The Environment Agency has wild ranges of responsibilities for waste management function. Such as: licensing waste management facilities, including supervision of waste management activities and taking actions against any breaches by polluters; the registration of activities which are exempt from the waste management licensing systems; the registration and regulation of waste carriers and brokers; the administration of the surrender of waste management site and the enforcement of the duty of care under the section 34 of the Environment Protection Act (EPA) 1990.
Under the Part 1 of the Environment Protection Act 1990, the environmental agency has a duties for the control of any substances into the environment or into the air which from industrial process. Also, under the Environment At 1995, there are number of news functions which the environment agency are responsible for; under the provisions in Part IIA of the EPA 1990 concerning the regulation of historically contaminated land, the agency has specific duties relate to sites of special interest; under section 93 and 94 of the Environment Act 1995, the agency has duties for the administration and regulation of the producer responsibility; also, carrying out of research and providing information on the environment to the public and being statutory consultees in relation to the National Air Quality and the National Waste Strategy.
"We are the leading public body for protecting and improving the environment in England and Wales. It's our job to make sure that air, land and water are looked after by everyone in today's society, so that tomorrow's generations inherit a cleaner, healthier world." The Chairman of the agency explains its goals to sustainable development.
Section 4 of the Environment Act 1995 states that ‘the principal aim of the agency, in discharging its functions so to protect or enhance the environment, taken as a whole, as to contribute towards attaining the objective of sustainable development.’ By this two explanation on what it’s the goal of the agency, it can be seen as a duties to protect our environment for the future generations. But the doubts are still remaining: Are the Environment Agency work in an effective way to protect our environment? Why there are so many harmful environment incidents occur in a year, but the successful prosecution rates are still remains low? As mentioned in the introduction, the agency have been critics its performance to protect the environment. In the next section of the essay will be evaluated the work of the Environment Agency and the criticisms along with.
A study from Bell, D and Gray, T (2002) examined four aspects of criticisms of the agency’s performance which made by the House of Commons Select Committee: lack of a coherent vision, low public profile, failure as a regulator and lack of accountability.
The Select Committee’s first criticism of the agency’s management was that it is lack of an integrated vision. As only two per cent of the agency’s employees agreed that had a ‘clear vision and direction. As one of the agency’ employee responded that the internal communications are ‘pathetic’. ‘Too many managers spend too much time jostling for power and feathering their nest and non-productive meetings.’ Bell and Gray suggested that because the agency’ employees are mainly from pre-existing department: HMIP, NRA and other 83 Waste Regulation Authorities. They had different regulatory styles, worked within different scientific traditions. As these people work together, it will create conflict and competition within the agency.
The other area of criticism is more focus on the agency regulatory role. From industry the main criticism was that the agency was inefficient: slow, inconsistent, expensive and opaque. Bell and Gray (2002) suggest that this failure was caused by poor and inappropriate management systems and inadequate legislation.
There are many criticisms about the fairness of the agency when it comes to enforcement. In 1990 -2000, there are 342 prosecutions in waste management and 22 prosecutions in IPC sector. The annual prosecution rate suggested that with waste management companies facing an apparently higher risk of prosecution than IPC operators.
A study from De Prez (2001) argued that the environment agency has two different approaches to enforcement in waste management and IPC in particular which best highlight the notion of ‘bottom heavy’ enforcement. She identified three explanations of ‘bottom heavy’ enforcement. These are Regulatory capture, optimal regulation and goal displacement. She argued that the regulators and the regulator share a ‘cosy relationship and the goals of the regulator become assimilated to those of the regulated. She claimed that it is a direct result of recruitment practice, as section 16 of EPA 1990 requires that IPC inspectors must have suitable qualifications. Therefore, most of the applicants are likely worked in the industry before. Also the level of trust invested in IPC sector is further evidenced by self-monitoring arrangement. This means the agency is heavily reliant on the operator for information concerning its own violations. Fineman suggested that IPC inspectors ware keenest to present themselves as expert partners with industry. While building relationship was regard as the key to effective regulations.
Another explanation is that optimal regulation which suggest that voluntary compliance are more effective with large operators then small one. As wealthier companies are more susceptible to persuasion to protect the environment, on the other hand, the local skip firm does not have the resources to be persuaded to improve practice. De Prez also suggested that due to absence of clear goals, the agency tend to concentrate on performance indicators. As an officer commented: ‘The emphasis in our work ethic appears to have moved away fro quality towards being driven solely by quantity.
Waton 2003, discussed about the low fines for environmental offences are due to a reluctance of the agency to commence prosecutions. Officers feel uncomfortable with enforcement and prosecution, they have been discouraged from taking legal action by low fines and unpredictable sentencing. As 62 per cent of environmental health officers said that the fines imposed by the count are low or very low. But in 1996-97, there were 4668 successful prosecutions for fisheries offences. Fishing without a licence is a serious offence which always leads to prosecution, as most of the environmental crimes are strict liability. This can cause the agency to concentre on prosecution of soft target, such as fishing without a licence.
In 1970, an American government-funded environment agency had established: the Environment Protection Agency (EPA). The mission of EPA is to protect human health and to safeguard of the natural environment – air, water and land – upon which life depends. EPA has developed ten goals in its strategic plan. These include: clean Air, clean and safe water, safe food, preventing pollution and reducing risk communities, better waste management, reduction of global and cross-border environmental risks, quality environment information, sound science, a credible deteent to pollution and greater compliance with the law and effective management.
Under each goal, the EPA has produced numbers of missions to achieve each goals. Also sub-missions can be found, which states the targets for the forming year.
In 2004, the president of United States will budget around $1,202 millions in total for the EPA to implement their goals. Compared with the Environment Agency in England and Wales, their resources are mainly by self-funded (for example, selling fishing licence) and partly from the government. There are dynamic problems to balance the revenue, as the average cost per offence is £962 in 2001/02. This can lead to expand why the ‘bottom heavy’ approach is existing.
The EPA has taken a pro-active approach to work with other public bodies, industries and public. They established the on-going relationship with the industries and the public through the Compliance Assistance Centre. It provided assistance directly to the regulated community and provides information on the agency’s progress to citizens and the regulated community.
The EPA also offers incentive to encourage industries to assess their overall compliance with the environment requirement and voluntarily correct and report compliance problems. These incentives included: reduced penalties for violations, extended time for correction, and potentially fewer or less frequent inspections.
For small business, the EPA has produced the Small Business Compliance Policy to encourage greater participation by small business. Through the Compliance assistance Centre, the EPA develop a set of tools which small business can use to understand applicable requirement and take advantages of the flexibility offered by the policy.
But in England and Wales, the Environment Agency has not taken a direct approach to building relationship with most of the business. Such relationship might exist in IPC sector. The partnership activities such as, compliance assistance centre and compliance incentives, are one of the method can encourage business either small or multinational to particulate in environment protection.
Another different appeared is that the EPA created the Office of Environmental Justice in 1992, and implemented a new organizational infrastructure to integrate environmental justice into EPA' policies, programs, and activities.
Environmental Justice is ‘the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, colour, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies’.
This establishment can ensure: public contribution can influence the regulatory agency's decision; the concerns of all participants involved will be considered in the decision making process; and the decision makers seek out and facilitate the involvement of those potentially affected.
Bell, S & McGillivray, D, Environmental Law 5th edition, pp.163-164
Sir John Harman, the Chairman of the Environment Agency, quoted from http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/aboutus/?lang=_e
Bell, D and Gray, T 2002 ‘The ambiguous role of the Environment Agency In England and Wales’
ENDS 282, July 1998, Regulators back criticisms of Environment Agency pp.14-15
Paula de Prez, 2001‘Biased Enforcement or Optimal Regulation? Reflections on Recent Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Environment Agency’
ENDS 282, July 1998, Regulators back criticisms of Environment Agency pp.14-15
Watson 2003, Low Fines for Environmental Offences? Blame the Regulators Not the Courts.
EPA 2004 budget http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/budget/2004/2004bib.pdf
Watson 2003, Low Fines for Environmental Offences? Blame the Regulators Not the Courts.
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/index.html