To what extent was Disraeli's rise to the leadership down to luck?

        Disraeli was most definitely a political opportunist. In spite of the publication of his ideological novels Coningsby, Sybil and Tancred it has been argued that Disraeli was motivated entirely by seizing the political advantage and manipulating situations to his advantage. Feuchtwanger has been one particularly strong advocate of the idea of Disraeli as a political opportunist. This was perhaps primarily seen in Disraeli’s stance towards the Peel Corn Laws. Disraeli favoured a policy of protectionism and formed part of a conservative majority who opposed the Corn Laws. Disraeli saw that if the party was split he would emerge as one of its focal points. This is not to say that he set about deliberately splitting the Conservative party with his attacks on Peel. But he was one of the leaders of the ‘Young England’ movement which ruthlessly criticised Peel’s government and when the opportunity arose in 1846 to remove Peel, he sided with the protectionists. Disraeli’s marriage to Mary Anne Evans has also been pointed to as a further case of opportunism. Twelve years older than him, some have argued that Disraeli merely married her to fund his political career.  Disraeli’s Reform Act of 1867 though was perhaps the best case of his political opportunism. Indeed, Cowling has stated that ‘Disraeli’s was a policy of consistent opportunism’, arguing that Disraeli moved towards the issue of reform not because an extension of suffrage was an issue with which he had a particular sympathy for, but simply because it was pressurised by events. Firstly it can be argued that Disraeli manipulated the situation in order to remain first in line for the leadership of the party. Disraeli believed that if he and Derby could get the Bill passed then their position would be sealed, meaning that if their principle rivals, Cranborne and Peel wanted to dislodge them then they would once again have to tear the party apart. Machin portrays the idea of Disraeli as a calculating opportunist further, stating that he put forward the Reform Bill as a means to ‘divide and weaken Liberal forces.’ Disraeli astutely realised that by implementing a radical reform act he could accentuate and prolong the Liberal split and therefore cement the Conservatives’ position in power.        

        Although opportunism certainly played an important part in Disraeli’s rise to power, it must be argued that this was only one of the skills which he possessed as a politician. Disraeli’s skill can be witnessed in that as Chancellor he took large steps towards modernising the party. His 1852 budget conceded support for free trade, cut malt tax in a bid to appease landowners and increased income tax, in an attempt to construct a wider appeal amongst the ordinary voters. These proposals were most unusual for a Conservative budget and were responsible for the modernisation of the party which allowed the Conservatives to become an electable party again. Disraeli also possessed great skills as a political orator. This was witnessed in his attacks on Peel over the Corn Laws and generally he was a convincing speaker. However, he lacked the ability to produce anything as convincing as Gladstone’s Midlothian Speeches for example, but he was aware of this and therefore ensured that he did not attempt to deliver out of his depth.

        The fact that he overcame his religious background, as well as coming from a background which was less moneyed than that of most conservative ministers(he only turned to literature as a career because he was so desperate for money), clearly highlights that Disraeli was not a man who rose to power through luck. Certain elements of his climb ‘up the greasy pole’ are said to have contained a certain degree of luck, including the split of the conservative party in 1846. However, Disraeli always used his opportunism and skill to make the best of these opportunities when they arose. He was a skilful politician and his modernisation of the conservative party clearly highlights this.