But despite enjoying a brief period of major social and economic advantage, the villeins’ new found glory was not to last. The Government was quick to stifle the villeins, by introducing the Ordinance of Labourers Act of 1349, which enlarged and amended, becoming a Statute in 1351 . In the aftermath of the Black Death, as stated, wages rose fast - and they would presumably have risen even faster but for the Statute of Labourers. The act denied these wage rises, instead trying to restore the economic and social conditions of England back to how they were before the Black Death, making it worse for the serfs, and giving the landlords the upper hand once more. The statute’s demands included freezing wages at 1346 levels, binding labourers to accept the rate of that year and confirming to their personal lords the first claim on their services. Furthermore, landlords were forbidden from offering higher than customary rate wages in order to secure labour.
Basically, as Dunn puts it, the entire tone of the Ordinance was one of reproach towards labourers and artisans seeking to gain a competitive wage for their labour. It was essentially the fact that the serfs had become so expectant following the Black Death that made them even angrier when they were suppressed in such a way that was quite clearly designed to impede them. As Robin Frame suggests, ‘it was no accident that uprisings affected, not the poorest regions of England, but those where expectations had risen most’.
The resentment was added to further by the Church’s decision to side with the government against the serfs. Abbotts and Bishops sided with barons, often making serfs feel like they were being exploited, rather than helped, by the church. All in all, the Black Death had caused the serfs to be suppressed not only by the government, but also the church. Essentially, the result of the Black Death was a long-term battle for the upper hand between the Serfs and those who wanted to suppress them. The government had chosen to side against the serfs, and shatter their expectations, which undoubtedly increased chances of a rebellion happening. Ziegler himself says that the government’s suppression of the serfs was responsible for the revolt, claiming that the result of the Statute of Labourers was ‘resentment on the part of the serfs, which simmered angrily for thirty years, finally erupting in 1381, in the form of the Peasants’ Revolt.’ Of course, it is important to remember that other factors such as taxation, and the political aftermath of Edward III’s death, contributed to the anger which indeed ‘simmered’ for all those years.
It is undeniable that a war of any scale and situation has dramatic consequences on the economic and social structures within a country. The Hundred Years’ War that was so prevalent during the fourteenth century was indeed no exception to this rule. The said war was in fact longer than 100 years (it took place over 116), but was actually a series of much shorter wars, feeding England’s feud with France in short bites, throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Nine years after the success of the Treaty of Brétigny, the war reopened in 1369, as a result of deliberate provocation on the French side – and the English were ill-prepared. The consequences of this particular war were great in number, one of which being further alienation of those in the southern counties of England, many of whom already blamed the government for not being able to maximise their chance of prosperity after the Black Death. The war only added to their woes about the government. Geographically speaking, the link between the origins of much of the rebellion, and the positioning of France gives evidence that the war had a particularly unpleasant effect on the people of the south-eastern counties. The Hundred Years’ War, which consisted of continuous defeats for the English , proved to be nothing but a nuisance, particularly for those in the South-East, an area repeatedly ravaged by French naval raids. These attacks were in fact admitted in parliament after the Revolt, as being one of the main causes of the uprising, and it’s a fair thing to say indeed, as the majority of rebellion started in the region subjected to these attacks.
Aside from the naval attacks suffered by those in the rebelling areas of England, the war had further consequences, particularly the large taxation, which was ‘heavier and more sustained than it had been at any time since the 1340s’ . It was indeed England’s re-entry into war that required such taxation. To suggest that it irked people at the time is certainly an understatement. Serfs, already financially stifled by the Statute of Labourers, were to face further financial woe at the hands of the Government. This was naturally very frustrating.
The fourteenth century was not one devoid of taxation by any means. It was something that, as in most societies was common and enforced. However, the poll taxes of 1377, 1379 and 1380, introduced due to exhaustion of traditional sources of revenue, and intended to subsidise the war against France further were, for a lot of people, the last straw. Despite the reasonable success of the first two, the poll taxes were seen as a further drain on the already meagre funds of the poorest of the poor. We mustn’t forget that they’d already been subjected to a significant tax increase not long before the first poll-tax, making the blow of the poll tax even larger. After the 1380 poll tax collection, in fact, at least half of what was supposed to be collected was missing. The number of people evading this tax just demonstrates how unable, or indeed unwilling people were to pay it. Furthermore, one of the poll-tax collectors of 1379, namely John Reed, found himself specifically targeted during the revolt in 1381. His house was badly damaged and his possessions stolen, by enraged poll-tax payers. Understanding why the poll-tax was so disfavoured by the rebels is not difficult. It was ‘exceptionally severe’, and ‘lightly conceded in parliaments and extortionately levied from the poor people’. In other words, the poll tax was harshest on those who had the least money, and this was clear from the onset. The 1380 tax in particular, which charged three times more than the 1377 tax, and applied to each individual, was the harshest of the three. Dunn suggests that this tax could have been avoided, had the crown adjusted its military ambitions to suit its fiscal needs, which ties in with the crisis in confidence of the government, who were less interested in supporting the needs of their people than pursuing costly, yet fruitless expeditions. This poll tax only served to infuriate the people who had to pay it, particularly serfs, who suffered the most – and to add to the resentment towards the government. The disdain for the government called by the poll tax certainly acted as a catalyst which catapulted the country into revolution.
It could be argued that it was a combination of all the tax increases around this time that inspired the revolt. It is impossible to say whether, had any not happened, the revolt would not have formed when it did and in the conditions in which it did, but to rule this out is just not possible. What is clear is that both tax increases had a knock-on negative effect amongst the people of England, which must have been in the back of the rebels’ minds during the rebellion.
England’s economic and social turmoil, much of which can be traced back to the aftermath of the Black Death, had haunted the country and its people for decades. Some of the earliest instances of unpleasantness go as far back as 1315, when the Great Famine disturbed the country’s welfare. The widespread conditions were so detrimental that most countries in Europe suffered two or three whole harvests lost completely . Indeed, the conditions were so poor that some resorted to cannibalism, and the Canon of Bridlington claimed the misery was ‘such as our age has never seen’. Inflation reigned, and government attempts at price control proved futile. Interestingly, the panic brought on by the Famine resulted in harassment and raids. The keeper of the king’s horses claimed to have been assaulted and robbed. From this example, it can be drawn that in the face of adversity, and at times of great struggle, violence and rebellion took hold in England. The resemblance this shows to the revolt of 1381 is undeniable. The attacks, some of which were on royal officials, demonstrate a crisis in confidence in the government and its effectiveness in dealing with the famine. Indeed, it can be said that many contributing factors towards the revolt of 1381 were perhaps down to other ‘crises in confidence’.
One such factor was the death of Edward III, which shook the country’s confidence in the government, as 10-year-old Richard II took to the throne. He, by nature, had advisers to help him deal with the power with which he found himself so suddenly bequeathed in 1377. However, after the death of such an able king as Edward III, there was much concern within the country that Richard’s councillors would not be able to protect the kingdom. Indeed, this particular crisis of confidence can be suggested to have been generated by the Hundred Years’ War, which was spiralling fast out of England’s control at the time. There was often increased hatred towards Richard’s advisers, particularly his avuncular councillor John of Gaunt, whom many saw as being behind a lot of Richard’s decisions. John had been partially in command of the direction of the conflict with France between 1371 and 1377, had often presided on Edward III’s behalf in parliament, and was undoubtedly a powerful influence in council - and by 1381, he was heading Richard II’s government. The rebels of the revolt did not want such power to go to these officials, whom they considered ‘traitors’. At Smithfield, on the 15th of June, they called for ‘no lordship save that of the king’. Indeed it was the opinion of many people at the time, that John of Gaunt and many of the King’s other councillors were corrupt, and responsible for some of the country’s greater hardships, like England’s lagging military performance. The truth in this sentiment, when looking at the causes of the great revolt, is of course, irrelevant. What’s important is that the people at the time had little confidence in, and even despised people such as Simon Sudbury, John of Gaunt and Sir Robert Hales, whose heads they were all calling for during the revolt. Had the crisis in confidence of so many of the King’s officials not existed, the revolt may have been averted. However, the disdain for these men was so great that many people simply couldn’t stand having them in power. For many, the revolt was a protest against who the government were, not just what they were doing.
The Peasants’ Revolt was more than a revolt against taxation. Although the heavy taxation at the reopening of the war, and the poll tax thereafter, were both factors which alienated the rebels indefinitely, it is indeed quite possible that had it not have been for many other factors, the revolt simply would not have happened. The tragedy of the Plague of 1348 and all its social and economic consequences raised the expectations of those oppressed by serfdom. But the government’s reaction to this, to cruelly take away any of the serfs’ chances of prosperity, was what really upset them. The church’s supporting of the government alienated serfs further, as it meant they seemed to have nobody to turn to, and at Smithfield in 1381, abolition of serfdom was stated as one of the rebels’ demands. The war and the competence of the government when dealing with the war also had huge effects on the revolt’s formation. Not only did the losing of the war infuriate those in England, but the taxation of a war which was being lost did also. The officials in charge of the war were also hated, and were attacked during the revolt; their incompetence and so-called ‘treachery’ being the primary reason. The motivations behind the revolt were very complex, with one reason being linked to or potentially dependent upon another. Had the Statute of Labourers in 1351 not have come about; the crisis of confidence in the government and their handling of such issues may not have manifested itself. Had England have been winning the war, the taxation may not have bothered the people as much, and once again, the government and officials may have been more trusted and liked, potentially averting a revolt. It is impossible to say how far each factor influenced the rebels of the revolt, but what is sure is that the revolt can not be simply labelled as a ‘protest against taxation’. Rather it was a protest against all the political, social and economic struggles that the country had struggled with for so many years. So, although taxation can be cited as a motivation behind the revolt, the picture is really, much bigger than that.
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