What were the principal causes of the First World War?

It has been observed that conflict in mainland Europe had been looming ever since the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and serves to emphasise a corresponding shift in the balance of power in Germany’s favour. Indeed its conclusion is worthy to note, seeing that the newly created German Empire had imposed a harsh peace on France, including the annexation of the Alsace - Lorraine, which became the source of French resentment towards Germany in the myriad of events subsequent to French defeat. So much so that it was assumed this animosity between the two continental powers would remain indefinitely , thereby resulting and perpetuating the alliance system. Thomson observes ‘...this enmity would always, in the end supervene all other considerations’, and it is upon this premise ‘...that the system of alliances was built’. Having successfully united Germany, Bismarck intended to maintain the new state and sought to ‘preserve the settlement of 1871’ . Furthermore, Thomson emphasises, in Germany’s search for allies, the desire to ‘consolidate her new found national unity’ . It can be argued that Bismarck was mindful that any future conflict with France would entail the French seeking nothing short of those territories ceded to Germany under the 1871 settlement. Moreover, Germany can be seen as earnestly trying to isolate France, by not only securing an alliance with its closest ally, Austria-Hungary, and opening diplomatic relations with Britain. However, this can be seen as Germany desire not to be completely encircled by hostile neighbours. France on the other hand, despite the deep desire to regain the Alsace-Lorraine region, greater was the imperative need for allies and to avoid isolation, the latter being a contributing factor to her defeat by the Germans in 1870. In addition, France was desperate to find a ‘counterweight’ to the rise of Germany in the European balance of power. Such was the reasoning of the system of alliances, built upon this mutual hostility and resentment between France and Germany, despite their respective strategies being ironically defensive. Nevertheless, Europe was soon to be divided between the Triple Alliance (Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy) and the Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia), and can be illustrative of the alliance system, playing upon the insecurities of nations and aligning them into opposing camps, making conflict ever more likely in less felicitous circumstances.

Following on from this is the period in question’s general trend of overseas expansion, and its impact as a contributing factor in many European government’s decisions to go to declare war in 1914. In spite of the globe being accustomed to ‘some four hundred years of continuous European imperialism’ , the process of European powers extending their influence overseas went hand in hand with industrialisation and advances in technology. Although the expansion overseas was not new to the international conduct of the Continent, especially in the justification of new territories as being the trappings of ‘great power’ status, the trend arose in order to bolster the concerned state’s apparently recessionary domestic economies. However familiar, this period of expansion was markedly different, as illustrated by Joll, in that:

‘[imperialism] opened the countries of Africa and Asia to European influence on

a far greater scale than ever before, giving their populations a taste of the evils

as well as the benefits of European technology, European administration methods

and European ideas’.

A factor which is key to understanding imperialism within the context of the period 1870 till the Great War, and indeed its implication on the worsening diplomatic situation of 1914, can be seen as much an economic as well as inherently historical feature. With the advent of the industrial revolution came not only the creation of new markets, both domestic and overseas, but crucially new industries requiring more and new natural resources, which ultimately were in short supply in many European states. Hence the need to acquire foreign territories, rich in resources. The map of Europe, and indeed the globe, illustrated the trend of acquiring as much land as possible, building empires and dynasties and many European powers competing for resources for industry, leading to inevitable conflicts. Its inevitability is widely dictated by Marxists, since the need to replenish exhausted domestic resources is a factor of capitalism itself, making conflict (and thereby the Great War) an unavoidable, even necessary event. This is highlighted by the period being marked by such colonial rivalries, often showing how willing states were prepared to enter into full scale war and thus lend credence to colonial rivalry being a contributing factor to the outbreak of war in 1914. An example of this is when the rivalry of Britain and France (before becoming affiliated as the Entente powers) came to a head, with regards territorial control in Central Africa, which resulted in ‘direct confrontation’  in 1898 at the Fashoda fortress on the Upper Nile. A French expeditionary force were sent to stake a claim to territory in the Fashoda area, only to be met by better equipped, superior British force, fresh from having reacquired the Sudan. Needless to say, the French, though fighting ‘bravely’ , were defeated. It should be highlighted that the ‘Fashoda incident’, considering the general bitterness in French opinion regarding the British  colonial presence in Africa, had the full backing of the French government, having informed the garrison that ‘You are going to fire a pistol shot on the Nile; we accept all its consequences’ . Thomson continues:

‘The deadlock at Fashoda brought Britain and France to the brink of war...[and

crucially] when the news reached London and Paris, public opinion reacted

wildly and irresponsibly’

Thomson illustrates therefore just how easy and indeed eager states were to enter into a war in their needs for territory for their empires and economies, lending credence to the notion of colonial rivalries escalating out of control. As seen in July 1914, and the subsequent five weeks in history, would prove not to be the last occasion in which a relatively small incident could ultimately lead to war.

As seen from the discussion above, no single factor can be attributed conclusively to the cause of the Great War. Any such attempt to do so would prove a gross simplification of a complex period in modern history, as well as failing to take in account a number of factors. Indeed many factors can be identified. The clause included in the Versailles treaty regarding German ‘war guilt’ perhaps has some credence when looking at the manner in which Germany was unified and remaining in the grip of Bismarckian style policies. Seeing that Germany was a new nation and conceived in war, its new standing in Europe and national identity was imperative to establish, arguably of a bellicose nature. She sought to achieve this aim by securing as many allies on the Continent as possible. This should be seen as symptomatic of insecurity and the fear of encirclement, perpetuated by the ongoing animosity between herself and France. Following on from this, was France’s need for allies, whose major concern was finding a ‘counterweight’ to Germany’s prominence in the balance of power and avoid diplomatic isolation next to such a powerful adversary. What should be illustrated is that France’s position in Europe following the Franco-Prussian War had dwindled from a continental power to lesser state. Its suspicions and hostility to Germany therefore should have precedence in explaing the alliance system.  Moreover, Britain could be seen as having misjudged the balance of power, as a natural harmoniser of international relations. At first, not only did Britain fail to see the Germans in the same light as the French, but always saw France as its main European concern and opponent. The general picture is further marred by the general application of force in the face of skirmishes, allowing relatively small situations escalate out of diplomatic control, highlighted by the various incidents between states, such as the Fashoda crisis or the Anglo-German naval rivalry. From this can be interpreted the issue of imperialism and its impact on the scene, referring not only the associated colonial rivalry but also empires containing many different social and ethnic groups. Arguably, it was only a matter of time before various groups would resort to means to voice their objections to autocracy via small elites. Unsurprisingly, such opinion was manifest in the form of violence seeing that such systems of government had little or no democratic procedures. In conclusion, the mix of  the pursuit of national identity, security in the face of powerful adversaries, rivalry arising from imperialism and the growing trend of insurgent nationalism and increasing calls for self determination, would prove too great for diplomacy and the balance of power to maintain the stability of Europe. The Great War summoned and signified the death of an old age, the age of empire, which had in the end left colonial areas devolved to an extent, but leading to rivalries between states, perhaps not the most desired factor in the volatile, ‘melting pot’ of Europe.