Whilst the dangers arising from a protracted and uneven arms race may suggest that war was inevitable, there is debate among the authors that the First World War may in contrast have been a result of short term contingent causes. Williamson (1989 p.236) argues that in the “absence of any one” of the numerous key decisions in the July crisis; such as Potiorek’s demand that Vienna go to war, or Berlin’s decision to support this war, a major European conflict might have been avoided. Against this point Schroeder (1972 p.321) argues that the “frequent escape from crises before 1914” in Europe indicated that war could not be avoided indefinitely. This is in contrast to Mulligan (2011) who argues that “In 1910…Europeans had good reason to be optimistic about their future” based on achievement dating back to 1874”, thus suggesting that the causes of the war were more contingent and short term. Mulligan’s argument is strengthened by the point raised by Williamson. Williamson (1989 p.244) states that had Grey better understood the crisis of 1914, Britain would have had a considerably better chance of manipulating the crisis “toward a peaceful solution”. On the other hand, the point is raised by Ferguson (1999 p.100) that even before the July crisis, arguments for a “pre emptive strike were already well established in Berlin”. However this statement by Ferguson should not be seen as rendering the war as inevitable, as it is dated at a mere one week before the July crisis. Therefore, as Williamson argues, (1989 p.244) it could have been avoided had Grey acted appropriately previously. This suggests that war was not inevitable as Schroeder’s comment conveys, but rather that it could be seen as a failure of individual politicians to make the right decisions.
The issue of leadership as a cause for the First World War links into another point that the authors debate from differing angles, that is, the role that the desire for imperialistic expansion had to play as another important cause. Schroeder (1972 p.320) sees imperialism as a long term cause of the First World War, maintaining that the from 1890 onwards German leadership acted to “pursue world power” and although this wasn’t realised until 1910; it was the perception of Germany as a threat to Britain’s colonies that led to Britain excluding her “from world politics and empire”. On the other hand Mulligan (2011) sees imperialism as having the opposite effect, arguing that European peace between great powers and imperialism were closely linked. Mulligan (2011) states that the imperial deals and compromises between the great powers were as Churchill asserted “the nods and winks” that sustained peace in Europe, rather than antagonising factors that may have led to war. However such an interpretation seems misplaced, particularly in relation to Eastern Europe; as Williamson (1989 p.233) highlights, the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the impending decline of the Habsburg Empire led to tension between imperial powers over who would benefit. This is a point which is given weight by Schroeder’s (1972 p.336) argument that Austria-Hungary “committed suicide out of fear of death” from the surrounding imperial powers. It was this committing of suicide, arising from the fear of its surrounding imperial neighbours expansionist policies that was a crucial trigger in accelerating the inevitability of the First World War, primarily because it led to the direct involvement of Germany. Thus the role that imperialism had to play seems to be one that should not be undermined as it was imperialism that forced Vienna’s hand into trying to maintain its sovereignty.
The causes of the First World War, as have been addressed in this review, are subject to much debate between the four selected authors. None of the texts can be said to be consistently identical or in constant opposition, however there are clear similarities and differences present. Arising from this are distinct strengths and weaknesses in the approaches of the authors in relations to the issues discussed.
Bibliography
Ferguson, N. The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999)
Keegan, J. The First World War (Pimlico; New edition edition, 1999)
Mulligan, M. The Origins of the First World War History Review 2011 Available at [Accessed November 2011]
Schroeder, P. W. ‘World War I as a Galloping Gertie’ Journal of Modern History 44/3 (1972)
Stone, N. World War One: A Short History (Allen Lane; illustrated edition edition, 2007)
Williamson, S.R. ‘The Origin of World War I’ in Rotberg, R.I. & Rabb, T.K. Rabb (eds.) The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge University Press, 1989)
