Haas et al (1993) contend that ‘the key to assessment is an exercise in hypothetical counterfactual analysis’: expected causal pathways with or without the existing structures of global environmental governance can be compared, to judge how ‘fit for purpose’ these structures may be. However, this is not a simple process, and empirically demonstrating effectiveness is extremely difficult (Young 1998).
Najam et al (2006) argue that there is much in the global environmental governance system ‘that does, in fact, work well’, that ‘important strides’ have been made by global environmental policy in the last 3 decades. Porter and Brown (1996) seem impressed by the large number of agreements that have been made to reduce environmental threats, while Breitmeier (in Young 1998) highlights two major developments. The first is the formation of a global regime to protect the stratospheric ozone layer, which involved the 1985 Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol, and has successfully reversed the deleterious anthropogenic effects on the ozone layer. The second concerns the current efforts to create a global climate change regime; although this remains hotly contested, it has forced governments to consider climatic effects, and the expected 2012 protocol may prove more fruitful than Kyoto.
However, Elliott (1998) reminds us that ‘while there are now many, many thousands of words on paper – in conventions, protocols, declarations, statements of principle, management programmes, action plans, and communiqués – environmental degradation continues to worsen’. Despite a few positive outcomes, ‘the disturbing trends that drove action in the first place by and large continue’ (Speth, UNEP 2007). Najam et al (2006) voice several main concerns. The first is that, through the proliferation of multilateral environmental agreements and the fragmentation of global environmental governance, mandates have been duplicated and agendas often conflict each other; the system is ‘unwieldy and increasingly incoherent’ (Najam et al 2006). This can lead to an inefficient use of resources, and the assumption that signing ever more demanding treaties could solve global environmental problems has been labelled ‘inadequate and politically naive’ (Paterson 1995 in Young 2002). UNEP does not have the resources to coordinate successfully international cooperation, suffering from a paucity of funding, a lack of political support, and geographical isolation within the UN system (Elliott 1998). The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is similarly criticised for having inadequate power, acting as a Trojan pony for NGOs’ concerns inside the World Bank (El-Ashry in Young 2002). Coordination of non-state actors in a state-centric system is particularly problematic. Perpetual negotiation causes a lack of implementation, enforcement and effectiveness, while more generally global environmental governance is separated from trade, investment, and international development (Najam et al 2006). Haas et al (1993) lament that environmental politics is ‘replete with symbolic action’, that ‘the environmental rabbit that is pulled at the last minute from an organisational hat may turn out be illusory or ephemeral’. There must therefore be some change in global environmental governance to protect the environment effectively.
An important distinction vis-à-vis arguments concerning future development of global governance needs to be made. This separates a reformist, problem-solving approach (increasing ‘fitness’ by improving existing frameworks, within existing structures, responding to a crisis in governance), from a critical approach (which challenges the structure itself, seeking a sometimes radical transformation, responding to a failure of governance) (Elliott 1998; Ford 1998; Newell 2001). Reformists could argue that existing governance is potentially fit for purpose with a few tweaks, whereas radical critiques involve a complete denial of this, and may suggest that the current purpose itself is unfit for the environment.
The International Institute for Sustainable Development’s report on global environmental governance (Najam et al 2006) suggests working with the existing system, rather than proposing grand organisational reform; that the system has not ‘failed’ but has ‘outgrown its original design’. Bearing in mind the five goals of leadership, knowledge, coherence, performance, and mainstreaming, the study outlines five possible models of reform, summarised below:
(from Najam et al 2006)
If however environmental problems are conceptualised as social rather than physical phenomenon (as hoped by Lipschutz and Mayer 1996), with the contemporary hegemonic political and economic order part of the problem (Elliott 1998), the above reforms to global environmental governance will not be sufficient to reduce environmental degradation. Kildow (1992, in Elliott 1998) claims that ‘there can be no breakthroughs as long as the current institutional infrastructure remains’, and Thomas (1993, in Elliott 1998) contends that we need to focus on ‘the underlying structure in which this process is being played out’. The ‘hegemony of [Western] neo-liberal economic assumptions’ (Paterson 1995 in Elliott 1998) perpetuates a power structure that may not be beneficial to the environments of developing countries: ‘for all the power and ambition in the hands of the global elites, any reforms which do not start from the needs and knowledge of people suffering now from unsustainable and unjust developments can hardly hope to save their world for them’ (Young 2002). Haas (2004) proposes that the key insight of the most sophisticated current organisational theorists is that loose, decentralised, dense networks of institutions and actors may be more fit for the purpose of environmental salvation than the monolithic bodies proposed by reformists. This raises the important issue of scale within global environmental governance. Lipshutz and Mayer (1996) suggest there may be no optimal or logical size for political institutions, whilst Newell (2001) argues it is a mistake to ignore the national and regional scales. Local wisdom, common property resource systems (Lipshutz and Mayer 1996), participation (Elliott 1998) and social movements (Ford 2003) may be crucial in challenging global hegemony and successfully preventing environmental collapse.
It is universally conceded that, despite significant growth in recent decades and some specific success stories, the existing structures of global environmental governance are not able to deal fully with global environmental problems; the environment is still being degraded. However, it is almost impossible to determine how best to proceed to ensure the governing architecture is fit for purpose. Romanticised concluding notions of a global commons regime that ‘must surely by based on honesty and mutual trust which – like love – can be shared and earned, but not effectively bought’ (Young 2002) are not helpful, but a challenge to existing hegemonic structures does need to be brought to include the marginalised and their environments. Young (1998) stresses the importance of avoiding inflated expectations about the capacity of regimes to deal with the world’s troubles; we may need to re-examine our precise purpose in realistic terms before casting judgement on the current global environmental governance structures.
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