Can abortion ever be reasonably thought of as 'self defence'

CMW Williams

Can abortion ever be reasonably thought of as ‘self defence’? If it can, does this justify abortion?

The issue of abortion is widely explored with a myriad of literature available for reference and analysis. This question refers to an area chiefly examined by Jane English; that is the ‘self defence’ aspect of abortion. To satisfy the title-question I must first overcome the main problem with abortion and the area which most philosophers/thinkers/campaigners address, which is the personhood of the foetus. Following this, using English’s paper as a foundation it will be possible to explain, firstly, what is meant by ‘self defence’ and how it can be applied to abortion; and, secondly, that abortion can be justified under specific interpretations of the meaning of ‘self defence’.

Jane English successfully elucidates the lack of importance of personhood of the foetus in justifying or deploring abortion. She explains that no definition or ‘person’, however elaborate, readily satisfies what we think of as a person. And that the question of abortion, for both pro and anti-abortionists, centres around what one calls a ‘person’. English calls ‘person’ a cluster concept; in that one can give a description which is more or less typical of a person. It is this lack of a sharp definition for personhood that renders any argument, pro or anti-abortion, that relies on such a definition dubious.

The first, and most basic, form of self defence is where one’s life is in jeopardy, and the preservation of one’s life requires aborting the baby. This we shall call ‘basic’ self defence. So, if giving birth to the foetus will mean a mother will certainly die, then most reasoned people would call this morally and practically acceptable. Using an example of this in practise helps highlights the obvious acceptance of abortion as self defence in this case. If a policeman has a gun and is stood behind a suicide bomber about to murder an innocent civilian; no-one would question the policeman’s morality in shooting the bomber. If we take the policeman to be the Doctor aborting the child, the baby to be the terrorist, and the mother the innocent civilian we can see that abortion is acceptable. However, there is a stark difference between a foetus that has simply grown and threatens his mother’s life, and a terrorist who is actively seeking to murder a civilian. This distinction is an important one, and it will be addressed in necessary detail later.

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The second form of self defence that requires analysis is again covered by Jane English; and is closely related to ‘basic’ self defence in that it addresses any disproportional actions when defending oneself. English best describes it as inflicting ‘somewhat but not enormously greater’ harm on your attacker than he/she would if his/her attack was successful. This type of self defence will be known as ‘proportionate’ self defence; and it is with this that the waters of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ regarding abortion become murky. The law states that so long as an action in self defence is proportionate to the one that would have been inflicted it is lawful. English seems to take this point and run (too far) with it. Using law and subjective individual case decisions as support for the proportionate self defence claim for abortion lacks thorough thought. For an action of self defence to be deemed proportionate one must be taken through the courts, and then acquitted of whatever potential crime their self defence warranted. This means that a ‘proportionate’ self defence argument for abortion cannot be a general one and each case must be assessed separately.

This argument is taken further to highlight the third and final case one can give for self defence. That is defining self defence as defending one’s ‘life prospects – we shall call it ‘prospect’ self defence. All ‘prospect’ self defence does is take ‘proportionate’ self defence and use it in a different context. So, instead of someone defending themselves from a physical attack; ‘prospect’ self defence is one defending one’s life, and life prospects. There are two excellent analogies that help apply this form of self defence to abortion.

The first is ‘the violinist’; but which we will call ‘the footballer’. Suppose one day you wake up with a Frank Lampard attached to your body in such a way that he has use of your vital organs, and if removed (in the next nine months) will die. Neither he, nor you, had any say in this procedure but the Chelsea FC fan base believe, unwaveringly, that you should allow him to stay attached for the nine month period. This example clearly shows the dilemma pregnant women are in an unwanted pregnancy. Even if they are prepared to give the baby up for adoption the nine months the foetus is inside the woman it is taking over her body and ruining her life prospects for those nine months and probably beyond: This is due to having to take time off work, possibly missing out on a promotion because of this. This comes under societal issues to do with abortion, which will be covered shortly.

So, this example proclaims to show that we would be justified in killing Frank Lampard, and thus the unborn foetus. But why? There is no moral law set in stone allowing us to kill Frank Lampard, so why should there be of the unborn foetus? This example is highly unlikely and contrived that there are no laws on it and thus the ‘morally just’ outcome is unclear. However, the main problem with this example is thus: A baby has no way of defending itself, it has no say in whether or not it is aborted. Frank Lampard does have a say. In lieu with our new ‘self defence’ theory Lampard would be justified in using ‘proportional’ self defence to make me incapable of detaching myself from him and thus killing him. Frank Lampard could remove all my arms and legs to stop me from detaching myself and thus defending himself. The foetus does not have this option.

The pivotal point one must acknowledge is that the issue of self defence hinges on the nature of the society. Put simply, if the society one lives in is a society that interprets ‘proportional’ self defence in very liberal manner, then abortion may be considered far more readily than in another society.

Society also has a bearing on the ‘life prospect’ aspect of self defence in abortion. If society is liberal and allows mothers time off for children and does not discriminate because of this (e.g. being refused a promotion because of time off work to give birth etc.). Societal features are a key factor in determining the legitimacy of abortion as self defence.

Legitimising abortion as ‘self defence’ is a strong argument. There are three main areas that have been observed: Basic, proportional and prospect self defence. As was explained, there are few arguments against justifying abortion on the grounds of ‘basic’ defence; but the questionability of abortion’s justifiability is progressive through ‘proportionate’ and ‘prospect’ self defence. So there is an argument for having abortions based on self defence, but, in most cases it is not as clear cut as ‘basic’ self defence. Proportionate and prospect self defence are so intricate and based on a number of variables such as the woman’s choice to have the baby (was she raped) the social environment the woman lives in, how much her life prospects would change; that they cannot be considered general enough to provide a sufficient valid reason for adoption. Jane English does away with the requirement for a definition of personhood (the traditional and standard abortion discussion) and move it onto an argument that is just as unsatisfying in that one cannot provide a reasoned justification for or against abortion on the grounds of self defence (barring the extreme and rare cases of ‘basic’ self defence).

Bibliography

Jennifer Mather Saul, Feminism, Issues and Arguments, New York (2003)
Jane English, Abortion: Beyond the personhood argument in L.P. Pojman and F.J. Beckwith, The abortion controversy: 25 years after Roe v Wad,. Belmont
Judith Thomson, A defense of abortion, Philosophy and public affairs 1 (1971)
Alison Jaggar, Abortion and a woman’s right to decide, Philosophical Forum 5 (1973)