Tactical changes pioneered by the Dutch army were essential to Roberts’ theory. The rise in infantry firepower in the 16th century led Count Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625), who assumed military leadership of the Dutch revolt against Spain, to
introduce shallower troop formations that allowed more soldiers to fire at once; he argued that six rotating ranks of musketeers could maintain continuous fire. To
maximise the effect of this; a broader battle formation was needed. At first ten ranks were needed for constant fire, but Gustavus Adolphus, who was greatly influenced by
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[5] M. Roberts, The Military revolution 1560-1660, Belfast Press (1956)
[6] G. Parker, The Military Revolution - a myth? Cambridge University Press (1996) P.1-2
Nassau’s tactical reforms, was able to use, through constant drilling and practice,
only six ranks to maintain constant fire. Gustavus also stressed the importance of attack, whereas the Dutch would use the tactic in defensive counter marches, Adolphus employed these tactics offensively, with the ranks moving forward past their stationary re-loaders. The effectiveness of the Swedish army was demonstrated at the battle of Breitenfeld in 1631, in which the Imperial army under Tilly, which had previously be a successful army, was defeated by the Swedish troops, even after their Saxon allies had fled. Firing by rank brought about the need for improved training and discipline and this led to an increase in the number of officers and the production of detailed training manuals. More complex manoeuvres required more training and discipline that could be best ensured by creating and maintaining permanent force, rather than the previous way of hastily hiring men at the outbreak of wars. The new armies turned infantry firepower into a manoeuvrable battle winner, allowing rulers to undertake successful campaigns. This increased the value of these larger armies rather than of fortifications, but they also brought a substantial increase in the administration and cost of maintaining them, that led to the institutionalisation of the army to keep control and meet the larger financial demands. The outcome brought about, in the short term, decisive military success by the Swedish army led by Gustavus Adolphus, finally reversing the stream of tactical victories of the Austrian Habsburg Empire and their allies in the Thirty Years War. In the long term, the creation of these large armies was to be used as an effective form of statecraft, both internally and against other states. This was to assist the development of absolute monarchies by shifting the balance of power towards sovereigns and away from their subjects.
A contribution to the debate of a military revolution has come from Geoffrey Parker’s work on Spain. Parker used his detailed knowledge of the dominant army in western Europe, a force that Roberts considered to be conservative, to suggest that it was the Spanish who were as equally progressive as the Dutch and Swedes. He argues that the Spanish were as flexible in infantry and cavalry tactics and training [7], Parker believes that the revolution began back in the 15th century when there was the need for reform as the introduction of gunpowder weapons required a change in fortifications and battlefield tactics. Cannon balls could bring down the old tall, thin walls. Stronger defences and new castle designs, such as lower walls that were strengthened with earth, were introduced. Parker adds: “the improvements in artillery in the 15th century, both qualitative and quantitative, eventually transformed fortress design…. The increasing reliance on firepower in battle – whether with archers, field artillery or musketeers – led not only to the eclipse of cavalry in most armies, but to new tactical arrangements that maximised the opportunities of giving fire… accompanied by a dramatic increase in army size… whether in army size, fortifications or firearms come from the lands of the Habsburgs or of their neighbours: from Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and France. That was the heartland of the military revolution.”[8]
Although Parker has explained his view of when the military revolution began, he is unclear when it ended. However, he has argued not only as Roberts did, that the military changes played a significant role in both states and societies, but also that
they were instrumental in shifting the balance of power away from Asia and towards Europe. Parker adds that the major Asian powers were not defeated, largely due to
their independent military developments [9], which may seem as an argument against
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[7] G. Parker, The Military Revolution - a myth? Cambridge University Press (1996)
[8] G. Parker, The Military Revolution - a myth? Cambridge University Press (1996) P.24
[9] G. Parker, The Military Revolution - a myth? Cambridge University Press (1996)
a revolution as the developments in Europe did not influence, or were not adopted by,
any outside states, who continued to adapt their own effective tactics. It is possible that the major changes that did occur were concentrated in the century after the one that is normally associated with the revolution.
Roberts’ Thesis seems to minimise the role of change in earlier centuries. It could also be argued that Roberts emphasised the change in battlefield tactics and did not look into some other aspects of military activity.
Jeremy Black, another contributor to this great debate, has outlined the principal changes in 1660-1720 as both qualitative and quantitative [10]. The substitution of the pike by the newly developed bayonet, the pre-packed cartridge and creation of the flintlock, which replaced the matchlock musket and substitution of the pike, increased the firepower and manoeuvrability. It also led to a decline in the relative importance of cavalry in most European armies.
Navies provided some of the best indicators of change in the period 1660-1720. The developments of line-ahead tactics greatly altered naval warfare, not only tactically but also by increasing the importance of heavily gunned ships, and thus of the states able to deploy and maintain these large numbers of ships. The English fleet used this Dutch pioneered formation and in 1639 at the Downs, the first attack in line-ahead was ordered in European waters. Also, there were significant developments in the size of navies. Advanced shipbuilding techniques were followed, thus larger ‘standing navies’ were a new feature of the late 17th century. Similarly, larger standing armies developed after the century Roberts describes as the time of the ‘military revolution’. The biggest growth occurred in the later part of the 17th century and this seems to be
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[10] J. Black, The Military Revolution debate, Westview Press (1995) P. 97
a continuation of already established patterns of growth. Nevertheless, it seems that the army sizes of the major powers rose dramatically in the period 1660-1720. This administrative dimension, neglected by Roberts, was one of many important changes during this period. Better administration allowed the recruitment and maintenance of larger armies. Parker neglected the post-1660 period as an important period of change. Parker and Roberts link broad military and societal changes to changes in tactics and military technology and argue that these were both revolutionary and innovative. Although, it seems that the tactical developments were mainly developed through the period and many were far from original. It was an adaptation of existing ideas to suit circumstances of battles. The change in tactics could bring revolutionary results, but only at a local level.
The concept of a military revolution in the early modern period has been challenged and has been argued that the changes commonly stressed can be qualified both by considering what had advanced and considering its effect on the situation throughout Europe. A concentration on warfare in the last decades of this period suggests that the notion of a revolution is inappropriate. If a military revolution did occur, then it is likely to have occurred around 50 years after the period highlighted and dated by Roberts. Whether the attention should be placed more on weaponry or tactics, where the introduction of the bayonet and the gradual phasing-out of the pike were of considerable importance and where the change in depth of infantry ranks to maximise firepower, or to the position of the European states, such as France, Prussia and Britain, which emerged as the great European powers at the end of this period. The military changes of the period 1660-1760 were considerable and they included a dramatic growth in firepower of the major naval powers and a significant increase in the use of firepower and the trained manpower available to the major armies. Jeremy Black adds: ”War is often seen as a forcer of innovation, technical in the form of new weaponry, governmental and social in the shape of the demands created by the burdens of major conflicts” [11]. This argument should not be ignored when thinking about early modern European society. The expanded armed forces of the period developed in a way that did not harm the social reality on society. Larger armies brought more opportunities for nobles, who benefited from the assumption that they were naturally suited for positions of command. Thus, armies were not forces ‘outside’ society, but rather reflections of patterns of the remaining social control and influence that continued to enforce cohesion into these patterns. However, the technological changes to allow the European powers success in Africa and Asia did not occur until the following century [12]. Stress can be placed on training, morale, size of the armies and tactical flexibility for the successes of the armies such as the Swedes, as opposed to new tactics, which may have been a short-term factor in their early victories, such as Breitenfeld. However, it is difficult to measure other factors such as the relationship between government and military development. The situation varied chronologically and nationally, this can also be used as an argument against a revolution as different things happened in different states at different times. States developed tactics, they were not totally revolutionary, and they merely evolved through a long period of time. The definition of revolution suggests a complete change over a short period of time, this was probably not the case; also a revolution could appear obvious or more noticeable than in this case.
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[11] J. Black, A Military Revolution? Macmillan Press (1991) P.96
[12] D.R Headrick, Tools of the Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in 19th Century Europe, Oxford Press (1981)
Bibliography
G. Parker, ‘The Military Revolution - a myth?’ Cambridge University Press (1996)
Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? Macmillan Press (1991)
D.R Headrick, Tools of the Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in 19th Century Europe, Oxford Press (1981)
M. Roberts, The Military revolution 1560-1660, Belfast Press (1956)
M. Roberts, Essays in Swedish History, London Press (1967)
C. J. Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution debate, Westview Press (1995)
