"For my part, I do not think that the time has yet arrived when it is possible to state the law in a way which will deal with all the practical problems which may arise in this difficult field, consistently with everything said in the cases." - Discuss
"For my part, I do not think that the time has yet arrived when it is possible to state the law in a way which will deal with all the practical problems which may arise in this difficult field, consistently with everything said in the cases." Mustill L.J. in Grant v. Edwards  I Ch 683 @ 651 D-E. Consider whether this statement is still true today. The statement made by Mustill L.J in Grant v Edward (1986),1 raises difficult, but absorbing issues. The courts have frequently expressed the view that it desirable, for the transfer of the property to contain express declaration of trust concerning the beneficial interest. Nevertheless, in reality, this is not always the case. It is frequently encountered, as is always seen in this area of law, that couples do not formulate their intentions at the time of the conveyance and purchase of the property, but consider the matter only when their relationship has dissolved. Thus, the law in this area is widely regarded as unsatisfactory. The Existing Law It has been suggested that Lloyd's Bank v. Rosset2 removed all doubt and conflict produced by earlier authorities as to when and how one could acquire a beneficial interest in the matrimonial home.3 However, the case is leveled with criticism. Lord Bridge distinguishes between two completely different types of cases: First Category - the establishment of a constructive trust
"Criminal Law and morality are inherently connected. It would not be possible to separate the two even if this were thought to be a good idea in principle."
"Criminal Law and morality are inherently connected. It would not be possible to separate the two even if this were thought to be a good idea in principle." Before approaching the argument as to whether or not criminal law and morality are inherently connected, I believe that it is essential for us to understand the two terms clearly. Criminal law is by definition a set of rules, which embody community values of what is wrong and harmful. Ideally it seeks to protect society and individual's rights although it must me said that in a situation wherein there is a clash between the two the former is often given more preference than the latter. Morality is basically a set of principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior. If we assume that a crime is an immoral act one can easily conclude that criminal rules and moral rules are one and the same. But the crucial question that we are posed with is this: Are all crimes immoral? I for one believe that there are some immoral acts, which are not crimes and vice versa. I will discuss this aspect as I proceed with the remainder of my essay. A brief look at the origin of the law or the application of the law in ancient times will makes its inherent connection with morality very evident. In ancient times, morality and religion were synonymous. Both the lawmakers and the laws they dictated were
"In developing the doctrine of supremacy of European law, the European Court of Justice acted in a manner that was not only justified, but moreover indispensable to reach the fundamental objectives the Member States had agreed upon in the Treaty of Rome"
"In developing the doctrine of supremacy of European law, the European Court of Justice acted in a manner that was not only justified, but moreover indispensable to reach the fundamental objectives the Member States had agreed upon in the Treaty of Rome" Do you agree? The European Court of Justice has asserted that "the essential characteristic of Community [law is] its primacy over the law of the Member States"1, and has justified this statement in terms of its obligation to give effect to the intention of the Member States and the objectives of the Treaty2. This paper will use technical and theoretical analysis to determine whether or not the Court was justified in proclaiming its jurisprudence supreme. It will then examine the models of consent-based legitimacy which make the doctrine of supremacy allegedly 'essential' to the objectives of the Treaty, drawing a theoretical analogy to suggest where the doctrine of supremacy will lead us. I Intention, Consent and Reasoning: Was the Court Justified in Creating the Doctrine of Supremacy? Laws created by institutions of the European Community have primacy over the national laws of its member states. This is the doctrine of supremacy. This fundamental doctrine is not written in any of the founding treaties: it was invented by the European Court of Justice in the van Gend en Loos3 case, and has been expanded ever since by
"In general the criminal law prohibits the doing of harm but does not impose criminal liability for an omission to act". Assess the truth of this statement and the arguments used to justify it.
"In general the criminal law prohibits the doing of harm but does not impose criminal liability for an omission to act". Assess the truth of this statement and the arguments used to justify it. An omission can be most easily described as a failure to do something. There is generally no liability in English law for failing to act. For example, there is no legal duty to help someone who is in danger (i.e. somebody who is drowning). Many people often get confused between an act and an omission, so first it must be decided whether you are dealing with an act or an omission. There are three situations where the question "act or omission" arises: continuing acts, supervening faults and euthanasia. An act is usually where the defendant is proven guilty of a crime because they possess all the elements of actus reus and mens rea and an omission is where the a person has failed to do something which generally there is no liability for, but like any rule there are many exceptions so this has lead me to believe that the statement above is false. For example if somebody refuses to provide a breath sample or failed to report an accident, they can then be found liable because a limited number of statutory provisions create liability for omissions in specified circumstances such as the Road Traffic Offences Act 1988. Another exception is where there is a contractual duty to act, there
"In most societies there is a conflict between individual privacy, civil liberties and the need to provide adequate protection for the community" - Discuss.
LEGAL STUDIES ESSAY "In most societies there is a conflict between individual privacy, civil liberties and the need to provide adequate protection for the community". Change is omnipresent, and over time the balance between individual privacy, civil liberties and the need to provide adequate protection for the community may be shifted one way or the other - no delicate balance seems to exist because there is not one which can please an ever-evolving community. Therefore there is a constant battle over the order of importance and moral correctness of each of these items. Law enforcement is one area that attempts to strike a balance. Every step of the way, the police must respect their code to ensure that civil liberties are not imposed upon (to a certain extent) and to ensure that the essential rights of a prisoner are not ignored. They also must provide adequate protection for the community - but with widespread corruption still evident throughout NSW, that's certainly more easier said than done. Perhaps this is because they are horrendously underpaid for what they do; only the government is to blame for that. Law enforcement is not limited to police, however, courts themselves may impose fines and the like to protect the community - as seen with the Sydney hotelier receiving a $20,000 fine after the death of a patron who consumed excessive amounts of alcohol. Individual
"Intention to create legal relations could be used to replace the doctrine of consideration. There is no reason in principle why a gratuitous promise seriously meant should not be enforced."
"Intention to create legal relations could be used to replace the doctrine of consideration. There is no reason in principle why a gratuitous promise seriously meant should not be enforced." Critically evaluate this statement. Before looking at if the intention to create legal relations should be used to replace consideration, it is important to look at how these doctrines fit into the essential elements in a contract. Their use will then be discussed, together with the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In evaluating these principles reference will be made to case law, judicial comment and of leading contract academics work. Finally, thought will be given to the future of consideration, and if it is still necessary today, when so many other countries have adopted alternative approaches to ensuring that contracts are binding. In the formation of contracts two elements are vital. Firstly, the "offer," an indication by one person prepared to contract with another, on certain terms, which are fixed, or capable of being fixed at the time the offer is made.1 Secondly, there must be an "acceptance", an unconditional assent to a definite offer.2 These two combine to create certainty that a contract has been formed, for, as in Scammell v Ouston (1941),3 "if an agreement is uncertain on some important issue...the courts will hold there is no contract."4 Following this, the elements
"Interpretation of Taxing statutes"
Interpretation of Taxing Statutes (Term Paper towards partial fulfillment of the assessment in the subject of Direct Taxation) Submitted by: Submitted to: Abhishek Kodap Mr. Manoj Kumar Singh Roll No.349 Faculty of Law VIIIth Semester National Law University, Jodhpur Winter Session (January - May 2009) ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I take this opportunity to express my gratitude and personal regards to Mr. Manoj Kumar Singh, for making this research possible. His support, guidance and advice throughout the research project are greatly appreciated. I would like to thank my parents, for encouraging throughout my all semesters and for bringing me into such a position to undertake such a term-paper. My batch mates, for encouraging me to work hard and extending their kind support. Also I am thankful to all those people who helped me in preparing this project. Yours Sincerely Abhishek Kodap Table Of Contents s.no. Pg. no Chapter 1 Taxing Statutes: Introduction 4 2 Chapter 2 General Principles of Strict Construction 5 3 Chapter 3 Evasion of Statutes 9 4 Chapter 4 Land mark Cases 1 5 Chapter 5 Judicial trend in India with regard to Interpretation of Taxing Statutes 4 6
"Given the House of Lords' strict interpretation of the doctrine of offer and acceptance in Gibson v Manchester City Council  1 All ER 972, would The Satanita  P 248 be decided the same way today?"
Law of Obligations 1: The Law of Contract Question: "Given the House of Lords' strict interpretation of the doctrine of offer and acceptance in Gibson v Manchester City Council  1 All ER 972, would The Satanita  P 248 be decided the same way today?" 9 January 2007 In order to answer this question, it is essential to outline the basics of the formation of a contract and the doctrine of offer and acceptance. A contract is a legally enforceable agreement between two or more parties. It is formed when one party (the "offeror") makes an offer which is accepted by the other party (the "offeree"). Offer and acceptance are two components of a valid contract which result in a "meeting of the minds".1 Offer is a specific proposal to enter into an agreement with another. Acceptance validates the contract and it must be clear, unequivocal, unconditional and made by the person to whom the offer is intended. It is necessary to differentiate an offer from an invitation to treat. An invitation to treat is simply an indication of a person's willingness to negotiate a contract. In Gibson v Manchester City Council 2 the courts had to decide whether something said, written or done in the negotiation process was actually a contractual offer capable of acceptance or a mere invitation to treat. In November 1970, Manchester City Council (then led by the Conservatives) sent out
"It is becoming increasingly difficult to predict whether in any particular case the courts will or will not adhere to the principle of separate corporate personality as confirmed in SALOMON v SALOMON & CO LTD (1897)."
"It is becoming increasingly difficult to predict whether in any particular case the courts will or will not adhere to the principle of separate corporate personality as confirmed in SALOMON v SALOMON & CO LTD (1897)." The principle of separate corporate personality has been firmly established in the common law since the decision in the case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd1, whereby a corporation has a separate legal personality, rights and obligations totally distinct from those of its shareholders. Legislation and courts nevertheless sometimes "pierce the corporate veil" so as to hold the shareholders personally liable for the liabilities of the corporation. Courts may also "lift the corporate veil", in the conflict of laws in order to determine who actually controls the corporation, and thus to ascertain the corporation's true contacts, and closest and most real connection. Throughout the course of this assignment I will begin by explaining the concept of legal personality and describe the veil of incorporation. I will give examples of when the veil of incorporation can be lifted by the courts and statuary provisions such as s.24 CA 1985 and incorporate the varying views of judges as to when the veil can be lifted. Finally I will state whether or not I agree with the given statement. When a company receives a certificate of incorporation it has a 'separate legal
"It would be regrettable if a court had come to the conclusion that in a situation where the need for intervention of the court had been established that intervention was prevented by rules as to standing." (Woolf LJ in R v A-G ex p ICI 1985)
* "It would be regrettable if a court had come to the conclusion that in a situation where the need for intervention of the court had been established that intervention was prevented by rules as to standing." (Woolf LJ in R v A-G ex p ICI 1985) Are the courts so prevented? Should they be? An inherent difficulty appears in the law's attempts to provide a division between those who deserve to have standing for judicial review of an administrative decision and those who act merely as "busy bodies." Justification is necessary as to why some individuals and groups' applications are deemed acceptable whilst others are not. These decisions are naturally driven by the limitations on the resources of the judiciary, the available time and money should be used as efficiently as possible. Yet, as society broadens its outlook and becomes more cosmopolitan and pluralist, those who wish to question a judgment may become more diverse as may their reasons for the challenge. The UK today comprises more discernable groups of the population than could be recognisable in the past, which suggests that there are also numerous different views on certain contentious topics and that a number of different interests may be affected by a decision taken on a particular issue. As the number of applications for judicial review grows the requirement of standing becomes evermore important to constrain