarianism, the theory that instead of maximising general happiness, one ought to minimise
suffering. He suggests that this is interesting in that the theory can be seen as a ‘subordinate rule
of thumb’, but otherwise it makes utilitarian theory unclear as it would be harder to see which ills
to lessen than it would be merely to promote general happiness.
Utilitarianism is an attractive theory, mainly due to its promotion of happiness, to which
no caring human would object. There are, however, a number of problems to be considered
before a final judgement can be made, and the first of these concerns the definition of
utilitarianism itself. The question of happiness has not escaped the notice of utilitarians, the
definition above does not adequately explain what it is we ought to be striving for when we try
to maximise human ‘happiness’. Smart gives three positions, as represented by Bentham, Mill
and Moore. Bentham follows the hedonistic theory that happiness is pleasure, and that the
pleasures of all activities are more or less equal, while Mill believes that there are higher and
lower pleasures, and Moore suggests that some things, such as academic research, have
intrinsic value apart from pleasure. Smart is right in thinking that humans have an interest in
intellectual as well as sensual pursuits, and a purely hedonistic view is surely too simplistic.
Though it is true that humans enjoy pleasurable pursuits, this does not suggest that that is all
humans wish for in their lives. Smart suggests that we were made ‘for higher things’, and that
had it not been for our eagerness to pursue subjects on their intellectual merit alone, the human
race would not be as it is today.
The concept of happiness is still not clear, however, as it must be shown to be different
from enjoyment. The main difference must be that happiness is a long term concept, whereas
enjoyment is momentary, but it is still hard to define what true happiness really is. This was the
problem which King Croesus of Lydia presented to Solon, the legendary Athenian law-giver.
Croesus expected that Solon when asked would name the king as the happiest man in
accordance with his immense wealth and good fortune, and was most disappointed when Solon
did not name him as the most, or even the second most happy individual. In Solon’s opinion
Croesus had been lucky so far in his life, and the happiness of a man could only be judged when
he is dead, ‘until he is dead, keep the word ‘happy’ in reserve. Till then, he is not happy, but
only lucky…look to the end, no matter what it is you are considering. Often enough God gives
man a glimpse of happiness, and then utterly ruins him. ’ Since is so difficult to decide what
happiness is, utilitarianism suffers the problem of only having a vague guiding force, we are told
to maximise happiness, but we are unclear as to what this exactly means. As shown above,
happiness means more than physical well-being or pleasure, so it is hard to know what to do for
the best.
The reliance on analysis of consequence may also prove to be a handicap for the
utilitarian. No one can predict the future, and it is not clear how much the utilitarian is expected
to worry about consequences hereafter, or whether only the direct consequences of an agent’s
action are important. It is also unclear whether an agent can be responsible for a further agent’s
action who has been influenced by the first. Quite often in real life the consequences of an action
cannot be seen, or the agent may have made a mistake leading to a disastrous final outcome.
The utilitarian does not seem to allow for this eventuality. Also it is not clear whether one ought
to consider whether an apparently benevolent action may aversely affect universal happiness -
Smart gives the example of a man saving Hitler from drowning in 1938, obviously had he been
left to die many of the atrocities of the twentieth century would not have been committed. It
does not seem fair, however, to blame the heroic rescuer for not being able to see such future
consequences of his action. This is why utilitarianism usually speaks of ‘direct’ consequences,
but still this is not entirely convincing, as there are times when decisions must be made which
affect more than the immediate future.
The most unacceptable facet of utilitarianism has always been the rigid insistence on the
happiness of the majority over that of the minority. While in principle this does not seem to be
such a terrible thing, when more closely examined utilitarianism in practice becomes impossible
for many people to countenance. Examples have been given - ‘Jim and the Indians’ for instance
- which show that utilitarian principles may sometimes call upon an agent to commit horrific
deeds in the name of benefit to the majority. Utilitarianism demands that, if faced with a situation
where one must choose between personally murdering one man to free others or watching a
group be killed, the utilitarian choice would be to kill one man. This is utterly untenable for the
majority of people, though the example given may, in certain situations, be an option to be
considered, but utilitarian principles go yet further. Utilitarianism is a theory concerned with
consequence, but following this to its legitimate end, to maximise the general happiness, one
ought to act now to prevent future disaster. There seems to be no problem with this, but after
consideration this principle allows for the murder of the innocent now if that would be in the
general majority interest in the future. This is utterly unacceptable for most, and refusal to act in
such a way can only be answered by accusations of ‘self-indulgence’ from utilitarians.
Appeals to integrity do not seem to have much effect on utilitarians either, and the
theory does not appear to follow generally held ideas of justice. Mill saw the concept of justice
as the strongest attack on utilitarianism, and felt that if he could explain the concept of justice in
terms of utility, then that would answer the main non-consequentialist argument against
utilitarianism. He presents two arguments concerning justice, firstly that all moral elements in the
notion of justice are dependent on social utility. He points out that the two main components of
justice are punishment and the idea of rights violations, and so argues that punishment is
composed of vengeance and social sympathy, and that rights are claims we have on society to
protect us. In both cases Mill argues that such components reduce down to social utility. Mill’s
second argument suggests that as justice is rather ambiguous, then it cannot be as foundational
as his opponents would contend. He points to the existence of dispute in matters of justice
which can only be resolved with appeal to utility. Mill then concludes that though justice is a
genuine concept, it must be based on utility. This is still not convincing enough in cases where
the happiness of the majority depends on the extermination or maltreatment of a minority group.
Most people would not regard such an action as just, but it is in accordance with utilitarian
principle.
The insistence of utilitarianism that the happiness of the majority must be considered to
be the ultimate aim of action ignores the ‘rights’ of the minority, and indeed could be seen as
denying them rights altogether. This way of behaving to minority groups is not generally
accepted in our ‘civilised’ modern world, but this has not always been so, and even now, within
living memory, theories of majority right over minority have resulted in mass murder, torture and
oppression. As such actions are condemned by those who live in liberal societies, it is not clear
who is right, or whether those who condemn can do so without fear of reprisal. Fear of
punishment for one’s views by the current regime has not always prevented people from
speaking out in opposition to such practices though, so it would appear that, in general, actions
which result in the suffering of the minority for the sake of the majority are not right by human
instinct.
The necessity to adopt policies of extreme action for the greater good may seem to be
something which would only happen on rare occasions, utilitarianism taken to its logical end
would appear to be a dangerous principle to adopt, setting worrying precedent for the future. If
utilitarianism is correct, then human instincts of equality and justice must be wrong, despite Mill’s
efforts to associate justice with utility. The theory, though immediately attractive, can be seen to
have a number of flaws which apart from being problematic present mankind with situations
which most would not accept as right, and in extreme cases would horrify most people. The
accusation of utilitarians of ‘hard-heartedness’ does not ring true when it is considered that
utilitarianism allows for atrocities to be committed with the only justification needed as the agent
believes that it is for the promotion of majority happiness. Utilitarianism does not give adequate
guidance in individual cases and tends towards a ‘tyranny of the majority’, failing to protect
minorities. The whole concept of happiness is difficult to gauge, and as this is the only aim of the
utilitarian, this must present terrible difficulties for the agent, leaving plenty of room for error.
Lastly, the idea of utilitarianism as a universal principle is personally repellent, and as it has never
been accepted by all, it can only be hoped that it never will be.
Smart in JJC Smart and B Williams Utilitarianism : For and Against (1973)
Herodotus Historiae 1.32
Williams in JJC Smart and B Williams Utilitarianism : For and Against, and M Hollis’ answer Jim and the
Indians Analysis 1983
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AJ Dowler
