Another major assumption of realism is that states are the main actors in international relations. This claim has caused problems for realist theorists in recent years, as Jack Snyder admits ‘it is harder for the normally state-centric realists to explain why the world’s only superpower announced a war against al Qaeda, a non-state terrorist organization’. After the events of 9/11 the US had no choice but to declare a ‘war on terror’ because they were unable to attribute the attack to one particular state, as the perpetrators originated from different countries including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both allies of the US. The only thing that the hijackers shared in common was their involvement within the terrorist organization, al Qaeda. Therefore, this group and other similar terrorist organizations became the target of the US and its allies’ ‘global war on terror’. This notion of going to war with non-governmental organizations has greatly altered the nature of international conflict and has left realist theorists contemplating the relevance of their theory in modern international affairs.
However, realists maintain that the emergence of terrorist organizations does not undermine the dominance of states on the international scene. The realist scholar John Mearsheimer actually believes that ‘realism and terrorism are inextricably linked’. He argues that the war on terror ‘will be played out in the state arena, and, therefore, all of the realist logic about state behaviour will have a significant effect on how the war on terrorism is fought’. The United States plays a particularly dominant role in international affairs, when it comes to tackling terrorism. The US has tried to persuade countries, such as Pakistan, to combat the problem of terrorism within their borders and has hinted at intervention should they prove incapable of doing so.Concerning US foreign policy G. John Ikenberry writes, ‘Moreover, countries that harbor terrorists, either by consent or because they are unable to enforce their laws within their territory, effectively forfeit their rights to sovereignty’. It is clear that the job of combating terrorism ultimately falls to states and that those states which are incapable of tackling terrorism within their borders are likely to face invasion from larger more powerful states. Therefore, although the theory of realism cannot clarify the importance of terrorist organizations it can explain the manner in which states react to terrorism.
The third key concept of realism is the idea of a balance of power; ‘standard realist doctrine predicts that weaker states will ally to protect themselves from stronger ones and thereby form and reform a balance of power’. Since the end of the Cold War this concept has come under heavy criticism because currently ‘no combination of states or other powers can challenge the United States militarily, and no balancing coalition is imminent’. When you look at global military spending this dominance becomes even clearer given that the USA actually spends more on the military than the next forty-five highest spending countries in the world combined. The supremacy of the USA displayed since the end of the Cold War has essentially disproved the existence of a balance of power and therefore it could be argued that as the Cold War ended, so did realism’s relevance as a theory of international relations.
Despite these convincing criticisms, realist theorists continue to argue for the existence of a balance of power within the contemporary international system. Some suggest that rogue states such as Iran and North Korea seek nuclear weapons so that they can protect themselves from more powerful states like the US. The realist scholar Robert Jervis discusses how this can compel other fragile countries to align with these rogue states; ‘whatever these weapons can do, they can deter all-out invasion, thus rendering them attractive to any state that fears it might be in the Pentagon’s gun sights’. This kind of posturing for power indicates that attempts are being made to balance the power of the US hegemon. Other realists point out that the growing importance of China represents the biggest step towards the balancing of power. David Rousseau states that, ‘the economic and military progress China has made since the late 1970s represent a rising threat to American interests’. Both of these examples illustrate that, although the balance of power between states is less obvious today than during the Cold War, it still retains a subtle influence over international affairs. Therefore, realism will continue to be seen as a realistic theory until this influence is rendered totally irrelevant.
In spite of the challenges posed to realism, the theory remains arguably the most convincing and realistic in international relations. Critics may deem realism to be too pessimistic yet it provides the most credible rationale for states’ actions. The emergence of powerful non-governmental organisations such as terrorist groups may have undermined the realist arguments about state-centricity, but it is the realist theorists who can best account for the responses of states to terrorism. Finally, despite the lack of a clear balance of power within the modern international system, history has shown that it is a key part of international relations and therefore it is only a matter of time before the balance begins to shift again.
Bibliography
Articles
Ikenberry, John G. (2002), ‘America’s Imperial Ambition’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81,
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Jervis, Robert (2003), ‘The Compulsive Empire’, Foreign Policy, 137 (Jul/Aug), pp. 83-87.
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Keohane, Robert (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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Mearsheimer, John (2002), ‘Through the Realist Lens: A Conversation with John Mearsheimer’, Interview held at The Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, (08/04/2002)
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Rousseau, David. (2003) ‘The Rise of China through Realist, Liberal, and Constructivist Lenses’ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, (31st August)
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Rousseau, David (2003) ‘The Rise of China through Realist, Liberal, and Constructivist Lenses’ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, (31st August), p.5