With Great Britain sinking it’s hooks into the resources of the Ottoman Empire, Russia tried other tactics to prove their commitment to the preservation of the empire. This began in 1833 when the Russians gained a foothold on the Ottoman lands in Europe through the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which put the
Tournis, 3
Ottoman Empire under the strict protection of the Russians and gave the Russian Navy and merchant ships access to the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. By protecting the Ottoman Empire, Nicholas I was trying to gain support from Ottoman leaders and people, so when the time came to divide the lands of the former Ottoman Empire, Russia would be looked upon as the heir and given control, and, in the meantime, reap the benefits of increased shipping in the Mediterranean. By 1840 though, Russia changed its mind, and realizing the British influence building in Turkey, Nicholas I decided to try and form an alliance with Great Britain in case the empire suddenly fell. He tried for four years until finally in 1844 he came to a secret agreement with Great Britain and, “the two powers agreed to preserve the Ottoman Empire as long as possible and, in case of impending dissolution, to consult with each other about what should be done” (Stavrianos, pg. 322). Though there was one problem with the agreement, and that was that it was not a formal alliance and either could disavow it at any time. Although it would seem that Great Britain and Russian would eventually gain control over Ottoman lands, relations between the two quickly dissolved and the British became strongly opposed to the Russians. Russia aided Austria in quelling revolutions in the late 1840’s and was looked upon by the French, British, and Turks as tyrants. This shows the development of how the two main powers became involved in the Crimean War. Now with this understanding we will look at the how this lead to war.
Tournis, 4
The simplest way to see the balance of power argument is through the classic realist view. The situation began with the questioning of whether or not Greek Orthodox monks should have possession of the keys to the inner and outer churches in Bethlehem. The Russians, being an Orthodox nation, supported the Orthodox claim to the keys, while the French held that the keys belonged to the Catholic monks. To further the problem, Turkey sided with the French because they were sympathetic to the Catholic claim. By 1852, Napoleon was in power and did not want to risk any of his power in Palestine, so he sent an envoy to the tsar to peacefully resolve the problem, but it was too late. The Russian people wanted total control for the Orthodox Church in Bethlehem and were not willing to negotiate. The tsar sent Prince Menshikov to Constantinople to negotiate a convention, but the negotiations were a complete failure and resulted in British intervention. Britain wanted Russia to back down and accept a diplomatic note. The Russians did not want anything less than a legal convention stating the Orthodox claim in Palestine, and after hearing of the failed negotiations, the tsar wanted to declare war. Instead, Russia sent Turkey a not e stating that, “unless Mensikov’s demands were accepted within eight days Russian troops would occupy the Principalities” (Stavrianos, pg. 327). The Turks refused and gained both British and French naval support in the Dardanelles. This course of action complies with a classic realist view of alliance structures forming (Great Britain, France, Turkey, and later Austria), strategic planning, a security dilemma mounting, and aggressive diplomatic procedures
Tournis, 5
that would eventually lead to war. The Turks, under British pressure, replied with “The Turkish Ultimatum,” which was misinterpreted by the Russian Ambassador in Vienna and rejected by the tsar. However, the tsar did not go to war and asked Austria to present the “Buol note,” which called for peace and recognition in the Holy Land. The note was accepted by the French, but rejected by the British, which then lead to British naval support moving to Constantinople, Finally, strong Turkish support for war led to raids across the Danube, and, consequently war. This was the international level of analysis that can be attributed to the beginning of the Crimean War. Now, we will look at the internal problems of the Ottoman Empire that could be reasons for the Crimean War.
Internal Problems in The Ottoman Empire
The leaders of the Ottoman Empire knew in the early 1800’s that their empire was quickly declining, and it is because of this that they sought aggressive policymaking and strategic planning to strengthen their failing reign. The peripheral regions of the Ottoman Empire began slipping away around 1810 when Serbian resistance began mounting. By 1812, the Serbs had gained their independence, and then in 1828 the Greeks began retaliating and by 1829, with the help of Great Britain, France, and Russia, had finally regained their independence. Egypt’s unsuccessful revolution in 1832, and successful one that lasted followed this from 1839 to 1847. This string of fighting caused many problems within the empire. First, economically the Ottomans were greatly lacking in technology and because of the fighting were not able to build much
Tournis, 6
industry at all. Secondly, the fighting also greatly depleted their military, since they traditionally took young men from all of the regions that had rebelled to serve in the military; the number of possible recruits was drastically reduced. Finally, they did not have any of the advanced weaponry of the time and their navy was very weak, especially after fighting the Greeks, Russians, British, French, and Egyptians. All of this compounded into aggressive policymaking in the late 1840’s and early 1850’s.
In 1839, the sultan issued an imperial decree that called for the reformation and “Westernization” of the Turkish economy. This would have been a promising venture, but the plan called for the aid of the British. As discussed previously, the British wanted to establish themselves in Turkey only to be able to reap the benefits of low tariffs and future lands. The Tanzimat, as the plan was called, began well on the education front, but led to increasing foreign debt and later the termination of the plan, and subsequent fall of the empire. It was the internal problems of the Ottoman Empire led to basic British control of the military in the Crimean War and economy before and after.
This situation can be compared to the Diversionary Theory of War, in that that the internal economic problems of the Ottoman Empire led to aggressive actions by the Turkish military. The Turkish leaders knew their empire was crumbling and gained public support b pinning the crisis as a religious war, which therefore diverted attention to the greater problem of survival. Also, the Turkish leaders, or elites, had nothing to lose with French and British backing, and thus pushed for war.
Conclusion
I believe the Crimean war was one fought over the balance of power in Europe. At the time, Great Britain was quickly rising in power economically and imperially, which created a need to strengthen their hold in the Middle East, while Russia felt they were heir to the European principalities held by the Turks. Together, they tried to take a hold of Turkey, but the final result was war.
Bibliography
-
Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989. Holsti, Kalevi J. Cambridge University Press. 1992. New York.
-
Balkans Since 1453. Stavrianos, L.S. Rinehart & Co. Inc. 1958. New York.
The Causes of the Crimean War
Nick Tournis
Y375
April 12, 2001