The documents most important aspects are the responses to this idea that they created a ‘myth’. This ‘myth’ was not only damaging to the American President but it was damaging to the global opinion of the American war effort, As some members of the Manhattan project called the “wave of horror and revulsion”. Many countries were suspicious of this new weapon and the motivations behind its use. Stimson quells these fears by stating that the alternatives were “impractical”, however the document first attempts to portray the situation at hand to cement the necessity for finding such alternatives impractical.
Stimson first explains the phenomenon by revealing that the Germans had been working on Atomic fission as early as 1938, and thus it was in the interests of the Americans, that President Roosevelt spare no effort in securing the earliest possible successful atomic weapon. It was in this context that Stimson defends the later year’s focus on finishing such a weapon, although he states the terrible potentials of such a weapon, he concluded “But we were at war, and the work must be done.”
The document also includes the report from June 1 1945 that the Interim Committee submitted to President Truman. This report unanimously suggested “The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.” However perhaps Stimson’s most compelling and straightforward reason to use the bomb was as follows “the principal political, social and military objective of the United States… was the prompt and complete surrender of Japan.” But this did not answer the public outcry, the ends does not always justify the means, and in war there are always alternatives.
The alternatives to the dropping of the atomic bomb eroded the ‘so-called’ success of the bomb and allowed critics to ask; was it really necessary? The surveys and reports during 1946 and the earlier creation of the United Nations revealed devastating costs to Humanitarian and economic aspects of Japanese lives. What was also revealed to the public was the conclusion that the Japanese were close to surrendering in any case. As Alonzo L. Hamby suggests “the Japanese government wanted to surrender, it was only its determined attachment to the emperor.” Furthermore at the Potsdam Conference of July 17 1945 the Americans had considered allowing the emperor to remain post surrender, but instead insisted on unconditional surrender. Although this does not really feature in Stimson’s article it is interesting to note he once wrote to President Truman suggesting its inclusion. But as Stimson claims “I felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the emperor…they must be administered a tremendous shock…proof of our power to destroy the empire.”
Being Secretary of War it is not hard to accept that Stimson’s main focus was the alternative to invade, blockade and air bombard, estimating that this route of action would have been more costly to American and Japanese lives since the Japanese had approximately five million troops waiting, and war would then have to progress into 1946.The Atomic bomb was then a faster, cheaper and safer approach to ending the war.
The idea that the atomic bomb saved lives is a poignant point considering the outcry at the time. Critics however didn’t swallow this, pointing to the relationship with the Soviet Union that at the time was slowly becoming hostile. Today many scholars even suggest that the atomic bomb was really the start of the Cold war. Critics argued that with the Soviet declaration of war on Japan, just after the bombing of Hiroshima, the Japanese would have surrendered anyway. That instead the decision to drop the atomic bomb was based on stopping the Soviet influence in the East and to make Russia more manageable in Europe. Henry contextualizes the decision as one of fastest success and lowest possible casualty rate, but the critics saw it as an opportunity to show off, many reminding the public of the findings of the Franck report.
The Franck report of April 1943 was released by the Committee on the Social and Political Implications of Atomic Energy, chaired by James Franck. It recommended that the bomb not be used for military use. However President Truman never read this document as it was turned away by the Interim Committee, headed by Stimson. Interestingly enough this is not included in “decision to use the Atomic Bomb.”
What Stimson does not write in response to the critics becomes then a great point of interest. Stimson leaves out any reference to the tax payer money spent, which was in the billions. Whether he thought this was irrelevant in the decision it is not clear but it is key to remember that much of the public outcry claimed it was only because so much had been spent that the decision makers felt it necessary to have something to show for it. Obviously there were a multitude of pressures beyond the war effort in making this decision, what Stimson tries to do is remove any doubt that it was none other than a military decision based on the prompt surrender of Japan.
Stimson’s focus on the practical nature of the bomb, while including the analysis of its estimated destruction explains the phenomenon as necessary, effective and difficult, because “war is death.” The document attempts to satisfy the public with this somewhat simplified conclusion. It is important to note however that Stimson himself appears not only to support his decision but also to recognize that it should not be made again. Whether this is an admission to the fact that the decision was a weighty one beyond and above the belligerent aims, or simply a hollow statement that war is bad, it does remind the reader that the decision to drop the atomic bomb did have its bad consequences, along with its good. And in any decision that requires an evaluation of pros and cons there will always be an aspect of anger or disillusionment that the decision makers are responsible for answering.
The “Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb” was a chance for Henry L. Stimson to defend his decision and silence his critics. The article was important because it explained the phenomenon of the end of World War Two as a practical necessity, a necessity that saved lives and won a war, but should not be repeated. With this he gave an authoritative voice, but one of humility, important to a post war public who were tired of the horrors of war.
A. L Hamby, The Decision to drop the Bomb, Journal of American History, vol.84, no.2, September 1997, pp.1-5
A. J Andrea/ J.H Overfield, The Human Record, 4th ed. 2001, vol.2, p.420
J. Franck, ‘Report of the Committee on Social and Political Implications’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.1, no.10 April 1946, p.3
Andrea / Overfield, p.419
Andrea / Overfield, p.420
J.H Bentley/ H.F. Ziegler Traditions and Encounters; A Global Perspective on the Past. Second Ed. 2003, p.1038