United States Policy towards Cuba

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

Memorandum from Eric Wickersham of the National Security Council Staff

Dec. 15 1960

Subject

U.S foreign policy regarding Cuba has become an extremely contentious issue since the decline of the Batista government. The ascendancy of Fidel Castro and the 26th of July Movement has raised a multitude of concerns and speculations. The development of a clear strategic plan and ability to take decisive action has not been demonstrated primarily because of the ambiguous nature of the Cuban threat. It is advised that this administration resolves to define its position on Cuban affairs before the inauguration of the incoming Kennedy administration Accordingly, the State Dept. must provide a clear analysis of the dangers Cuba poses to the United States. Therefore my memorandum will summarize the issues that comprise the Cuban threat through an integrative analysis of several points of view. It is obviously important to examine the historical effectiveness of our past policies regarding Cuba, thus I will provide examples of past policy as point of reference. Finally, I will outline my recommendation on which of the available options should be promoted to the incoming Administration.

Summary of Past Policy

The United State’s initial stance on Cuba was one of tolerance towards the Castro regime in order to provide this government a chance to establish a reasonable relationship with the U.S. While the radical and anti-American background of the Castro family was well documented, such as their involvement with Communist causes, the future direction of this government could not be predicted, despite grave doubts held by American analysts. Castro had maintained that Cuba would be a democratic government, having elected officials and that the government would honor international obligations and agreements. While U.S. officials were skeptical about the future of democracy in Cuba, a “wait and see” policy was adopted because of the popularity Castro enjoyed in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world, such that officials felt there was little alternative. Indeed, Castro assured Vice President Richard Nixon in April 1959 that his aim was to set up a democracy and that he was not a Communist. When Castro increased his public criticism of the United States, our government issued no reaction in order to allow him the possibility of fostering his alleged political ideology of democracy and a working relationship with the U.S. Cancellation of elections followed, as did removal of moderates from government, ascension of Communist leaning government officials, anti-Communists were persecuted and the status of officials possessing alleged pro-American sympathies were revoked.

Cuban-associated efforts were made to inspire revolution in various Caribbean governments, and there were increased rantings of Anti-American sentiment. During these early days of the new Cuban government under Castro, the Embassy felt that Castro’s position on the U.S would change over time, as his self-interests lead him to rethink the importance of his relations with the U.S. Multiple reliable sources informed the Embassy that Castro considered his popularity to be of utmost importance and he used anti-American propaganda to reel in the loyalties of the uninformed masses. Castro went so far as to attribute Cuba’s economic woes to the U.S.

When Castro chose to enact the extremist-backed Agrarian Reform Law on May 17, last year, he authorized the expropriation of extensive American properties, all without acceptable compensation. This action not only caused a further loss of faith in Cuba, but more importantly, it signaled an increase of the Communist influence in Cuba: Communists have infiltrated every aspect of Cuba’s life and government. The Communist party is the only party allowed to operate. At this point, we retained our tolerant attitude regarding Cuba as any demonstration of force against, what was in the world’s eyes, a weaker ...

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In summation, any hope of Castro reforming his views on the U.S. appears to be futile. Castro’s government is closely aligned with the Soviet bloc and the United States faces a belligerent anti-American, pro-Communist government in close geographical proximity. An additional concern is the influence that this aggressive neighbor could wield on the surrounding Latin American countries. In short, the United States is confronted with a hostile neighbor, that in spite of its small size, it poses a large threat to our national security, as I will detail below.

Examination of the current status of the Cuban Threat

A. Anti-Americanism

Two years of open attacks by Castro on the U.S., have damaged the U.S reputation in Latin America, particularly by inspiring doubts in those who have less direct influence by America, being the poverty stricken, uninformed masses in Cuba. . Castro’s influence on the people is immeasurably strong, as observed by Assistant Secretary of State for inter-American affairs, R.R. Rubottom, after a Castro speech in November of last year: “The hypnotic hold that Fidel has over the mob is frightening-he can raise it to a bloodthirsty pitch then cool it to an obedient ardor. Hitler was never as good, although it must be admitted he worked on a better educated element.”

The U.S. did not defend itself against this criticism and while attempting to appear tolerant, the lack of response may have appeared as a tacit agreement with the claims made against the United States. Our lack of counter attacks may yet have been in our favor as our level-headed response to Castro’s vitriolic attacks may give the U.S. policy regarding Cuba a reputation of being rational and balanced.

C. Communist threat

An ongoing question persists: Is Fidel Castro truly a Communist? There has been an increase in communist rhetoric during his regime and Khrushchev has expressed a willingness to militarily back up Cuba against western attack. Indeed, Cuba is virtually part of the Soviet bloc in that it is receiving arms shipments such as tanks, anti-aircraft guns, large numbers of machine guns, ammunition, and electronic equipment. With the aid of the USSR and China, a nation-wide people’s militia of considerable size is being created.

The Cuban Charge d'Affaires Daniel M. Braddock puts the security threat this poses to our government is the proper light with his statement “Though Cuba is not a Soviet satellite in the traditional sense, it plays as active an effective a role in Soviet plans for world conquest”

The Castro regime is following the tactics which the U.S State Department. has identified as the Communist procedure for Latin American expansion. The communist label is avoided and instead, the movement describes itself as being nationalistic. Anti-Americanism and speeches on economic progress gradually identify it with the goals and ideology of the Communist party no matter what its label. We expect that there will be further cooperation and identification between the Castro regime and international Communism.

Possible Courses of Action

Three courses of action can be delineated at this point: 1. Further Economic Warfare

2. Covert Insurgency supported by Anti-Castro rebels (FRD)

3. Maintain existing protocol

These options will be discussed individually and a strong recommendation made for which promises the greatest success in reducing the threat of hostilities that are currently posed.

1. Economic

In recent months, we have experienced a rapid decline in the ability of the Cuban and U.S. governments to keep up friendly relations. This worsening of relations has been the result of actions such as the Cuban government seizing oil companies and the U.S. responding quickly with a reduction in the Cuban sugar quota. American owned sugar companies, oil companies and utilities were confiscated, and the U.S owned banks were nationalized. The U.S embargoed exports to Cuba, and Cuba responded by confiscating most of the remaining American-owned enterprises. Interestingly, Cuban economy has actually improved in some sectors despite U.S. efforts to weaken Cuban economy. This outcome demonstrates that economic sanctions are not necessarily effective. The U.S. retracting its supply of grain, lard, rice, automotive parts, etc has had little effect and the ban on the import of Cuban sugar has back-fired as the result of these two policies has been to create an economic vacuum which our enemies will readily fill. The Soviets have are more than willing to replace our economic influence, making Cuba dependant on Soviet crude, and dependent on the USSR’s purchase of Cuban sugar by two million tons, when the U.S has reduced its acquisitions by nearly one million tons.

2. Covert Insurgency

The Anti-Castro opposition in Cuba- has not demonstrated any capacity to sustain a strong, unified action against the Castro government. The Cuban people do not have an alternate to Castro’s leadership. The result of this situation is that people face the choice of fleeing this government or resigning themselves to the Castro being the leader of their country. Those that would flee the country are those who have lost the most: landlords, businessmen, dispossessed property owners, moneyed types of individuals and professional men. In contrast, the population that strongly supports Castro includes workers, peasants, and their sons, all of whom are quite prepared to do battle for the revolution to rise up against the wealthy.

In order to overthrow Castro, a prompt, united and effective effort is needed as well as a plan for a provisional government to effectively govern the country following Castro’s defeat and during the transition to democracy. To build public support in Cuba among the middle and lower classes the transitional government might be built around the original cabinet that took over following the fall of Batista. The Cuban public must come to believe that this new government is committed to “rescuing” the revolution.

If the U.S. were to give active support to a government in exile while an overthrow were being planned, The U.S. would be subject to charges of violation of provisions among the U.N and the O.A.S (Organization of American States) charter. The leader of the FRD has expressed little hope that the O.A.S. would support its insurgency against the Castro regime. Further, a major military effort would be needed and for that, the U.S. would need to supply men and arms, especially with the support that Cuba has received from the Soviets.

Intervention in Cuba would serve several functions: it would send the message to the world that the U.S will not tolerate the establishment of Communism in the Western hemisphere, that the U.S will not hesitate to act when its security is at stake and it would likely have the effect of discontinuing U.S. baiting by minor powers. On the other hand, this action would drive more anti-American sentiment within Latin America. While popular support for Castro has declined, he is the symbol of revolution and he maintains a tight grip on the country. Any intervention by the U.S. would serve to raise his popularity and have the effect of slowing his fall.

3. Maintain Existing Protocol

Taking no action and maintaining the current policies toward Cuba is not likely to correct the problems we face with the growth of Communism in the West or the future threat of USSR involvement with a country that is close to our shores. The risk of a nuclear war between the USSR and the United States is elevated with the ability of the Soviet Union to use Cuba as an ally. Relations with Cuba will not improve as Castro continues to play on U.S-Cuba tensions for his political benefit, to make irrational demands and not make any compromise in negotiations. Soviet support has also reached the point of no return, we can not hope in displacing their influence.

Recommendation of Action

As it is quite obvious from this analysis, a solution to the Cuban threat is not easily apparent. Economic retaliation has thus far appeared flawed, and largely counter-productive to the U.S agenda. Hypothetically, if U.S economic sanctions were deemed responsible for the fall of the Castro government, then the replacing government would have weak popular support in Cuba and the western hemisphere. Castro would be perceived as the “latest martyrs to American imperialism”, rather than an example of the consequences of Communist take over of legitimate revolutionary movement in the Americas. In the same vein, it has been documented that U.S economic sanctions have been manipulated as to appear to be aimed against the Cuban people, rather than Castro. This is obviously counter-productive to the U.S goal of inspiring tension between the Castro government and Cuban citizens.

In the same regard, the success of a covert counter-insurgency movement seems doubtful given the lack of support from the lower echelons of society. The continuation of an outwardly non-interventionist U.S policy toward Cuba would be the worst choice of action given the documentation of U.S-Cuban relations over the last two years.

The primary threat to the U.S. is the growth of Communism in the Western World. The recommendation by this office is to remove the economic retaliations and improve the economy of Cuba with the aim of reducing this country being a foothold for Communism. Rather than tolerate anti-U.S. actions we will support the efforts of the Cuban government to improve the quality of the lives of the poverty-stricken people so that they see the benefits of the capitalist market. The U.S. will be seen as helping a struggling small nation and supporting its chosen leader. .