Although it was Delors himself who gave the initial impetus to the idea of a "Federation of Nation-States" in the current debate when he resurrected the idea in an article to Le Monde early last year, it was Germany's Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, speaking at Humboldt University in Berlin on May 12th 2000 who popularised it. Subsequently, Fischer beat an orderly retreat from his initial high federalist ideals leaving everyone bewildered and inquisitive as to why he started it all in the first place. At Humboldt Fischer called for the EU to make the transition from a Union of States to a European Federation based on a European Parliament exercising legislative powers and a European Government with real Executive powers. He added that the Federation will have to be based on a constituent treaty. He also cautioned that such a project could only be launched successfully if "European integration takes the nation-states along with it into such a federation, only if their institutions are not devalued or even made to disappear." He argued further that "the completion of European integration can only be successfully conceived if it is done on the basis of the division of sovereignty between Europe and the nation-state." Fischer emphasised that Europe must always represent two things: a Europe of nation-states and a Europe of the citizens. He concludes that aim of sharing of sovereignty can be achieved primarily by better defining subsidiarity and following this up by enshrining it in a European Constitution.
In Mr Fischer's own words, subsidiarity entails "a clear definition of the competencies of the Union and the nation-states respectively in a European constituent treaty, with core sovereignties and matters which absolutely have to be regulated at European level being the domain of the Federation, whereas everything else would remain the responsibility of the nation-states." Such a task, if and when completed, would satisfy the fundamental requirements of a federation. The urgent need of clearly defining the powers of the EU and the Member-States recurs time and again in most positions published so far and the proposal seems to enjoy broad support as one of the major tasks facing a future IGC. However, we must never for a moment underestimate the delicacy of the task given for example that many competencies in the EU are shared ones. Besides, can the task be achieved with the neatness that many wish?
Incidentally, in his Humboldt speech Fischer also espoused a core or avant-garde Europe approach, whereby the "Federation of Nation-States" with its own President, Government and Parliament will be formed by a core group of member states wishing to intensify integration among themselves without having to wait for the others. The latter aspect of his proposal was opposed by a majority of the Member States because it smacks of a centralising federalism, logically a step from confederalism into federalism. Boiling down Fischer's proposal to its bare essentials, a four-tier European polity emerges made up of:
* Regional and local authorities and their various sub-tiers
* The nation-states with their governments, parliaments and legal systems
* The Federation of nation-states made up of a core group of member states
* The enlarged European Union retaining its Council, Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice.
Without any doubt, in making his proposal Fischer was also responding to internal pressures. For example in the early stages of IGC-2000, the German Lander pressed very hard for the strict delimitation in the treaties of regional, national and EU competencies.
Subsequent reactions to Mr Fischer's opening salvo throws some light on attitudes in other member states, some of which are surveyed below. France's Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, wrote to Fischer on June 8th, 2000 promptly rejecting any idea of a core Europe, mildly rebuking Fischer for initiating in such a forceful manner a big debate on the future of Europe just one and a half months before the start of the French presidency (though of course Védrine praises Fischer for his timely move) while providing a number of reasons why such an initiative had not been taken up by France. We must not overlook the fact that the strongest pressure faced by France at that point was to bring the IGC to a successful conclusion. The most important passage in Védrine's letter, which is of great relevance in the post-Nice context is the following:
"As we were able to note in the statements of a number of French commentators and politicians, not only does the idea of "federation" no longer frighten people, but its even quite appealing…Many reservations or hostile arguments seem out of date at the time of globalisation…Yet this state of mind and diffuse sympathy do not justify support from the key political leaders of a country for such a radical upheavel without very careful consideration. All the more so as the federal system suggested by various people differ on key aspects. It seems to me therefore that the best way of proceeding at this stage would be to avoid theoretical controversy about the various meanings of the word "federalism", to formulate the precise questions that come to mind in order to define better the points that need to be clarified…"
Notwithstanding that Védrine stated that he did not want to engage in discussion on the meaning of "federalism", he did however pose Mr Fischer a number of rhetorical questions, by which he made it clear that despite the emphasis that the latter had made on the continuing role of the nation-state, the federalism he was espousing would actually lead to the disappearance of the main institutions of the nation-state. Védrine emphasised that it is not enough to affirm that one needs to reconcile the creation of federation with the preservation of the nation-state. It is more important according to him to define subsidiarity more closely by delineating what should continue to be managed at the national level and what should be managed at the European level.
The German position was clarified further in a document which has been prepared for the National Conference of the Social Democratic Party which will meet in Nuremberg in November 2001. Again the main emphasis is on the need of clarifying in detail how subsidiarity and proportionality are to operate in the EU. The document calls for a detailed catalogue of tasks and responsibilities that should be assigned to the Member States and to the EU institutions. It emphasises the need of strengthening the EU institutions to help them better deal with the tasks assigned to them. The process of Europeanisation of decision-making, in other words the transfer of powers from the national to the European level has to be approached more cautiously in order not to undermine Member States' jurisdiction. Finally, the proposal calls for the "renationalisation" or repatriation of certain powers that have already been transferred to the European level, if it is felt that these can be more suitably performed at Member State level. Provided of course that such a "renationalisation" does not impinge negatively on the single market and other major polices. In May 2001, the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroder threw in his weight behind these proposals while the German Christian Democrats (CDU) declared their support for this line. In the meantime, Minister Fischer's own initial proposals on Europe have undergone a metamorphosis following the criticism levelled against them: he was reported to have spoken of Europe being transformed into a "lean federation of states", thus indicating a retreat from his initial 'hard' federalist proposal.
Equally important to a thorough appreciation of the 'German' position is the plea for a European Constitution made to the European Parliament in April 2001 by the President of Germany, Johannes Rau and the public stands taken by the German Landers. Rau proposed a three-part European Constitution composed of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a section articulating the division of competencies between the Member States and the EU, and finally the EU's institutional framework. He stressed that this would be essential for the realisation of a "Federation of Nation-States" and should not be misconstrued as a first step towards the creation of a European State. When it comes to the position of the German Landers, full justice cannot be done to it in this presentation but this was epitomised by Wolfgang Clement, President of North Rhine-Westphalia last February, who laid special emphasis on the need of countering centralisation tendencies in the EU and of "finding a practical model for allocating powers, a model which creates legal certainty and which is capable of being further developed." The German Landers are convinced that Germany's participation in the EU has eroded their autonomy and they are keen in repatriating some of this lost power through a better definition of competencies in a future EU Constitution/Treaty. The so-called constitutional regions of the EU are broadly supportive of this approach. They would like to acquire a stronger role in the European decision-making process and have laid special emphasis on the need of placing the discussion of the principle of subsidiarity at the heart of the debate. The regions of Europe are not content to stop at the level of a "Federation of Nation-States". They would like competencies to be defined down to the regional level. However, the role of the regions at European level, even of the constitutional ones that boast of their own parliament, must be left in the hands of each Member State to decide. Otherwise the EU risks being turned into a tool for dismantling states and creating new ones.
Meanwhile the initial French position submitted in reaction to Fischer's proposal has also been clarified further. In June 2000, while addressing the German Bundestag French President Jacques Chirac emphasised that the nation-state was the basis of EU and "For the peoples who come after us, the nations will remain the first reference points" and that it would even be absurd to envisage their extinction. Chirac called for a greater effort to improve the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the institutions before trying to invent new ones. This would entail a stronger involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs. He appealed for the further clarification of the meaning of subsidiarity which has to be based on a clear delineation of competencies between Member States and the European institutions. Finally, Chirac favoured the clarification of the legal standing of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
A more detailed French position was put forward by Premier, Lionel Jospin, broadly speaking reinforcing Chirac's contribution. Jospin rejected the German and the United States federal models, symbolising for him a strong federal executive exercising powers over the member states. He squarely rejected any idea of a European executive responsible to a European Parliament. Instead he upheld the concept of a "Federation of Nation-States" as originally proposed by Delors, adding that this was politically sound because "…Europe is an original political structure, a unique precipitate of an indissoluble mixture of two different elements: the federalist ideal and the reality of the European Nation-State." Once again, Jospin referred to the need of clarifying the respective competencies of the Union and the Member States in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, if indeed Europe wants to achieve the objective of a "Federation of Nation-States".
The UK's position on the "Future of Europe" is another 'site under construction' given that the formal debate has only recently been initiated at the national level. Probably the most important characteristic of the UK approach is its pragmatism. Moreover, for the first time in many years Britain has joined the debate in a manner that has not upset its fellow EU Member States. Contrary to their European counterparts, UK spokesmen studiously avoid such concepts as a "Federation of Nation-States" and "federation". Thus, despite the policy shift towards Europe that has occurred under Tony Blair, British public statements on the future of the EU show both unmistakable strands of continuation with past policies (aiming for the home audience), though they are more attractively packaged, as well as refreshing departures from them that dove-tail neatly with the rest of the European debate. The most substantive contribution to the debate so far was made by the Mr Blair himself in a speech to the Warsaw Stock Exchange on October 6th, 2000. Mr Blair identified three important processes in Europe that contradict the allegation that European unification is slowing down and that as a consequence the federalisation of the EU must be intensified: monetary union, the European defence policy and enlargement. He rejected an EU based on a free trade area similar to the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) while at the same time he was critical of the classical federalist approach. In a typically British pragmatic manner he argued that there are basically four different competencies which devolved on the different decision-making actors in the EU: "(1) In a Europe with a single market and single currency there will inevitably be a need for closer economic co-ordination. (2) In negotiations over world trade and global finance, Europe is stronger if it speaks with one voice; (3) In areas like the environment and organised crime, in policing our borders, Europe needs to work together. (4) In foreign and security policy, though nations will guard jealously their own national interests, there are times when it will be of clear benefit to all that Europe acts and speaks together." Emphasising that Europe is a Europe of free, independent sovereign states, Mr Blair argued that the pooling of sovereignty had helped the member states achieve more than they would have achieved on their own, acting independently. He added that the "EU will remain a unique combination of the intergovernmental and the supranational." Blair concluded that the decision-making institutions of the EU should be improved by making better use of the existing legal framework with as few changes as possible (save for example for introducing a second chamber) and that the competencies of the institutions should remain unchanged as outlined here:
*The European Council should set the agenda of the Union
*The Commission President will continue to share in the Council's work and in drawing up the agenda, while the Commission should continue with its role of acting as the guardian of the treaties
* A charter of competencies should be established (subsidiarity). However sub-national levels of decision-making should be determined at the individual nation-state level
* A second chamber to the European Parliament composed of Representatives of the national parliaments should be established
* Stringently "bounded" flexibility that prevents the member states participating in such schemes from forming a "core Europe"
Other UK contributions to the debate on the Future of Europe have been made by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in a lecture delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and by Peter Hain, Minister for Europe. Foreign Secretary Straw used the familiar metaphor to describe Europe as a "Union of Nation-States", thus probably leaning more towards the confederal than the federal model of political organisation. Again he emphasised the age-old British preoccupation with policy outcomes (jobs, safe food, security of the individual etc.) rather than institutional structures and debates. Minister Hain spoke of the need to use a popular language instead of what he called "Eurobabble" if people are to understand what is happening in the EU and support it. Hain made a number of other interesting proposals: a better definition of competencies, harmonisation must not be pursued for its own sake, the need to involve national parliaments in the EU decision-making and finally the dangers of introspection or Europe closing in on itself.
The positions of Germany, France and the UK on the future of Europe are the most detailed so far. The Italian position is the least articulated. This can be explained by the fact that the new Government of Silvio Berlusconi, which took office a few months ago, has not had sufficient time to publicly elaborate a more comprehensive position. The new government has however stated quite clearly that it favours a continuation of the previous governments' European policy. Berlusconi has described his government as a "convinced and intrinsically Europeanist". How this will translate in practice we will certainly know over the next few months. However, given these undertakings, it is not prudent to envisage a major policy shift from previous policies.
The Spanish Prime Minister, José María Aznar, made an initial statement on the future of Europe in Brussels on the 9th of October. He proposed the following points for discussion: a reform of the Community budget; the gradual constitutionalisation of the Treaties including granting legal status to the Charter of Fundamental Rights; improvement of democratic legitimacy including a "Charter of National Parliaments" that articulates how the national parliaments are to be involved in decision-making at the Community level; a system for the distribution of powers between the EU and the member states that must not be rigid. With respect to the latter point, Aznar pointed out that "the boundaries between the different powers assigned to the Community institutions are increasingly tenuous and difficult to identify." For Aznar, one of the most crucial points is "how the Union and its Member States co-ordinate among themselves in order to ensure the effective implementation and management of Community policies. The Exercise of the EU powers can be improved within the current framework of the Union treaties. Therefore, any new formula for the exercise of powers should respect the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and sufficiency of means."
The Position of the Smaller States
In assessing the position that has been taken so far by the smaller EU member states, I propose to describe each very concisely.
Ireland: the Irish participation in the Future of Europe Debate has been stymied by the negative result of the referendum on the Nice Treaty. In June, Taoiseach Bertie Ahern speaking to the Irish Dail emphasised a number of points:
The internal balance between large and small states in the EU institutions should not be touched;
The traditional balance between the institutions has worked and does not need to be changed;
The nation-state must remain the building block of the Union.
In as much as Mr Ahern's approach is influenced by the national mood, which it doubtlessly is, Ireland after the debacle of the Nice referendum appears less disposed to a root-and-branch overhaul of the EU institutional structure. The Taoiseach emphasised that the debate on Europe's future must be more on substance than on abstract institutional questions. What is it prepared to settle for? Perhaps to use Attorney General Michael McDowell's phrase, a "Partnership of Member States".
Denmark: In a white paper published last August, the Danish government positioned itself thus: "We do not want to promote the idea of a United States of Europe. But we believe in a Europe built on nation-states, providing a unique mixture of intergovernmental co-operation when that is more practical and integration when that is necessary." The paper calls for " a clearer picture of which tasks will be dealt with jointly in European co-operation on the one hand and which tasks will remain national tasks on the other hand." The Danish authorities appear perturbed by 'world disorder' that can in their eyes only be stabilised through international regulation as well as by international solidarity and respect for human rights. The starting point to achieve this is the EU. Small states which stand to gain most from achieving global order depend more than larger ones on effective European economical and political co-operation. At the level of the EU itself, Denmark proposes closer co-operation with the national parliaments. It favours a Union based on 'binding co-operation' and commitment, (rule-based Union) as opposed to a loser one which would inevitably be dominated by the larger states. It is rules that enable small states to exercise influence. Neither does Denmark want a 'federal' union nor a mere intergovernmental organisation. Danish Foreign Affairs Minister, Mogens Lykketoft said that Denmark subscribes to Jospin's notion of a "Federation of Nation-States" which they (the Danes) prefer to call "A binding Community of nation-states".
Benelux Countries: The Benelux countries have co-ordinated their initial contribution to the Debate on the Future of Europe in a joint memorandum issued last June emphasising the need of a European Constitutional treaty and a better description of the competencies of the Union and of the member states. The document steers clear of any reference to federalism and calls for a strengthening of the 'Community method'. A series of other improvements to enable the institutions to function better are proposed such as the direct election of the President of the Commission, strengthening the Commission's role, rationalising the Council's work, increasing the scope of qualified majority voting hand-in-hand with the expansion and deepening of the co-decision procedure. In a white paper, the Dutch government has proposed simplifying the treaties into a simple constitutional document and for a "pragmatic and transparent distribution of responsibilities and powers, based on the subsidiarity principle, between the EU on the one hand and its member states on the other. General subsidiarity guidelines must be drawn up for this purpose. They must also be useable in future circumstances and must not stand in the way of critical reassessments of existing policy." The white paper proposes that such general guidelines must be flexible allowing for a reassessment of policies. The delimitation of powers (EU/member states) should be formulated on meaningful criteria to help assess at what level powers should be vested. A repatriation of some policy controls may be necessary if it is found that power has been transferred to the wrong level. The Netherlands also favours a stronger involvement of national parliaments. The Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel while addressing the European Parliament last July said that the debate on the delimitation of powers between the EU and member states must not be sidelined and that the priority is to establish prerogatives in the majority of cases where authority is shared. He added: "The approach must be a pragmatic one; we are not drafting a catalogue of rules but are instead clarifying, wherever possible, who does what."
Luxembourg has stated that the debate on the institutions must not be an end in itself and that the Union must seek to go beyond the dispute between "small" and "large" states that characterised the last Inter-governmental conference. In a reaction to the proposals made by Jospin in May, Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker said that he shared the French Premier's call for the creation of a "Federation of nation-states" The nation-state is not a temporary invention of history, claims Juncker. On the other hand as he put it a few days before in Brussels, Europe draws its strength from its member states which each on their own would be incapable of confronting the challenges they face. At the same time the European Union is essential for taming the forces of nationalism that can lead to competition and precipitate war in Europe.
Greece: The speech made by Prime Minister Simitis at a Conference organised by the Hellenic Centre for European Studies, EKEM, last July is probably the most representative of the Greek position. The Greek Prime Minister listed seven issues that must be safeguarded or achieved in the next IGC:
The Union's redistributive policies must be maintained to achieve real convergence. Greece opposes re-nationalisation of policies if this weakens these policies
The European social model must be brought up to date and re-inforced;
Reinforcement of co-ordination of macroeconomic management - monetary union must be strengthened by economic union;
Harmonisation of taxation policy;
Adequate, stable and predictable financial resources for the EU;
Confronting the daily problems faced by European citizens such as food safety, environment, asylum and migration and the fight against organised crime;
In the international system the EU can help in the creation of polycentric global system by strengthening a common foreign policy and a common defence;
The EU is a political community based on democratic values whose epicentre is the human being. The Charter of Fundamental Rights affirms the identity and political culture of the EU.
Simitis favoured a 'flexible' EU based on differentiate integration and a more closely integrated Europe a "federal model based on the community system and the community method of integration." Such a union safeguards the role of states in the EU whose relevance is additionally underpinned by the application of the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and the respect for the community model. Simitis opposed the idea of a 'catalogue of competencies' to define the powers of the member states and the EU.
Portugal: In my opinion and unless I am missing the subtler nuances, the Portuguese position is one that favours the classical federal approach. Both in an address at Humboldt University and during a speech to the Portuguese Parliament (the Republican Assembly), Prime Minister Atónio Guterres cautioned against what he described as a 'fraudulent federalism' that creates a European federal structure which however is an empty shell. To prevent this Europe's federal structure must be based on strengthened institutions. The EU today has both federal and confederal elements and a deliberate show of faith must be made in federalism. He argued that such a federalism can be achieved through for example a strengthened role for the European Parliament on bicameral lines, with a house of citizens and a house of states. Similarly to his Greek socialist counterpart, Mr Guterres also outlined seven principles for future EU reform (most popular Biblical numeral):
The Human Rights Charter must be given legal and binding status;
The European Commission must be strengthened;
The three existing pillars must be merged;
Strengthening of the open co-ordination method begun in Lisbon;
A stronger role for the European Council - strong leadership and political initiative
Enhancement of the powers of the European Parliament must be accompanied by an increase in the powers of the national parliaments to act at the European level; he supports the idea of a Congress meeting regularly and bringing together various institutions and the national parliaments;
Support for a flexible approach to European integration so long as Portugal is always involved in all future co-operative activities;
By suggesting the merger of the three pillars into the Community one, the Portuguese approach appears to be in the trend of 'classical federalism', though it also supports the idea of strengthening the powers of the Council and the role of national parliaments. At the same time great stress is made on strengthening the role of the European Parliament by turning it into a bicameral institution that will naturally compete for space with the national parliaments. Of the proposals reviewed in this presentation, this is the one that appears to imply a weakening of the role of the nation-state in Europe, despite its many caveats to the contrary.
Austria: The Austrian position has been mostly articulated by Foreign Minister Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner who last September identified four main questions that must be addressed by the next IGC:
What values does Europe stand for?
Which issues that are important to its citizens does the EU want to address?
What decisions lie within the EU competencies and within those of the member states?
How can the level of democracy, transparency and efficiency within the Union's institutions be increased?
Ferror-Waldner spoke in favour of defining more clearly the powers and responsibilities of the EU and the member states. She did not view the re-nationalisation or repatriation of policies as being feasible. The Commission's regulatory powers must be kept in check. The Council is perceived by many people as the best guarantor for safeguarding national identities. However, its reorganisation along parliamentary lines is impossible, though some of its legislative debates could be open to the public. A repeated theme in Ferror-Waldner's contributions has been that 'more Europe' may be essential in key areas that can only be tackled successfully at the European level such as in the case of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). She has also favoured a gradualist approach to the further development of the EU decision-making process particularly on the issue of the division of competencies between the EU and the member states: "A completely new distribution of roles between the bodies is unrealistic." Ferrero-Waldner has also made interesting contributions to the small-large state problematique in the process of European integration.
Sweden: The position taken by Sweden's Prime Minister Göran Perssons on the four main issues before the next IGC reflect very much the position taken by the Swedish Parliament and its main thrusts can be summed up as follows:
The wording of the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not sufficiently precise for incorporating it in the Treaty as it is. Any incorporation must not lead to the undermining of the European Convention on Human Rights. The EU should rather accede to that Convention;
Simplification of the Treaties on which the EU is founded cannot occur without endangering their substance, given that they are the fruit of a number of compromises. The Treaties themselves can already be seen as a European Constitution. It would be advantageous if we could concentrate the core rules, competencies and procedures in a single document.
The division of competencies between the EU and the member states is crucial and this must be based on the principle of subsidiarity. However, this should not be achieved at the expense of dismantling what the EU has already achieved. It must not lead to an inflexible Union that cannot take on changes;
National Parliaments can best influence EU policies by closely scrutinising the work of their national governments in the EU Council.
One of the expressions used by the Prime Minister and other members of the Swedish Cabinet is that Member States must not seek to build the Union from scratch every time they face new challenges. The Swedish approach is a call to making the EU function better in many areas. The contributions made by Foreign Minister Anna Lindh on the semantics of the debate such as the different images evoked by terms such as 'federalism' (centralisation or decentralisation) and the apparent or artificial division between what is "European" and what is "national" (both national and European parliamentarians derive their mandates from the people) provide a unique approach to the issues being debated.
The Swedish Parliament has before it a Report by the Joint Committee on the Constitution and Foreign Affairs (2000/01:KUU1). The position of this Committee on the main issues facing the next IGC are briefly the following: the wording of the treaties is to be simple and comprehensible to ordinary citizens but bearing in mind that "the origins of the treaties have been characterised by a politically motivated need for compromise". The Committee laid special emphasis on the need to simplify secondary legislation.
The effort to simplify the treaties should also clarify as far as possible the delimitation of competencies at various levels. However, the delimitation of competencies at the national level must be left completely in the hands of the member states as this affects their individual form of governance. Hence, subsidiarity must be clarified but it must not be strictly defined as otherwise it may rob the EU decision-making process from the pragmatism it currently enjoys.
On the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Swedish Parliamentary Committee favours an EU Declaration of Rights. However, it stands four-square with the proposal that the founding treaties must be amended to enable the EU to accede to the European Convention, something that it claims has found the support of the Commission, the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The Swedish Parliament cautions about the probability of ambivalence and divergent praxis between the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and the Court of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg if the Charter of Fundamental Rights is given legal standing in the EU. On the role of the National Parliaments, the Committee favours their stronger involvement by strengthening the means to achieve this both at the national and EU level.
Quite interestingly the Committee views the European Parliament as playing an important regulatory role in the EU decision-making process however its interests may diverge from those of national parliaments. The growth in strength of the European Parliament lessens the importance of the Council and as a consequence the national parliaments' ability to control what goes on at the EU level. A stronger European Parliament implies a shift in power towards supranationalism and as a result a weakening of national parliamentary control. On the control of parliaments in the second (CFSP) and third pillars (JHA) the Committee came out against the idea that an inter-parliamentary assembly from the various national parliaments should provide the "parliamentary dimension" to these pillars and supported instead a stronger direct involvement of the national parliaments.
Finland: The Finish government hints that the debate on the future of Europe should not be corralled within the confines of the four objectives outlined by the Nice European Council but should also delve deeper into the content of policies. The EU must not only determine "how" decisions are to be taken but also "what" and "why". Speaking at the European University Institute in April, Finland's Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, laid special emphasis on the EU's need to strengthen the 'internal' policies, falling under the heading of Justice and Home Affairs, particularly a common asylum policy and measures to fight organised crime, in line with what had been decided at the Tampere European Council in 1999. In Finnish eyes this will mean strengthening the security of ordinary European citizens. The urgency of reaching these internal goals may have increased as a result of the September 11th attacks. In April the Finnish Premier had voiced an opinion that there are a number of issues and challenges facing the EU (enlargement, the introduction of the Euro, internal security, demographic changes, environmental threats, the involvement of civil society…etc.) and that because of this the agenda for the next IGC "should obviously be left open ended" . Finland also supports the involvement of the applicant countries in the next IGC.
Conclusion
In this paper I have summarised the main positions taken by the EU member states in the Future of Europe Debate. I must re-state that since the debate is still in its initial 'brain storming' phase many positions will change either because they are abandoned or because they will be elaborated further. There is little doubt that at this stage of the debate some contributors may have engaged in some kite flying to test reactions while some governments may be holding back certain proposals until the conference takes off the ground. For example, although the proposal for a 'core' Europe has not been raised in a serious manner so far in the post-Nice debate (though it was raised before), this does not mean that it will not be proposed when the conference begins. The Greek Prime Minister has already commented favourably on 'flexibility', so long as this is kept open ended. Already many statesmen examined here have indicated that they are not favourably inclined to limiting the scope of the IGC to the four areas identified at Nice. In addition, many of the ideas that have been 'thrown in' the debate need further elaboration. It is one thing to say that Europe should aim for the creation of a "Federation of Nation States" and another thing to give concrete substance to it. There is an urgent need to clarify the concepts being used sometimes with apparent recklessness.
On the main issues the EU member states do not appear to be deeply divided: there is complete unanimity on the need of better defining subsidiarity in other words articulating which competencies will be in the hands of the EU supranational institutions and which will be left in the hands of the member states. In this respect there seems to be little support for a more rigid catalogue of competencies and member states seem to lean more towards agreeing on a set of guidelines to be used in dividing these competencies. It is also most likely, that at the sub-national level, competencies will be left to the individual member states to decide. On the question of the 'repatriation' or re-nationalisation of competencies, this seems to be more difficult to achieve. The most serious obstacle to this task is a legal one.
With respect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights the unanimous view seems to be that it must be given legal subsistence by being incorporated in the treaties. However, as Sweden rightly points out what is to be done with the European Convention on Human Rights which every EU member state has signed? Unless this issue is handled carefully, Europe can end up with disagreements on interpretation of human rights between the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. One way of getting round this, in addition to other legal arrangements, would be for the EU to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. The issue is rendered more delicate by the fact that the Convention and its Court can still be useful in the case of countries which have joined the Council of Europe and which will not for various reasons be EU member states in the near or the longer-term future. If only for the sake of these countries the authority of the Convention needs to be preserved.
The other important issue facing the next IGC is the question of the involvement of national parliaments in EU decision-making. On the one hand it is argued that their involvement in the EU decision-making process strengthens its democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, adding a new chamber to the one that already exists simply overburdens the decision-making process unduly when no member state or applicant country desires to do this for the sake of enhancing the institutions' efficiency. This will need becomes more acute when the Union grows to 24 and then on to 28 or more member states. Here again, the National Parliaments need to be informed more thoroughly on the various aspects and matters being decided at the EU level in order to better equip them to handle the task of controlling what the national governments are doing at the EU level. Would it be physically possible for national parliaments in a far-flung Union that will be created soon after enlargement to offer a substantive contribution to the EU's decision-making process through their participation in a second chamber? Does Europe require more or less decision-making levels at the European level? The European Parliament is the first directly elected trans-national Parliament of its kind. What it needs is for public interest to be mobilised in its favour.
There is the question of the constitutional regions, which have their own parliaments and an appreciable amount of local freedom to act independently in certain matters. These have been demanding more direct participation in the EU. Of course this is also achievable as long as these regions are not accorded the same status of nation-states.
Lastly, the small versus large member states divide that had characterised substantial parts of the last IGC particularly with respect to the institutional debate does not appear prima facie to have expanded into other issues. This divide will become manifest again in the next IGC only when the institutional issues are rolled back on the discussion table. Otherwise on many issues indicated above, small states' interests do not appear to be much different from those of the larger member states.
