With such extensive support for Radical ideologies taking hold of the population the Weimar Republic was sentenced to fail as soon as The Great Depression hit Germany. Although Rothermund disagrees with the judgement that the Great Depression was a fundamental cause of World War II “The Depression was not the direct cause of the war but there was at least one obvious link between it and the war: the rise of Hitler”[7] However, this view can naturally be considered invalid as Hitler’s rise to power is a result of the Great Depression and therefore is an absolute direct cause. Rothermund even says himself “Hitler’s claim to fame as the man who overcame the depression in Germany”[8], his view is therefore contradictory.
Essentially, it cannot be denied the momentous impact the Great Depression had on Germany, and one is inclined to agree with Calvocoressi’s view that the Great Depression was the main enabling factor to Nazi success. This is because, one can distinctly see that the consequent Great Depression of the Wall Street Crash devastated Germany economically and opened the doors for Hitler to take advantage of Germany’s weakened state; hence it can be seen as the pinnacle cause of World War II.
In order to fully understand the economic cataclysm of which was Germany during the 1930’s one must consider another possible root cause of Germany’s economic distress. That is, of course, the Treaty of Versailles. There are no words to describe the enormity of pressure that “the dictated peace of Versailles”[9] placed on the German economy, it plunged Germany into an overwhelming amount of debt that almost destroyed its economy. On May 8th 1919 President Ebert himself proclaimed the treaty terms as “unrealizable and unbearable”[10] It was not an unusual occurrence for the cost of war to be charged to the defeated country, in order to repair the damage that had been done to the victors. An example of this is in 1878 after the Russo-Turkish War, the Treaty of San Stefano. Russia was seen as the victor after advancing into Plevna and Turkeys only option was to allow for peace negotiations. However, San Stefano was particularly harsh in depriving the Ottoman Empire of two thirds of Bulgaria and many other lands. Turkey was also to pay a war indemnity and support a Russian army occupation for two years.
What was similar between San Stefano and the Treaty of Versailles was that the defeated country was allowed no part in the drawing up of the treaty terms, which means both treaties, were unnecessarily biased towards the victors. Nonetheless when the Treaty of San Stefano was completed, it was protested against by many countries including England and Austria, who threatened to go to war with Russia if it wasn’t revised. If San Stefano was legitimatized the massive territorial losses and war indemnity could have crippled Turkey like Germany was crippled by Versailles, and started a European war. In this case war was completely averted by the revision of the San Stefano Treaty, however this differs from the Treaty of Versailles as the reparations clause was altered to make them more manageable but it didn’t change the bringing about of World War II. This shows that the Second World War would commence regardless of whether or not the Treaty of Versailles was revised or not; which shows its impact was minimal in provoking said war.
The Treaty of Versailles is considered particularly unjust because “the war guilt clause was a vindictive oversimplification of the causes of the war, [and] that reparations were excessive”[11]. What was surprising about the Treaty was its ambiguous nature concerning the reparations; it failed to produce a fixed amount of which Germany was to repay: “The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany.”[12]
That is until 1921, when the Allied Reparations Commission produced the figure £6,850 million, and even that wasn’t a definitive amount. “J. M. Keynes, whose own assessment of Germany’s capacity to pay was £2000 million, stigmatized this arrangement as morally detestable, politically foolish and economically nonsensical.”[13] Keynes’ evaluation was incredibly accurate as Hitler was able to use the heavy economic sentence in order to appeal to the population “who could know nothing of the war but that the bill for it will outlast their lifetime”[14].
One the other hand, Shirer challenges Keynes’ assessment and argues that the Treaty of Versailles could be considered fair, as a cash settlement is what to be expected and fully within Germany’s capabilities during prosperous times. Shirer even goes as far as saying “[it] left the Reich geographically and economically largely intact and preserved her political unity and her potential strength as a great nation.”[15] However, this statement is proven false by the fact that shortly after the settlement, Germany fell into a Depression due to hyperinflation and the German currency becoming utterly worthless. This is a direct consequence from printing more money to pay the excessive reparations. Nevertheless, due to the quick recovery of the Reichsbank and the German economy it would be indecorous to suggest the reparations themselves were a main cause for World War II. Additionally, there being two decades between the ratification of Versailles and the Second World War, which leads one to question whether or not it has any relevance as an actual cause for war.
In 1815, the Second Treaty of Paris imposed an indemnity of 700 million marks on France, who also had to bear the costs of an occupation which was to remain till the indemnity was paid. These treaty terms put substantial pressure on the French economy, however unlike the Treaty of Versailles, the Second Treaty of Paris was accepted by the French population and the established Government remained in power until 1848. Also, it should be noted, without feeling the need to descend into war. This shows how a harsh economic treaty isn’t always followed by a global war, and displays a route of which Germany could have taken after Versailles. It is therefore indisputable to think that the economic burden the peace treaty imposed on Germany was not a main cause for the Second World War; especially when compared to the economic disaster of which the Great Depression was.
Another economic factor which must be considered is Hitler’s own policies; which appealed to the German people because it offered to restore Germany to its former power and pre-war economic stability by any means necessary. Hilderbrand accedes this point “By demanding a ‘stronger’ foreign policy and hoped to offer their supporters not only economic but above all psychological recovery from the defeat suffered in the world war”[16]. Naturally the German population would undoubtedly take that opportunity; Shirer agrees with Hilderbrand by explaining “…many of whom were attracted not only by Hitler’s fanatical nationalism but by the prospects he held out for an Army restored to its old glory and size in which there would be opportunities.”[17] Such opportunities included more job prospects due to his rearmament and work creation policies; which would alleviate the residual problem of mass unemployment caused by the Great Depression. Both historians recognise the appealing nature of Hitler’s economic policies, however the reasons for why Germany was so accepting towards Hitler’s policies must be considered; one can only approbate this as being the considerable economic effects of the Great Depression.
The tantalizing policies which Hitler presented enraptured those who also felt unjustly treated and suffered under the economic hardships the Versailles Settlement presented. Hitler pursued a policy of autarky. It was his ambition to make Germany self sufficient. However, this policy of autarky was dependent on his other policy of lebensraum which involved increasing the size of Germany through conquest. This policy is consistent in Fascist leaders for example; Mussolini from Italy, who in 1935 conquered Abyssinia in order to plunder their resources to boost the Italian economy, which at the time, like Germany, was still suffering from the effects of the Great Depression. This consequently encourages Hitler to follow his own economic policy regardless of the restraints imposed on Germany in Versailles, i.e. rearming and Anschluss with Austria. By violating the Versailles Peace Treaty, Hitler is deliberately provoking countries like Britain and France to retaliate; thus stimulating war. However, Hilderbrand goes on to question whether Hitler was in fact acting on behalf of the German population to improve their quality of life or was he in fact just acting to his own accord regardless of what the German people wanted or needed “Did he [Hitler] act in accordance with, and on behalf of social forces with the Germany of that time? Or does he confront us as a world conquering dictator without a mandate or agreement from his society?”[18] Hilderbrand is not convinced Hitler was acting in order to fulfil his economic aims or to feed his need for power. Nonetheless, Hitler was clear with his aims from the beginning and believed that a strong army meant he could fulfil his expansionist aims, and in doing so inject the economy with resources, employment and above all money, which Germany so desperately needed.
Historians such as Eyck have questioned whether it was in fact Bismarck in the 19th century who opened Germany up for future dictatorships; this is mainly due to his manipulation of the Reichstag, in which he cripples the development of democratic institutions in the establishment of the Reich. As well as the launch of his colonial policy in the mid 1880’s, this included acquisitions such as South West Africa. This could be seen as the basis of Hitler’s policy of Lebensraum; Calvocoressi agrees with this view when he writes “Nazism was a product of elements in German history and elements in European history”[19] By expanding into other lands, natural resources could be mined and ameliorate the German economy.
However, Bismarck never intended to start an international war which leads Rothfels to disagree with such statements regarding Bismarck’s influence in Hitler’s economic policy “We may criticise Bismarck for paving the way to some fatal trends of our day, but we cannot very well overlook the fundamental fact that Hitler did precisely what the founder of the Reich had refused to do.”[20] One can see that Bismarck did influence Hitler’s policy in some way just not to the extremities that Hitler went on to pursue, for example violently seizing lands, like Czechoslovakia, in order to take complete control over them and plunder any valuable resources. Clearly, Hitler’s economic policies were extremely influential, many of the population were susceptible towards his promises of prosperity, but still one must see that this is evidently due to its intensely distressed state following the effects of the Great Depression. Therefore, the Depression is the main enabling factor to Hitler’s rise to power, ergo the main economic cause of the Second World War.
Another factor for consideration, which could have evoked World War II, was the ineffectiveness and consequent economic weaknesses of the Weimar Republic. Historians such as Rothermund have argued that “Germany faced an impending bankruptcy at that time which was entirely unrelated to the events in America”[21]. Rothermund argues this is due to the Republics increasing expenditure in trying to cast the image of a modern welfare state which leads to increasing taxes and indebtedness. Be that as it may, there is little support for this view as it disregards Germany’s reliance on American loans and their debilitated economic policies. Nonetheless, the Republic’s economic policies could not have been as disastrously weak as originally portrayed, if so how was it able to outlast the hyperinflation crisis of 1923? Would that not have resulted in World War if the economic weaknesses of the Weimar Republic were solely to blame for the Second World War?
Be that as it may, the Republic’s economic policies did prove particularly feeble once the impact of the Great Depression hit Germany. They failed to promote a successful policy which would solve the dilemma of mass unemployment. For example, their policy of work creation; prior to 1931 there wasn’t one as such due to the Republic choosing to focus on making what work there was available stretch further. As Stachura states “It could be said that an active Work Creation policy would have strengthened the loyalty of a majority of Germans to the Weimar Republic and also their trust in the competence of a parliamentary democracy”[22]. Stachura is accurate in saying an active Work Creation policy to combat the mass unemployment caused by the Wall Street Crash, would renew the German public’s faith in their Government. Instead the NSDAP exploited these weaknesses in the Republic’s economic policy in their rigorous propaganda escapades during their rise to power. It could be said the Republic was unequipped to handle such a catastrophe which was the Great Depression, it must therefore be emphasised again the impact the Depression had on Germany in view of its implications in bringing about the Second World War. This is why Rothermund’s view is considered counterfactual the economic weaknesses of the Republic had everything to do with the events in America.
However to be discordant with Stachura’s view, it could be said regardless of the Weimar’s policies it was just too fundamentally weak to survive any major opposition. Calvocoressi agrees with this argument when saying “The Weimar Constitution provided a framework in which Germany might evolve from an oligarchical authoritarianism to a popular democracy, but the evolution was slow to start and then struck by adversity which it was too frail to survive.”[23]
One angle to consider is that the Weimar Republic was only weak during the latter part of its tenure due to the premature death of one of its key ministers; Gustav Stresemann on October 3rd 1929. Under Stresemann’s guidance Germany was able to flourish both politically and economically “The German economy achieved a certain degree of stability after the acceptance of the Dawes plan, the Locarno Treaties and Germany’s acceptance to the League of Nations”[24] Most would argue that Stresemann single-handedly restored Germany back to the ranks of a major power, including British Statesmen Austen Chamberlain who told Stresemann, proceeding the Hague Conference, “it was to him and his policies that Germany owed her success”[25]. Stresemann’s six year career in office was extremely accomplished with the securing of American loans to help ease the reparations into manageable amounts, industrial production was up 20 per cent and Germany had the most modern Merchant fleet in Europe. It is obvious that he excelled in many areas within the economy and reformed Germany into a prosperous state in a very short amount of time. Therefore one can see how his death would have disastrous repercussions on Germany: “After death had robbed Germany of the man who had wished to lead her uphill on the path of peaceful reconciliation, another man stepped further into the foreground who was to lead her back down to another war and a second defeat – Adolf Hitler.”[26] However, it could be argued that Germany could not have been that economically stable if the death of one politician consequently led to the collapse of the Republic. Stresemann’s borrowing meant Germany was reliant on American loans, which left it insecure and fragile; to quote Stresemann himself before his death “The economic position is only flourishing on the surface. Germany is in fact dancing on a volcano. If the short-term credits are called in, a large section of our economy would collapse.”[27]
This shows how tenuous the Republic’s economic policies really were as a Governing body, even Stresemann acknowledged the Republic would only survive if America continued to prosper. It is arguable that if the Great Depression had never occurred the Weimar Republic did stand a chance of survival, which would have prevented the Second World War. Layton agrees with this point when saying “The Weimar Republic had its weaknesses but it was not fatally flawed”[28] There is one fundamental factor which needs to be acknowledged, this being the majority of the Weimar’s economic weaknesses are rooted with the Great Depression, it would therefore be foolish to suggest those weaknesses are a direct main cause for the Second World War.
Through this longitudinal evaluation it can be concluded that economic hardships play a cardinal role in any global unsettlement; ergo an event like the Wall Street Crash, which virtually sent the whole world into a state of “weltschmerz”, was bound to have major international repercussions and should therefore be considered as the main enabling factor to the start of the Second World War. It can naturally be determined that without the Great Depression the Weimar Republic might have been able to survive longer and prevent Hitler coming to power; thus World War II might not have occurred at all. History proves that economic catastrophes have major consequences on the political ideologies of a country; clearly defining the boundaries of economic causes becomes difficult when economic and political factors become so closely linked. However, in this instance the Wall Street Crash should be the undisputed catalyst in bringing about World War II, due to it being at the root of all other factors.
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[1] “Total War”, Peter Calvocoressi; Guy Wint (Penguin Books)
[2] “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich”, William Shirer (Simon and Schuster Inc)
[3] “The Great Depression”, Lionel Robbins (Transaction Publishers)
[4] “Total War”, Peter Calvocoressi; Guy Wint (Penguin Books)
[5] “Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germany”, Peter Stachura (Palgrave Macmillan)
[6] “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich”, William Shirer (Simon and Schuster Inc)
[7] “The Global Impact of the Great Depression 1929-1939”, Dietmar Rothermund (Routledge)
[8] “The Global Impact of the Great Depression 1929-1939”, Dietmar Rothermund (Routledge)
[9] “Foreign Policy of the Third Reich”, Klaus Hilderbrand (University of California Press)
[10] “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich”, William Shirer (Simon and Schuster Inc)
[11] “Total War”, Peter Calvocoressi; Guy Wint (Penguin Books)
[12] “Treaty of Versailles” June 28th 1919 (Article 232)
[13] “Total War”, Peter Calvocoressi; Guy Wint Penguin Books)
[14] “Total War”, Peter Calvocoressi; Guy Wint (Penguin Books)
[15] “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich”, William Shirer (Simon and Schuster Inc)
[16] “Foreign Policy of the Third Reich”, Klaus Hilderbrand (University of California Press)
[17] “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich”, William Shirer (Simon and Schuster Inc)
[18]“Foreign Policy of the Third Reich”, Klaus Hilderbrand (University of California Press)
[19] “Total War”, Peter Calvocoressi; Guy Wint (Penguin Books)
[20] “Bismarck and the State”, Hans Rothfels
[21] “The Global Impact of the Great Depression 1929-1939”, Dietmar Rothermund (Routledge)
[22] “Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germany”, Peter Stachura (Palgrave Macmillan)
[23] “Total War”, Peter Calvocoressi; Guy Wint (Penguin Books)
[24] “A History of the Weimar Republic”; Erich Eyck (Harvard University Press)
[25] “A History of the Weimar Republic”; Erich Eyck (Harvard University Press)
[26] “A History of the Weimar Republic”; Erich Eyck (Harvard University Press)
[27] http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/weimar_depression_1929.htm
[28] “From Kaiser to Fuhrer: Germany 1900-1945” Geoff Layton (Edexcel)
by
hannah_j_94hotmailcom (student)
