What are the differences between Kant and Arendt on radical evil?

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Martin Camilleri 02947074

What are the differences between Kant and Arendt on radical evil?

The concept of evil is one that for all of us is difficult to come to terms with. In our everyday life, in the news and in all forms of historical contemplation we encounter acts of what we call evil, and we intuitively attempt to calibrate them. We look to find a scale against which we wish to measure ourselves in order to justify our own actions and for the religious of us, to estimate the chances of an eternal life with God. Philosophers and theologians alike, have looked for an explanation for the wrong doing around them and they theorise in an attempt to understand whether evil is inherent in human nature or not. Are we essentially evil? Can we work towards purifying ourselves or are we inherently good and is evil an ‘incomplete development of the capacity for good’?

Immanuel Kant introduced the notion of radical evil in his essay Of Radical Evil in Human Nature taken from his paper Religion within the bounds of mere reason. This was a theory that went against all of his previous convictions on the notions of good, evil and free-will. Previously, in Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788), evil had been for Kant varying degrees of the absence of the capacity for good. He now claimed that man could not be good and evil in varying degrees but that he was either absolutely good or absolutely evil. He is free to either choose to adhere to the moral law or to deviate from it. This view has influenced many thinkers from the time of inception to this very day, famously including Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) who abandoned this idea for her theory on The Banality of Evil. It is the relationship between these ideas that I wish to discuss. I shall begin with a more comprehensive description of Kant’s doctrine of radical evil in order to provide a basis for this discussion and then, in contrast Arendt’s transition from radical evil to the banality of evil. This will, I hope, allow us to see some of the differences in their thinking and the reasoning behind them.

 

Kant had discovered a problem with his previous convictions. On closer inspection of them, they seemed to say that man was not morally responsible for his actions. He had asserted that man’s moral experience indicates a division between the sensual world of inclination and desire, the animalityof human nature; and the intelligible world which is always in conformity with the dictates of reason (this is proven empirically – we are all aware of concepts such as good and ought and right). Firstly, the animal part of man’s nature is not subject to free-will, so can be considered neither morally good nor morally bad in the same way as a cat could not be held morally responsible for bringing home a mouse. The cat does not have the facility within him to choose otherwise. Secondly, for the perfectly reasonable part of man’s nature, it is only possible to conform to the moral law. He is not only aware of the moral law but he is also compelled to abide by it, so there is also without the freedom of choice. It would follow then, that for man to be morally obligated and to have a genuine free-will he must be given the freedom to choose and that choice must only be a choice between good and evil. Without this choice his life would be determined by his inclinations which are imposed upon him and a strictly formatted sense of reason from which, if he is healthy, he cannot escape either. We can now see that Kant introduced his doctrine of radical evil so as ‘to make freedom, in this sense, intelligible… to give a full and adequate justification of moral freedom’ It must therefore follow that evil is a necessary part of human nature. ‘The possibility of evil must somehow lie in human nature itself.’

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Seemingly negatively, Kant begins his essay by pointing out that evil is something that we cannot deny exists within all of us; ‘There is no man who liveth and sinneth not.’It is impossible to deny that man can be cruel for cruelties sake. This is empirically evident. If this were not the case, how could we hold anyone responsible for harm done to us? Anyone who genuinely believes in Kants original, unintended deterministic view is committed to accepting all that comes his way and laying no blame. There, however, seems to be no such person. Even those who believe ...

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