Although Lawrence had clearly broadened the concept of appropriation by encompassing consensual taking, there followed a series of decisions which incorporated a concept of appropriation which recognised the need for some unauthorised act on the part of the defendant. Alan’s case is quite similar to the case of R v. Skipp, where the single appropriation occurred when he diverted from an authorised route with dishonest intent. This was the defendant’s first unauthorised act and could apply to Alan’s case.
The next issue to look at is ‘intention permanently to deprive’. There is no clear definition for this phrase but a person will be taken as permanently depriving the other of property if he intends to treat the property as his own to dispose and regardless of the real owner’s rights. This obviously applies to Alan’s situation as he intended to take the cigarettes as his own and sell them cheaply to his friends and neighbours. From the information available to us, we are told that later that day, Alan returns home to reload the boxes because he is scared that he will be caught. This would not make any difference to the outcome. So long as Alan intended deprivation earlier, there is no need for actual permanent removal. It would also be difficult for Alan to use the defence in Easom 1971 where he did not make up mind to steal as his intention was clear in earlier statement of ‘intends to sell …’. Thus, Alan would be liable for theft in this case.
Regarding the case where Alan overcharged the customer by three times the value of the goods and kept the profit for himself, we will have to look at the law of ‘obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception’.
In order to establish deception in any case, it is necessary to find the five common elements which are; a person must be deceived, there must be a deception, there must be something obtained as a result of the deception, the deception is practised deliberately or recklessly and there must be dishonesty as a separate element to the deception. Also, deception, could, on occasion, overlap with the offence under s.15 of the 1968 Act.
In this case, the deception was through excessive overcharging the customer and obtaining the profit for himself. This is a way of dishonesty and so, there is no need to apply the Ghosh test, which will be discussed in detail below. Also, we are being told that Alan knew the customer very well and played snooker with him at weekends. This can support the fact that there is mutual trust between them. Thus, referring to Silverman 1987, Alan may have impliedly relying on his mutual trust that the charge was proper and fair. Furthermore, it is obvious that the deception was practised deliberately as Alan had overcharged the customer for three years. Therefore, Alan would be liable for s.16 offence.
As for the case where the shop assistance gave Alan too much change and Alan did not say anything and kept the money, we would have to look ‘belonging to another’ and ‘dishonestly’.
When Alan used a ₤10 note and the assistance, believing she has given a ₤20 note, gave him too much change, it is necessary to look at s.5(4) Theft Act 1968. This section deals with circumstances where a person receives property by mistake in which this case would refer to the extra change given to Alan. In such a case, Alan is under an obligation to restore the property to its rightful owner as he is not the rightful owner. If Alan fails to disclose the mistake and restore the property to the shop assistance, Alan will be classed as intending to deprive the other of it and may be liable for theft. It would be a different matter if Alan genuinely believed that he was entitled to the money or was genuinely unaware of the overpayment. However, this would not be the case as the information stated that “Alan does not say anything and keeps the money”. This indicates that Alan was aware of the mistake, was being dishonest and intended to permanently deprive the other of the extra change.
As for dishonestly, it is not positively defined in the act as the Criminal Law Revision Committee 8th report felt that it was a word that could stand without a definition and which a jury could easily recognise. Glanville Williams considers that ‘honesty’ can mean respect for property rights, refraining from deception and keeping promises. It is these that are important for the law of theft. As Alan’s case do not fall within any of situation in s.2(1), the courts have to look to the common law to decide whether Alan has been dishonest. In order to find out if Alan was dishonest, the court has to find out what Alan’s belief was in relation to the appropriation and then apply the basic test for dishonesty, which is the Ghosh test where Lane LCJ reviewed the history of dishonesty and arrival at a dual test which is to ask the jury to decide upon the following matter:
- was what was done dishonest according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people? If ‘no’, Alan is not guilty. If ‘yes’,
- Did Alan realise that reasonable and honest people regard what he did as dishonest? If ‘yes’, Alan is guilty; if ‘no’, then he is not.
However, it is not always necessary to give the Ghosh direction in every case. This test would only apply if Alan appeared to believe that his actions were not dishonest but there was some doubt about whether he really thought that others would share his view. In this case, it is quite obvious that Alan had acted dishonestly and knew that others would think that he was acting wrongly. So, it would not be necessary to apply the Ghosh test. Alan would be considered dishonest in this case.
Regarding Alan buying the second hand car from a friend’s case, we would have to examine the element of ‘obtaining pecuniary advantage by deception’.
In this case, we will look into ‘obtaining a property by deception’, where Alan buys his friend’s car with a worthless cheque. The deception is through paying his friend a worthless cheque for the car and is one of the most common examples of implied conduct. It is quite obvious to us that the deception Alan practised was intentionally. However, it is very important to realise that, in addition to any deception, it is also necessary to prove a dishonest intent. To decide whether Alan was dishonest, the Ghosh test, mentioned above will be used. With regard to dishonesty in theft, s.2(1) lays down situation where a person is not classed as being dishonest, it is essential to note that there is no corresponding section with regard to obtaining property by deception.
However, although the deception may be the operative, Alan may lack the mens rea of ‘intention of permanently depriving other of it’. This is because instead of treating the property as his own to dispose of, we are told from the information that Alan intended to return the car when he receives the money he is owed. Thus, Alan may not be liable for the s.15 offence in this case as he did not have the intention to permanently deprive the car from his friend from the start.
Lastly, in the case where Alan goes to a local health club to use the facilities, there is a possibility that Alan would be liable for ‘obtaining services by deception’. A ‘service’ is broadly defined in terms of a ‘benefit’ that an individual would be willing to pay for. It is generally logical that in health clubs like in this case, there is an understanding that the service (facilities) has been or will be paid for; as obtaining a free service is not sufficient to this offence. However, due to insufficient information, we are not sure if Alan was in fact, a member of the club and really left his card at home. This is vital because if he is, there is no dishonesty and deception thus; no offence was committed by Alan. However, if Alan was not a member of the club, the mental element for this offence consist of an intention or reckless (in the Cunningham sense) in relation to the deception and dishonesty. Once again, in cases of doubt concerning dishonesty, the Ghosh direction should be given to the jury. Meanwhile, it is important to note that the deception must take place before the obtaining and must be operative in the same way as s.15 of the Theft Act 1968 which was what happened in this case. Therefore, if Alan was telling the truth that he left his membership card at home, he would not be liable for the s.1 Theft Act 1978 offence, in which otherwise, he would.
In conclusion, the law of theft has grown quite complex, mainly because of the uncertainty generated by changing decisions on the interpretation of various words and phrases making up definition of theft in s.1 and the explanation provided in ss.2-6. As for deception, in 1999, the Law Commission published a consultation paper making proposals such as; provisionally rejected single offence of ‘dishonesty’ partly because it is uncertain whether this would be too loosely drafted to satisfy the European Convention on Human Rights, rejected the idea of a general deception offence and proposed that there should be an offence of depriving someone of property, irrespective of whether anyone else obtains it. Reforms are suggested to ensure that liability for obtaining a service by deception can be imposed where a machine is deceived in an effort to keep pace with technological changes and the development of internet. Finally, it proposes to abandon the requirement of a ‘representation’ being made before finding a deception offence. This shows that several reforms such as mentioned should be made to the law of theft and deception in order to make the law more understandable and easier to access in the future.
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R v. Preddy [1996] AC 815; [1996] 3 WLR 255
Section 2 of Theft Act 1968
Section 3 of Theft Act 1968
Section 4 of Theft Act 1968
Section 5 of Theft Act 1968
Section 6 of Theft Act 1968
Section 5(3) Theft Act 1968; Davidge v. Bennett [1984] Crim LR 197; Re Kumar [1999] Crim LR June 2000
Pitham and Hehl [1977] 65 Cr App Rep 45; Halls [1973] QB 126 ; Morris [1984] AC 320; Skipp [1975] Crim LR 114
Morris [1984] AC 320; Anderton v. Burnside [1984]; affirmed in Gomez [1993] AC 442
McHugh (1976) 64 Cr App R 92
Lawrence v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1972] AC 626; [1971] 2 All ER 1253; Gomez [1982] AC 442
Pitham and Hehl [1977] 65 Cr App Rep 45
Lawrence v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1972] AC 626; [1971] 2 All ER 1253
McPherson 1973; Eddy v. Niman 1981
Warner (1970) 55 Cr App Rep 93
Section 6(1) Theft Act 1968
Corcoran v. Anderton (1980) 71 Cr App Rep 104
Velumyl [1989] Crim LR 299
Section 16(1) Theft Act 1968
Section 15(4) Theft Act 1968
Section 15(2) Theft Act 1968
Silverman [1987] Crim LR 574
Section 16(3) Theft Act 1968
Gilks [1972] 3 All ER 280
AG’s Reference (No.1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182
Section 2(1) Theft Act 1968
Price (1989) 90 Cr App Rep 409; Square [1990] Crim LR 343
Section 15(4) Theft Act 1968
Feeny (1991) 94 Cr App Rep 1
Section 6(1) Theft Act 1968
Section 1(2) Theft Act 1978
Shortland [1995] Crim LR 893
Collis-Smith [1971] Crim LR 716
Section 5(1) Theft Act 1978
Legislating the Criminal Code: Fraud and Deception (No 155)