One of the biggest mistakes Schmacher and his party made in the 1950’s was economic rather than political. At this time the German population tended to prefer collective economic policies, which supported state intervention as opposed to free enterprise. The SPD failed to respond to this tendency and were therefore overshadowed by the CDU who offered the capitalist social market economy, which was one of the foundations of the economic miracle.
In economic policy Schumacher called for the nationalisation of basic and key industries and aimed to strengthen trade unions. His ideas were proving popular but the benefits of the 1948 currency reform and of Erhard’s price and wage liberalisation were beginning to show through, which was reflected in the 1949 elections in which the CDU won 31 percent of the vote to the SPD’s 29.2 percent. The SPD simply “did not believe that Erhard’s policies would work” (Padgett and Burkett 1986 p46) and maintained the view that the only thing that could result from price liberalisation and currency reform was poverty and unemployment.
Once again Schumacher was mistaken. His party’s popularity was harmed because many voters preferred to accept Erhard’s risky economic strategy than return to rationing. For the next 17 years the SPD found themselves in opposition. This was largely due to the success of the social market economy. The standard of living was rising rapidly and the country was rebuilt. The social market economy that the SPD so strongly criticised “quite simply worked” (Edwards 1998 p122) and there was no benefit to changing the political parties who promoted it and put it into use.
Another mistake made by the SPD was their refusal to join a coalition with the so-called ‘bourgeois parties’ particularly the CDU. Adenauer said, “In übrigen will die SPD keine Koalition mit uns, Schumacher und Heine haben sich gegen eine groβe Koalition ausgesprochen” (Buhrer 1993 p33).
Schumacher’s ‘all or nothing’ stance brought the CDU to “the centre of the political stage” (Padgett and Burkett 1986 p46) even though economics minister Ludwig Erhard’s policies were still looking risky.
An enormous tragedy for the SPD was the division of the two Germanys by the allies “The division of Germany was to be a serious handicap for the SPD” (Padgett and Burkett 1986 p44). The eastern territories had been popular ground for the SPD up until the start of the 1930’s and the loss of these areas was a huge obstacle for the party. Another problem was that there were many areas of the West where the SPD lacked strong support.
Schumacher himself was one of the factors, which prevented the SPD’s return to government. His personality was authoritarian and he believed that Germany needed a strong leader to achieve success and that he was the man for the job. He would also not allow his evaluation of post-war Germany to be questioned by anyone. He maintained the belief that the other parties would fail and when they did they would only have one place to turn: the SPD. The SPD, who historically have been a party geared towards the working classes, would attract the middle classes in this way. However, this was another error on the part of Schumacher as the middle classes had a “traditional fear of ‘bolshevism’ and socialism” (Padgett and Burkett 1986 p48) and this view was only strengthened by the soviet occupation in the East.
The SPD was branded with socialism by both the CDU and the Allies “socialism is still an albatross, which the CDU tries to hang about the SPD’s neck” (Padgett and Burkett 1986 p49). The American allies doubted Schumachers socialism and the French allies his nationalism.
In the build up to the 1957 elections Adenauer attempted to scare voters away from socialism using the example of the East German uprising of 1953 and the 1956 Hungarian revolution. He even suggested that a social democratic government “would mean the end of Germany” (Edwards 1998 p122). This tactic was very successful as voters forgot about the substantial contribution the SPD had made over the past few years particularly into the development of social policy. The CDU won the election with 50.2 percent of the vote. It was the first time in German history for any party to achieve an absolute majority.
Another miscalculation made by Schumacher was his misjudgement of how the German population viewed its Allies. Germany did not see them as welcome guests “no doubt the Germans resented the remaining prerogatives of the Allies” (Pulzer 2003 p57) but the Western Allies were seen in a more favourable light than the Soviet Allies in the Eastern zones. He built up a reputation for being awkward and unwilling to work with the Allies, which again was a tactic designed to attract the nationalist middle class voter. He later dubbed chancellor Adenauer ‘Chancellor of the Allies’ (Kanzler der Allierter).
The party’s demography was also a factor in the SPD’s failure to return to government. The SPD failed to come to terms with the interest group structure of Germany at this time and saw particular social groups as foes. The party placed a powerful emphasis on social class and was largely anti-clerical but this was not enough to attract the anti-clerical middle class vote.
The SPD also seriously underestimated the influence and the force of the Catholic Church. Schumacher made a serious electoral blunder when he accused the CDU of being a Catholic conspiracy. He didn’t believe that the party could overcome the differences between Catholic and Protestant, entrepreneur and farmer but he was wrong because in the ashes of the Third Reich the one thing that did remain was Christian belief. Catholics and Protestants had a form of equality between them after the division of Germany and the Catholic clergy wasted no time in advising their people “who were God’s men among the new politicians” (Padgett and Burkett 1986 p50). There was a very strong catholic majority at this time particularly in the French zone, which helped give Adenauer his lead.
It is fair to say that in the 1950’s the failure of the SPD to return to government was largely because they wanted to reform society by using “democratic rather than revolutionary means” (Edwards 1998 p120). With the experience of Weimar in the past the German population did not favour a democratic government “when the Germans had previously been political they had got their fingers burnt” (Padgett and Burkett 1986 p47).
The loss of support due to the division of the two Germanys by the Allies was a massive blow to the SPD and the catholic majority in the West was also very problematical for the party.
Schumacher was scarred by what life had done to him and his party during the Third Reich. He was extremely dedicated but his dedication often “clouded his judgement” (Padgett and Burkett 1986 p44), which resulted in his misjudgement of the bourgeois parties, particularly Adenauer, the post war situation and of the economy. Schumacher was just “as reactionary as Adenauer but lacks the ability to get votes” (Padgett and Burkett 1986 p44).
