Following the introduction of the Single European Act in 1987, the ability of countries to use their veto has been diluted, with the further utilisation of Qualified Majority Voting. The extension of QMV by the SEA was significant because it included legislation concerned with the creation of an internal market. Thus, member states were unable to prevent proposals with regard to the elimination of trade barriers, or more importantly to other related legislation such as the synchronization of social and political institutions in member states. The intergovernmental nature of the Council of Ministers is gradually diminishing, as majority decisions may colour Council made judgments.
The European Council
The function of the European council is to make broad policy decisions, and represent the interests of the member states. It is largely regarded as “the epitome of intergovernmentalism in institutionalized Europe,” (Weiler cited in Dinan, 1994, 230). The authority comprises of elected leaders of the member states, their foreign ministers and the president and vice president of the commission. The Council has been an important force for integration, with previous discussions leading to the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties.
Although some of the actions of the European Council are criticised as seemingly steeped in secrecy, it is important to consider that “the legislative process is largely a negotiation among member states,” (Pinder, 1994, 277). However, this does not impinge upon a country’s autonomy, and confirms the European Council as an intergovernmental body.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The ECJ fulfils two main roles. A primary function of the ECJ is to apply the law, and has subsequently been regarded as the “guardian of the communities,” (Urwin, 1991, 83). Secondly, the role of the ECJ is interpretative in ensuring that “EU law is interpreted in a clear, consistent and uniform manner,” (Nugent, 2001, 194). Thus, the ECJ can bring member states to court whereby EU law and those of the member state conflict. This does signpost the ECJ as a supranational body; however I believe this is a fallacy. The ECJ does not impinge into member states’ domestic legislation. Its focus is mainly “economic issues in which the EU has been most actively involved,” (McCormick, 2002, 110). It is not intruding into internal politics with which it should not be concerned.
The European Commission
The function of the European Commission is to initiate, develop and implement proposals for new laws and policies, and further serves to regulate this. The Commission manages the budget of the Union and handles external associations. Unjustly, this institution is regarded as the most undemocratic and remote, and perhaps the central core of the argument of Euro sceptics of Europe encroaching on member states’ autonomy. A concern levelled towards the Commission is that its members are unelected and appointed, (McCormick, 2002, 152). A mandate to govern is important, and elections do prescribe legitimacy. However, too many spheres of influence can challenge our domestic leaders authority, thus the democratic deficit is overstated in this respect.
Out of all the institutions, the Commission is perhaps overly supranational in some respects. The decisions of the Union are commenced, orchestrated, and wrought by the Commission. Ultimately, however, they are not accepted by the Commission. It is not a chamber of approval or rejection. Additionally, “as member states appoint all the members of the Commission, they are able to keep a close check on most Commission activities,” (Nugent, 2001, 325). Fears of the Commission’s supremacy, I believe, are overstated. There is no more loss of national sovereignty within the Commission than there are within any other EU institution.
The European Parliament
The European Parliament (EP) is the only democratically elected institution of the EU. However, its influence is arguably the most limited. There is a stance that believes the narrow influence of the EP correlates to a lack of supranationalistic nature. This is, I believe, unfounded.
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are organised within the Parliament in an ideological spectrum, rather than as blocks of member states. For example, McCormick identifies the European United Left (GUE) as consisting of mainly French, Greek and German leftists, (McCormick, 1999, 107). Thus, the concern of MEPs is likely to follow along party line, rather than the preservation of a member states’ sovereignty. This enforces a sense of supranationalism.
The EP is possibly the most supranational body of the EU. Taking policy-making away from member states illustrates this argument. However, until the European Parliament is given broad legislative powers, it will always have to rely on swaying the legislative bodies to suggest laws it finds tolerable, rather than pass laws it considers essential. The EP has considerable and mounting influence over the legislative process, with Maastricht giving it narrow legislative powers, but in all circumstances it can be overridden, though this is being made increasingly difficult to do so.
Conclusion
I do not think that there is a sole monopoly of power within the EU that threatens the national sovereignty of the member states. Clearly, there are institutions which exhibit a greater amount of influence within the institutional framework, however this does not direct towards hegemony within the EU.
The EU has brought about a diminution in the powers of the member states national parliaments’, however this can not be seen as moves to create a European super state, rather as a reaction to the changing international situation. Institutions such as NATO and the UN indicate to the member states that they cannot survive on their own. If nations are to retain any sovereignty, they can only hope to do so by combining their resources, sharing their power, and accepting that national sovereignty needs to be coalesced if it is to be of any worth. Rather than seeing Europe as a threat, the European nations should seek to guarantee that it is intended to best suit their purposes, by ensuring genuine and effective accountability through the EP and Commission, and demonstrate to the people of Europe the benefits, and indeed, the necessity of a European Union. This can be summarised by Bogdanor and Woodcock who mention the unavoidability and allure of change. “The purpose of the community is to enable the member states to combine to carry out those activities where our national interests are best served by joint actions. It is not an abdication of sovereignty, it is a more effective way of exercising sovereignty,” (Bogdanor & Woodcock, 1991, 487-492).
Bibliography
Bogdanor, Vernon and G Woodcock. 1991. “Europe and Sovereignty,” Parliamentary Affairs, 44: 487-492.
Dinan, Desmond. 1994. Ever Closer Union?, Hampshire: Macmillan.
Heywood, Andrew. 2000. Key Concepts in Politics, Hampshire: Palgrave.
McCormick, John. 2002. Understanding the European Union, Hampshire: Palgrave.
Nugent, Neill. 2001. The European Commission, Hampshire: Palgrave.
Pinder, John. 1994. “Building the Union: Policy, Reform, Constitution,” in Andrew Duff, John Pinder and Roy Pryce eds., Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union, 269-285, London: Routledge.
Urwin, Derek W. 1991. The Community of Europe, London: Longman.
