Descartes thought he had solved the problem of the mind and the body, because he had worked out he must exist, and eventually got round to working out that his body exists and on the way that God must exist. But the one thing which still persists today with this principle of Dualism and this is the ‘problem of interaction’ or as we call it the Matilda problem in our class. This problem is that if the mind has power over the body i.e. if we want to or find something amusing we laugh. So if our minds seem to have control over our physical bodies why does it just stop there why don’t we have control over non-bodily things like Matilda did. Why cannot we pick up things through the sheer power of thought? Or put in other words make them levitate with just our thought. And no physical contact.
To solve the problem of interaction Leibniz put forward the theory of ‘Parallelism’. Which is much the same as Dualism, and is the belief that the mental ‘world’ runs in parallel with the physical ‘world’ much the same as two clocks set to exactly the same time, but which are totally independent to each other, another analogy is two different sets of dominoes set off at the same time. The problem with saying this is how did the dominoes start to move? It was concluded that God started both of them at the same time, because there wasn’t at that time any other feasible explanation of how they started. This argument I think should be seen as a weak argument because it depends on God to start the chain of events.
Leibniz also responded to Descartes ‘Dualism’ of the body and the mind, with the Idea of ‘Panpsychism’ this is the idea of every thing having consciousness. The pen with which you are marking this essay has a consciousness as well as the chair you are sitting on. This is thanks to the ‘Monads’ which make up every thing in this universe. Leibniz believed that there were different levels of consciousness, and the different levels depended on the concentration or order of Monads. So if you were to sit on me I would be able to tell you to get off me, because I have a high concentration or order of monads where as the poor chair on which you are sitting cannot because it is got a low concentration or order of the monads and so cannot tell you to get off it!
In a similar way to Leibniz, in order to solve the problem of interaction Malebranche brought forward the principle of ‘Occasionalism’ and said much the same as Leibniz and Descartes, that we are both mind and body, but he attempted to solve the big problem of interaction by saying how God swoops down on each occasion (hence the name Occasionalism) and moves my leg when I want to move, rather than me doing it myself. This did not in fact solve the problem in fact you could say that he moved it up a notch from the human level to the Divine level. How can God who we think of as a nonphysical being or thing move (or physically influence) a physical one? The other problem with this is Evil. If God who we view as good as did Malebranche why would he pull my finger back on the trigger if I was to try and kill someone, especially since in the Bible he teaches of how we aren’t to kill one another. I have to disagree with his idea simply because it doesn’t seem to be a very strong argument, and is I would say not a sound argument because of the problems of which are associated.
Ryle attacked what be believed to be ‘Descartes myth’, or the Dualist view which basically is that the mind is as it were ‘the ghost in the machine’. He said that the ghost in the machine example was one big mistake, and ultimately a category-mistake. He thought it wrong to talk of the mind as being an object or a sort of engine which drives the body as in the parable of the ‘Red Indians and the steam engine’. Ryle mocks Descartes idea of the ghost who drives the train, and he compares him to the primitive red Indians. The Indians meet for the first time a steam engine, they said to the driver, “Mighty big engine, How!?” The driver answers it is, and it has 100 horse power. The Indians then instinctively ask, “Well where are the 100 horses?” The Driver attempts to tell them of how there are no real horses inside it, and how it drives its self. But they cannot grasp this idea. So the driver strips the engine to bits to show them that there really is not a horse powering it. When they do not see anything, they blindly say or assume that there is a mighty invisible horse inside the engine and they just cannot see it. Ryle in this is saying that we have no mind driving ourselves, all we are is neurons in our brains, and to say that we have a nonphysical mind driving us is as ludicrous as saying that there is an invisible horse inside the train.
Another example is Ryle’s ‘University’ example by a image with a tourist visiting either Oxford or Cambridge for the first time, seeing the various colleges, playing fields and so on, but then asking the question, where is the university? This is implying that Ryle thinks the treatment by Descartes of mental events as separate to the other parts of the body, rather than viewing them as the one which he believed it was. Therefore there is no clear-cut difference between mental processes and physical processes.
But Ryle does not explain how consciousness occurs through his criticisms of Descartes, and it isn’t the most likely thing that conciseness was a side affect of the chemical reactions in the brain. And if our consciousness was just because of chemical reactions then it brings out the question do we have free will and if we don’t then it points to determinism which is the belief that all things came into existence and happen by pure fluke or coincidence.
Clifford, another materialist philosopher, who like the other materialists thought that there is only matter in this world and to think that there could be an actual separate thing such as the mind which controls the matter is absurd and irrational he gave an example of his point, ‘we can see how a material object can move another material object – a snooker cue can move a snooker ball. But is a difficult thing to see how an immaterial object like the soul can move a material object like the body’ - because even if there is a non-physical thing such as the soul they are entirely different entities and as such would be incompatible or so materialists believe. This idea is much the same as Positivism.
Positivism is based upon the fundamental ideas of science. And because there is no actual evidence or at least scientific evidence the soul doesn’t exist or until it is scientifically proven. Also a positivist explains how, the soul was invented; it was made up because science, in an un-advanced state, because science at the time could not explain our feelings and so on.
Susan Greenfield is another materialist. She has put forward the idea that consciousness varies in quality, and this variant of quality happens due to the arrangement of neurons. The bigger the assembly of neurons the more conscious you are, and then the smaller the group of neurons gives a lower form of consciousness. This idea is one which could well be true and could explain why monkeys cannot do all the same things we can with our minds simply because they have a lower concentration of neurons. Possibly as we develop further and possibly our concentration of neurons greatens possibly telekinesis may be possible.
This may possibly explain something of our moods, brain damage (lower conscious state), and even schizophrenia to name but a few things, but are these all merely because of the arrangement of neurons in our brains?
G Strawson says what he believes is the weakness in Susan’s argument as well as all other materialists. He says how Susan has explained the correlation of consciousness but not the explanation. Or possibly better put she has explained the mechanics of consciousness but not the why or the experience of it. And the why may be the most important thing about it, as explained in the following thought experiment; Dr Sam has a PhD in love and knows all of the physical aspects and principles the dilation of the pupils. But Dr Sam has never actually been in love himself, where as his friend Lee knows nothing about the scientific side to love but has actually himself been in love. So the person who knows more about love is Lee because he has experienced it.
So some philosophical thinkers like Bishop George Berkley came up with the idea of Idealism. Idealism is the concept of the world of which we experience in our everyday lives, is nothing more than our own interpretation of thoughts projected either by our selves of by a God or gods. Berkley said we cannot know whether we even have an actual body at all, we only have a body when we perceive it. He said ‘to be is to be perceived’. If his thoughts of there, possibly being nothing but thought (and no actual matter) are correct, there then comes the question of whether we live on after we die? If it is God who is generating us do we die as if we were turned off like a sort of hologram? Or do we still live on?
Something else which supports the concept of Idealism is that of Peggy Palmer’s condition, of her mind filling in the missing part. She suffers from bad eyesight - her brain only sees half of a word, and has to fill in the rest itself. This raises the question of whether our minds tell us what we want to see. It could lead to the idea that all physical matter is a projection of our minds.
I conclude that, for me one of the most feasible theories is Dualism, but because of the fundamental flaws in it with the problem of interaction, I have tended to Idealism. Quite simply because it works and has no flaws in it. I like it because it doesn’t put into question that there couldn’t be a God; in fact I believe it supports it. It gives a believable beginning of the universe, in my mind. I cannot compute the possibility that there was just a lump of rock and metal which exploded. Where did this lump of rock come from? We or I view mental things/spiritual things as eternal and them being realistically eternal because of a non-physical thing not being able to die because of the lacking of a physical shell to cease working. It makes so much more logical sense for the universe to consist of thought and only thought. It then makes miracles and other miraculous things become believably possible. I believe that life of which I am experiencing is much like a computer game which God has made or even a type of Matrix. It has boundaries or limitations and you can die in the game. But you walk away from the computer consol alive. So what I am saying is that in this world we may seem to die, but because everything is just mental then once you have finished your game you live on and that’s where I believe where the after life comes in.
Bibliography
The following were consulted directly.
EDWARDS &PAP A Modern Introduction to New York Free Press 1973.
ed. Philosophy
FLEW, Antony, ed. Body, Mind and Death. New York: Macmillan 1962.
PALMER Donald Does the Centre hold? California Mayfield 1996.
VESEY, Godfrey ed. Body and Mind. London: Allen & Unwin 1964.
The most helpful and main sources were essays by;
Paul Edwards in Edwards and Pap,
Anthony Flew in his volume above,
Donald Palmer in his book.
The following were met or consulted through selection in the texts above:
ARISTOTLE De Amina (cited in Flew)
AYER, Alfred J, The Concept of a Person and Other Essays. (Flew)
BERKELY, George, The principles Of Human Knowledge (1710) cf. Palmer
BROAD, C. D, The Mind and its Place in Nature. (1923) Cited in Vesey
CLIFFORD W. K. On the Nature of Things-in –Themselves (1878) Cited In Vesey
DESCARTES René meditations on First Philosophy (1641). Cited in Vesey
HUME David, Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding (1748) Cited in Vesey
HUXLEY T. H. On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata (1874) Cited in Vesey
KANT Immanuel The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) Cited in Vesey
LEIBNIZ G. W. The Discourse of Metaphysics (1685-6) Cited in Vesey
LEWES G. H. The Physical Basis of Mind (1877) Cited in Vesey
MALEBRANCHE, N, Dialogues On Metaphysics and Religion (1688) Cited in Vesey
MORTON PRICE the Nature of Mind and Human Automatism (1885) Cited in Vesey
PLATO Phaedro and the Alicibiades (Cited in Flew)
RUSSELL, Bertrand The Analysis Of Mind (1921) Cited in Vesey
RYLE, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. (1949) Cited in Vesey and Flew
SPINOZA Benedict The Ethics (1677) Cited in Vesey
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig Philosophical Investigations. (1953) cf Palmer
René Descartes (1596- 1650) often referred to as the father of Modern philosophy. He argued for Dualism. Famously quoted ‘I think there for I am’.
Leibniz (1646-1715) regarded as the most important figure in the seventeenth-century. He wrote the Discourse of metaphysics and the General inquires.
Malebranche (1638-1715) Put forward the principle of Occasionalism, and also wrote the book ‘On the search after truth’.
Gilbert Ryle (1949) a Materialist and wrote the concept of the mind.
W.K.Clifford a materialist thinker who wrote ‘On the nature of things-in-themselves’
Susan Greenfield a modern thinker and materialist
Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753) Irish philosopher, and was one of the founders of modern day idealism and he wrote ‘The Principles of Human Knowledge’.
