Persia / Rome & War and Peace in the 7th and 8th Centuries

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

Persia / Rome & War and Peace in the 7th and 8th Centuries

Relations between Rome and Persia were exceptionally peaceful in the late 4th and 5th centuries. The two countries built on the peace of 363 to form a stable relationship. Indeed during the 5th century it has been said the skirmishes of 421 –2 and 441 – 2 were the only conflicts of note. However, the onset of the 6th century bought an immediate return to conflict with major incidents in 502-5, 527-532, 540-562, 572-90. This period of bloody warfare was continued into the 7th century and can surely be said to have contributed to the downfall of both empires at the hands of Muhammed and the Islamic movement. In this essay it will be important to note not only the reasons for the resumption of hostilities in the 6th century, but the reasons for relative peace in the 5th century. Initially I will study the relations between the two countries in 5th century before analysing the differences in the 6th century that may have caused such an upheaval.

The 5th century saw the two great powers of the era utilising a new form of conflict resolution. Instead of going to war over even minor grievances, we see both sides exercising caution before embarking on military aggression. For example, the Romans did not take the opportunity to attack when the Sasanians persecuted Christians in 449 – 51, or when the Sasanians suffered internal crises, such as the death of Peroz at the hands of the Hephthalites in 484. Roman contemporary writers, such as Dio, may well have suggested that the Sasanian Empire was intent on expanding into Roman territory, but the evidence suggests otherwise. The Sasanians showed restraint when the Roman Empire faced problems with the Visgoths, Ostrogoths and notably Atilla’s Huns. These examples help to highlight the lack of expansionist aims on either side. The Romans showed little propensity for expansion. Expansionist wars fought from Crassus to Julian had been expensive and hard to bear for outlying provinces, and as we shall see the Romans in the East had finally begun to realise the true strength and qualities of the Sasanian Empire. Issac best describes this era of cooperation by describing the process in which treaties were amended and updated. He suggests that the great power used conflict as a means of strengthening or enhancing peace treaties. He sites the wars of 421-2 and 441-2 as prime examples. Contentious issues of the treatment of Christians in the Sasanian Empire, the rivalry for beduin clients and the lines of demarcation were regulated via treaty.

To assess why this period of cooperation and stability deteriorated so rapidly it is pertinent to examine why it existed in the first place. 5th century relations had been given a promising start by the removal in the 4th century of several major bones of contention. The partition of Armenia by Shapur III and Theodosius I being a case in point. The fact that Rome negotiated at all with Sasanian Persia is equally important. Despite assimilating Barbarians into Roman armies, and indeed into Roman dynasties, the popular perception of the Barbarian tribes was that they were sub-human. The Romans used the word instable to describe such people. It was not possible to negotiate fully with these unstable people because, rightly or wrongly, they were perceived as untrustworthy and unreliable. Whilst it would be wrong to think that the majority of Romans thought the Sasanians their equals, we see that they were at least respected and considered stable. The treaties that Rome signed with Persia were relatively complex in comparison to those signed with Barbarian and tribes, and during the 5th century it as the Romans rather than the Sasanians that broke treaties. The Sasanians diplomatic behaviour and their military prowess earned them respect. Cameron is not the only historian to suggest that the Sasanians were equal to the Romans in terms of military power. The Persian conquests of the 7th century show this. Sasanian Persia was the only power that could rival the Eastern Empire, and whilst this was not always explicitly stated by the image conscious Romans, we see implicitly that the Romans respected the Sasanians as near equals.

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Cooperation in the 4th century stemmed from the mutual recognition of external threats. The Romans faced Hunnic pressure from the north and at times pressure from the Avars and Slavs in the Balkans. The continuing problems in other parts of the empire, notably Carthage, provided additional external pressures. It would be wrong to state that the Sasanians were facing equally strong external pressures, but there is no doubt that the pressure from Kidarite raiding in the north east posed a parallel threat to Sasanian security. Both Empire had to divert resources and manpower to these fronts, and the Romans in particular worked hard to avoid wars on two frontiers. The internal situation in Sasanian in this period was also conducive to a period of relative calm. The Sasanian Empire in this period was constricted around seven great families and a series of hierarchal relationships with outlying nobility. The administrative and bureaucratic structures of the Sasanian Empire were not as developed as those of their Roman counterparts. Blockley argues that organising large-scale Empire wide armies was extremely difficult for Sasanian kings. The king was unlikely to have a large-scale standing army and required the support of the nobility for the release of large numbers of troops. Blockley argues that the Sasanian Kings continually tied to increase their authority by increasing the manpower and resources that they directly controlled. Therefore we see the Sasanian King using small, centrally controlled raiding forces to loot and gain booty from the Roman Empire. This was a quick and easy way for the Sasanian Kings to increases their status and centralised authority by enhancing the quantity and quality of centralised resources. This strategy, whether tacit or not, helped to lessen the scale of conflicts between the two powers. We see this Sasanian strategy in other contexts. The payment of tributes from the Romans had two interacting effects. Firstly the wealth paid to the Sasanians could be sued to build up central control, and secondly the king could use the apparent Roman subservience to enhance his own reputation. Why would the Sasanians King strive for Roman territory when they could extort large resources from a more peaceful alternative?

We can also use cross-cultural factors to explain the period of cooperation. The active Christian missionaries in Sasanian helped forge links across the border areas. In fact in may be wrong to talk in terms of cross-cultural relations. Mesopotamia for example was split artificially between Rome and Sasanian Persia. Indeed whether or not there was a definitive border is an going historical debate. We see the movement of peoples across a notional border as part of everyday life. Christians at least had free movement across the border, and Sasanian Christians were known to have gone on pilgrimages to Palestine. Similarly cross border trade existed, although officially both powers discouraged private travel across the border

. The Christians especially used these cultural links to foster sound relations between the powers. In 400 Marutha, bishop of Sophanene, visited the Sasanian capital of Ctesiphon with a Roman embassy. The bishop healed Ydzegard I’s son. The Bishop exploited Ydzgard’s gratitude by lobbying for extra rights for Christian in Persia. It was of course in the Mesopotamians interest to lobby for better relations. Battles that did occur between the two powers tended to occur around the fortified cities of Mesopotamia, and as recent studies show the Romans often relied on the residents of these cities to defend themselves. Cameron and Issac take this point to further. They attempt to show that the Roman military installations on the Mesoptamian border were not always military installations. They stress the concern for internal security, prestige, border policing, and trade as substantial reasons for the existence of these fortifications.

The dearth of aggressive attacks in the 5th century contrasts with the frequency of such attacks in the 6th century. In the early period we see Kawad launching an attack in 502 followed by Khusro in 540, Justin II in 543 and Khurso II in 603. Clearly this period sees the return of military conflict as the primary method of conflict resolution. In the 5th century we saw that the attitudes of both Empires as important in preserving diplomatic and military harmony. Similarly we see the attitude of Emperor’s as crucial in explaining these conflicts. On a simplistic level we can see Kawad’s invasion as a pursuit of internal status. The continual strengthening of the Sasanian Empire allowed the Sasanian King to initiate bolder military moves. We see the role of leaders in initiating conflicts more clearly on the Roman side. In the late 5th century we see Roman Emperor’s beginning to renege on their payments to Persia. Anastasius and Zeno tried especially hard to avoid paying these tributes. Rubin sees two main reasons for this dangerous tactic. Firstly, as Lydus confirms, these tributes were extremely expensive. At the end Zeno’s reign we see the Imperial Treasury with a surplus of 100,000 lbs of gold. Yes, this was in part due to the lack of military activity at this time, but Kawad’s internal difficulties allowed the Romans to renege on these costly payments. However Rubin stresses the political motivation behind these moves. He argues that a fundamental dilemma had emerged by the time of Anastasius’ reign. Rubin suggests that these Emperor’s faced a choice between becoming a satellite of Persia by continually paying tributes, or continuing the Roman imperial tradition by reconstructing the Mediterranean Empire. As an Emperor’s position rested on his honour, glory and primarily the state of the Empire, Rubin argues that this situation could only lead to long and costly wars. Rubin sees Justinian’s efforts to reconquest the West as an attempt to break free from this viscious circle. By taking this enormous risk Justinian and the empire “reaped the poisonous harvest of the dilemma”. Cameron eloquently states the irony that the “final assertion of Roman military and imperial tradition precipitated its decline”. The delicate balance of power seen in the 5th century was untenable in the long run as it relied upon a continual outflow of Roman resources and Roman pride.

The raids of the 6th century were much more destructive than those of the 5th century. Howard-Johnston relates the increased effectiveness of these conquering attacks to the gradual redressing of the economic imbalance. This economic growth, which is seen most clearly in the growth of Mesoptomain cities, came with an increased level of administrative and bureaucratic organisation. By looking at the complex and expensive irrigation system, and at the equally impressive fortifications, Howard-Johnston concludes that the central Sasanian government must have been strong and efficient. Such capital-intensive projects would have required logistical organisation as well as tax system to fund them. He contrasts this growth in administrative organisation, and economic power, with the decline in internal imperial control in the Roman East. Others extend this argument by suggesting that the wars of the later period were prolonged as a result of the economic decline in the East. As the 6th century continued Eastern emperor’s found it increasingly difficult to find the manpower and resources for war. The ease of which the Persians broke through the Romans Mesopotamian defences in 540 is a case in point. These economic deficiencies combined with other internal difficulties to, in the words of one historian, produce a “ferment of change”. Traditionally sectarian problems within the Christian faith have been highlighted as reasons for the ease of invasion by Persians and Muslims. The internal divisions in the church were significant, and often intensified by clumsy imperial behaviour. However we must not overplay the significance of this factor. For example, the Monophysite areas of Egypt, north and east Syria and Persian Armenia were seen as bulwarks of the Empire. These internal fragmentations combined with the persistent external threats from the Balkans and the Persians created an eerily similar situation to the Western empire in the 4th century. These factors contributed to the elongation of the Persian wars as well as the ease of entry of the Muslims.

By underlining the reasons for stability in the 5th century it becomes easier to see why there was so much more conflict in the later periods. The peace of the 5th century was by no means sustainable. It relied on large Roman financial outlays and a foreign relations policy that went against the principles of the empire. No emperor could justify assimilation into a Persian satellite state. The Persians used the refusal to pay tributes as a thinly veiled excuse to indulge in glorious, status building raids, and in the later period, conquests. These wars were exacerbated by the ferment of change in the Eastern province. To some extent this change was economic and was focussed on resource and financial problems, but cultural and political change added to a fragmented internal environment. The peace of the 5th century was an unsustainable one, and in the long-run it could be argued that this peace was in fact destructive.