In the short term, the Personal Rule could be considered a success in finance due to the improvement in the government’s financial position during this period, as by the end of the 1630s the Crown was solvent. By 1636 Crown revenue was 25% higher than it was a decade previously, which combined with lower expenditure allowed government debt to be reduced to £1,000,000. This is a substantial achievement, given the precarious position that Charles faced in 1629, with continental wars against France and Spain bearing a major financial burden on the Crown. Peace with France in April 1629 and Spain in November 1630 allowed English merchants to obtain a near- monopoly on the Iberian trade, with Sharpe noting that ‘Peace brought the expansion of trade’. During the Personal Rule two-thirds of Crown revenue was accounted for by custom duties, meaning that peace enabled the Crown to increase revenue through increased trade. Also, the Crown generated revenue through the levy of ship money, which was levied across the whole country in 1635. This was a particularly lucrative method of collection for the Crown, with £190,000 raised in its first year and a rate of non-payment of only 2.5% in the first three years. John Burghe, an academic at Cambridge, wrote in 1637 that people ‘seem content to pay’ ship money, and it is ‘well accepted’ suggesting that ship money was a stable source of revenue for the Crown. This seems to support Kishlansky’s view that the Personal Rule was ‘a golden age’, with relative prosperity. As a result, the effective solvency of the Crown, which was achieved during the Personal Rule, was a substantial achievement for the Crown.
However, financial policy during the Personal Rule was a failure as the innovative policies used to finance the government were not potential long-term alternatives to parliamentary subsidies. Though the Crown was able to raise £170,000, the equivalent to 3 parliamentary subsidies, from the distraint of knighthood, the fines were a short-term policy as there were only a limited number of men who could afford such a fine. Also, these fines induced resentment from the Political Nation, as men who owned land worth over £40 a year were targeted, establishing mistrust from powerful local elites whose support Charles was reliant upon. Ship money is another example of a tax that, while providing significant revenue to the government, was not a plausible long term solution. Levied across the whole country between 1635 and 1640, £800,000 was raised for the Navy in the construction of a fleet. Though this may appear to be a successful financial policy, closer inspection reveals that it was not a long term alternative to a parliamentary subsidy. Following the partial vindication of Hampden in 1637, when 5 out of 12 Judges found in his favour regarding the legality of Ship Money a bit more detail needed here, payment rates fell from 90% between 1634 and 1638 to 20% in 1639. Charles’ extraction of £70,000 from the City of London in 1635 after they failed to find enough people to settle in Londonderry is another example of a policy that achieved short-term financial gains for the Crown but harmed the government in the long run, with City only loaning him £5000 in 1639 in preparation for the Bishops War. During the Personal Rule no viable alternative to parliamentary subsidies were found, meaning that Charles was reliant on financially expedient policies which failed to provide Charles what the Crown actually required were the Personal Rule going to be a success, financial independence. Customs not discussed
The Personal Rule could be considered a success in religion as Archbishop Laud did achieve some conformity in religious practice, as well as protecting the wealth of the church. Services were made more uniform by insisting on strict adherence to the prayer book, bowing by the congregation when the name of Jesus was spoken, and the wearing of a surplice by the minister. Through the replacement of sermons with catechising in 1629, Charles achieved control of what Ministers said, forcing them to conform to the established pattern of worship. As well as this, Laud enthusiastically pursued ecclesiastical changes, with all bishops being ordered to live in their diocese and make regular visits to their parishes. As a result, the standard instrument of conformity became a diocesan visitation in which bishops would hear complaints against ministers who wouldn’t conform, giving significant power to bishops. Laud suppressed the feoffees, a group of puritans that bought up Church livings which eluded the jurisdiction of bishops, helping keep uniformity within the Church of England by preventing Puritans from appointing their nominees to ministerial and lecturing positions. Laud designed regulations to stop the practice whereby bishops would offer a long lease on a low rent in return for a high-entry fine, which impoverished future clergy for their own gain, helping protect the wealth of the church. Whilst these reforms failed to change the private beliefs of Puritans, as well as help drive people to extreme Puritanism, they did achieve some conformity in the actual practice of religion at Church. Seen how?
The Personal Rule was a failure in religion as Laudianism, rather than ending theological controversy and establishing conformity in religious belief, galvanised such intense opposition that radical puritanism entered the mainstream by 1640. Laudianism involved the suppression of preaching, with catechising replacing sermons following Charles’s explicit order. Whilst this may not appear to be a direct attack on Puritanism, by forcing ministers to conform to the established pattern of worship Puritan viewpoints were suppressed. The fact that up to 15,000 fled across the Atlantic during this period, to escape ‘the multitude of irreligious, lascivious and popishly affected persons’, suggests that Laudianism failed at capturing the religious spirit of the English. The anger that these reforms had stirred up among Puritans is demonstrated by their reaction to the reissue of the Book of Sports which said what? in 1633. Though it was identical to the one issued by James in 1618, Puritan anger at the reissue was intense. William Prynne, a puritan lawyer, wrote in his book comparisons between the king and the tyrant Nero and seemed to suggest that Charles should be assassinated for sponsoring plays, as many ancient emperors were. Given that Prynne was hailed as a martyr by many when he was punished by the star chamber with mutilation and life imprisonment, Laudianism had inspired opposition to the King, a clear sign of failure. This suggests that Barry Coward was correct in claiming that ‘Laudianism made the greatest contribution’ to growing anger at Charles’ government, meaning religious policy during the Personal Rule caused such levels of discontent that radical Puritanism was now a mainstream theological position.
In conclusion, the Personal Rule was a failure in both finance and religion. Whilst the financial position of the government improved during this period, this was financed by short-term solutions rather than a viable alternative to parliamentary subsidies. Ann Hughes notes that it was only possible to govern without parliament ‘as long as he avoided war’, meaning that the Crown failed to establish financial independence. Laudianism failed in establishing conformity in religious belief amongst the English, while also inspiring opposition to Charles, suggesting that Laudianism was a catastrophic failure as it set the stage for radical puritanism to enter the mainstream.
A sensible and well argued answer. You have a concise style (which is good), but occasionally need to expand on your examples a little.
You make some primary sources and the views of historians, although not always in the places where they might have made the most impact.
References-
The Personal Rule of Charles I by Kevin Sharpe
Extract from a letter from John Burghe to Charles I’s ambassador in Paris, October 1637-
Charles I , an abbreviated life by Mark Kishlansky
Johnson’s Wonder Working Providence 1628-51. (quote about the great migration, Kishlansky quoted it from this source)
The Stuart Age : England by Barry Coward
Causes of the English Civil War by Ann Hughes
by
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