'In the years 1933-37, German foreign policy was essentially nationalist rather than specifically Nazi'. How far do you agree with this opinion?

Hitler’s desire for lebensraum in the east was not a newly-found idea in German foreign policy, and neither was the desire for a union of all Germans in a ‘Greater Germany’. In fact, Chancellor Behtmann Hollweg’s ‘September Programme’ of September 1914 and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918 had both fundamentally referred to expansionism as well as the ‘biological struggle’ between races during warfare. Hitler, however, had taken his race thinking one step further through the pseudo-scientific boost of social Darwinism. Likewise, although expansion was not specifically Nazi in thought, Hitler was adamant that it could only be achieved through military means. As a result, his philosophy on expansion became more as a result of his Nazi policies, rather than through peaceful economic means as nationalist ideology can sometimes focus on. To achieve further living space, Hitler would need an augmented military, aiming to achieve this through overthrowing the Versailles Treaty and reintroducing conscription, culminating in his announcement of a Luftwaffe in March 1935. It was not until these nationalist aims had been completed that that he could pursue his Nazi ‘conquest of living space in the east and its ruthless Germanisation’.        

For that reason, Hitler’s ability to forge tactical alliances with ideologically-similar nations would also aid his cause, and perhaps explains his diplomatic meetings with Italy’s Mussolini, ensuring that Hitler could eventually annex Austria without resistance. Hitler had managed to forge a full-scale military alliance with Italy by November 1936 (the Rome-Berlin Axis) which would serve to assist in his acquirement of further lebensraum by ensuring that Italy did not interfere with Germany’s eastern European ‘sphere’. Incidentally, this alliance had come after Hitler gambled in remilitarising the Rhineland in March 1936 where he was met with little opposition for doing so, mainly due to Britain’s policy of appeasement and France’s internal strife. Hitler’s own foreign policy could now pick up pace, and the Rhineland incident would have satisfied the nationalist thinkers of Germany who would have felt they had regained their rightful territory. Hitler’s popularity had been helped by the incident and he had confirmed the frailty of the League of Nations and could now pursue his expansionist ventures with greater confidence.

By showing some continuity with nationalists of the Weimar era, Hitler had ensured that initially he had not appeared greatly controversial or radical in his demands. However, despite his cautious approach to begin with, Hitler had used favourable circumstances to exploit the weaknesses of other nations in order to step up in his own Nazi policies. For example, he had managed to denounce the Versailles Treaty’s armament limitations, increase pace of rearmament, leave the League of Nations, forge new alliances, reintroduce conscription and reoccupy the Rhineland in a short time period with little or no resistance. It is therefore apparent that, in 1933-37, Hitler had appeared to lay nationalist foundations on which he could then step up his rearmament programme in order to realise his underlying Nazi expansionist ambitions. However, he had done this whilst still satisfying the nationalist wishes of his government, industrialists, leading military figures and many of the German population.