With fear and insecurity, however, did not come a lack of control and a second characteristic of the system is that it was forged entirely by Bismarck and Germany. Not even Russia and Austria were interested in an alliance with each other, both had other preferences. Bismarck wanted a system which could prevent Austro-Russian conflict in the Balkans by tying the two powers to Germany (and indeed to each other), and which would prevent France from finding a significant ally. To achieve this he was prepared to bully the Dual Monarchy, Russia and even his own Kaiser, William I . For instance the Dual Alliance was itself a tactic to intimidate Russia who knew of its existence, but could only speculate as to the extent of its terms. Bismarck wanted to secure Austria first, against the wishes of William whose conservative principles favoured an alliance with Russia. Bismarck, and his entire cabinet threatened to resign if the Dual Alliance was not ratified.
Not surprisingly it was the Austro-Hungarians who provided the opposition to the extension of the alliance system to embrace Russia in 1881. Haymerle preferred a British coalition, even after the election of Gladstone in 1880. When British anti-Ottoman policies drove the Dual Monarchy back to consider Russia, the negotiations were between a Russo-German draft and an Austrian counter proposal, dashing Haymerle's hopes that the alliance could be used by the Central powers against Russia. When Haymerle became intransigent over terms, Bismarck threatened that "it would be his painful duty to tell St. Petersburg who was to blame." Even with the Triple Alliance, Vienna required considerable convincing that there was benefit for her in aligning with irredentist Italy, who herself represented a Balkan rival.
It should be noted that even Bismarck's control over the system and his allies' policies was limited. In the Dual Alliance of 1879, its renewal in 1883, and the Triple Alliance he failed consistently to achieve an Austrian guarantee to help protect Germany's western border with France. Unlikely as an unprovoked attack from France was, it was a particular concern for Bismarck; but he gained more from Italy and as much from Russia as he did from Austria in this respect. Furthermore, the murder of Alexander II in 1881, allowed Giers to delay in the negotiations for the Three Emperors League. Aware that Bismarck was obsessed with this treaty the Russians hoped the delay would add to the pressure brought upon Austria-Hungary which subsequently occurred. However, although the other powers could exploit Bismarck's determination for the negotiations to succeed to their advantage, the system was primarily a German one and would not have occurred were it not for the impetus of the German chancellor.
The reason for this is straightforward. The alliances served to settle German insecurities; they merely served to suppress Russian and Austro-Hungarian concerns. It was always going to be "a conjuring trick" to keep Austro-Hungarian tension from boiling over but a further feature of the system is that it did not settle the Balkan rivalry between Vienna and St. Petersburg, it merely provided a framework for "peaceful coexistence". The Russians could never be satisfied so long as the Dual Alliance remained in existence, even though they were as yet unaware of its terms, it was a compromise upon the Three Emperors League. In the Balkans they were to achieve a Big Bulgaria after all (although not as big as per the Treaty of San Stefano) through part four of the protocol of the Three Emperors League , yet this was of limited benefit since Alexander of Battenburg was a nationalist bourgeois ruler who refused to be a Russian satellite. For Austria's sake, Haymerle's hope that Germany and Austria could work together in league against Russia was disappointed, since Bismarck refused to promise Austria anything with regard to support for her policies in the Balkans; and any hope of an alliance with Britain was undermined by the League.
A further qualification however; the Bosnian revolt of 1881-82 did not develop into a crisis between Austria and Russia despite considerable popular agitation in both countries. This may be because the crisis occurred in "Austria's half" of the Balkans, a sphere of influence bolstered by her right to annex Bosnia and her bilateral alliance with Serbia (June 1881). Austria was the more restless of the two rivals in the Balkans since Russia had other outlets of influence, whereas Vienna had none. Thus when the Bulgarian crisis erupted in 1886 the tension was much harder for Germany to control. Austro-Russian tension was a paradoxical feature of the Alliance system; a feature which Bismarck felt made the system necessary, yet a feature which ultimately destroyed the system.
Ever since his total victory in 1870, Bismarck had feared a French revival. Alsace-Lorraine had been a valuable prize, but one which made the Chancellor nervous of revanchism. Consequently the alliance system set out to exclude France, specifically from a Russian alliance, but also from an Austrian alliance against Russia. Bismarck succeeded in this between 1879-83, and French isolation is a characteristic which distinguishes the system from the later 1880's where the French and Russians were gradually drawn together. The only specific treaty clause against France was in Article II of the Triple Alliance which protects Italy and Germany from attack "without direct provocation" . However, it was the Three Emperors Alliance which confirmed French isolation, the Triple Alliance merely provided for the failure of the policy; there was some fear that Italy might become a republic and form a league with France and perhaps ultimately Spain and Portugal in the Western Mediterranean, but such fears were tiny compared to a Franco-Russian alliance. The brief Gambetta administration in France (November 1881- January 1882) and the subsequent Skobelev crisis cemented such fears but at that stage they came to nothing. Bismarck even encouraged France in her occupation of Tunis in 1881 as he perceived that if she were compensated and kept busy in North Africa, France would be less likely to pursue a revanchist policy on the continent.
Britain also remained isolated during this period although less owing to German insecurity than partly to her own policies, and partly due to her lack of usefulness to the Bismarckian system. Initially the British government were delighted with the Dual Alliance, Salisbury described it as "good tidings of great joy" since it meant that Britain would not have to fight against Russia in the Balkans since Germany would be committed to preventing conflict or opposing Russia herself. The Three Emperors League however, was less to Britain's favour. Bismarck refused the trilateral treaty with Britain that Haymerle wanted partly because he felt it would increase the risk of conflict with Russia, conflict in which Britain would only commit her naval power, and Germany would have to bear the brunt of land fighting; he also opposed it because he wanted an agreement with Russia anyway and Britain could not be a part of that due to her rivalry with Russia. The League of 1881 agreed to reunite Bulgaria and accepted Russia's definition of the closure of the Turkish straits. Britain were in opposition but in isolation. She could not, as in 1833, even turn to France, since colonial dispute over Britain's occupation of Egypt isolated the two from each other. Gladstone's rhetoric and policies may have assisted this position but it was Bismarck's intention to exclude Britain and to that end he succeeded.
The British General Election of 1880 was fought considerably over foreign policy and the isolationist view prevailed. In the countries involved in the Alliance System, however, public opinion counted for little in the formation of Treaties. The reason why Alexander III was so reticent in dealing with Skobelev is because the latter was well supported and Pan-Slav/ anti-German feelings were popular amongst the Russian educated classes. The 1881 Austro-Serbian Alliance was arranged by Prince Milan without the consent of his cabinet, let alone the people; the Austrians had little desire to ally with the Italians who they regarded as irredentist and the large irredentist movement in Italy had a similar suspicion of the Triple Alliance. Even the Dual Alliance can be viewed as a sop to Liberal opinion in Germany which hoped for a common Greater-German voice in Foreign Policy. The Treaties were made, mostly on the basis of monarchical solidarity which perhaps was a strength in that monarchs could agree to settle there differences and not go to war, but simultaneously a weakness in that it ignored the feelings of large portions of the population, especially in regions where populist movements were easily galvanised.
The main features of the first Bismarckian alliance system were therefore, the fact that the system was created for German interests, to satisfy German insecurities and was built through Bismarck's personal impetus; the system existed because of and in spite of severe rivalry and tension between the Dual Monarchy and Russia in the Balkans; Britain and France were excluded from the system for separate reasons and due to mutual disagreement became isolated. Italy gained recognition as a great power but was to gain more in the later 1880's. Finally public opinion counted for little in the system which was built on the premise of monarchical solidarity. These were the features which built the system and the weaknesses inherent within some of them were later to combine to destroy it.
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