What are the main characteristics of rights, and which individuals or groups in a given society need them most

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What are the main characteristics of rights, and which individuals or groups in a given society need them most?

In order to address the question properly this essay is going to consist of five differnet parts. First we are going to look at the philosophy of rights, then we are going to consider the way rights have been developed in the last century and the ever growing problem of confliction between different rights.This will be followed by a discussion about the theory of special rights. In conclusion we are going to look at some case studies citing the need for greater protection for certain groups of people.

Philosophy of Rights  

The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines a right as including "a thing one may legally or morally claim; the state of being entitled to a privilege or immunity or authority to act." This definition recognises the fundamental distinction between legal and moral rights; a legal right will arises when there is a legal rule prescribing a certain mode of beahavior, that restriction could be either positive or negative. Positive in the sense that it imposes, a legal duty on another party to fulfil an entitlement or negative in the sense, that it disallows certain kind of beahavior. Moral rights need not be enforceable at law, and hence their existence is much harder to prove.

Moral rights can be further divided into deontological and teleological variants, Deontological liberals believe that human beings are born with "natural" moral rights. Natural rights derive their name from John Locke's intuition that certain rights vest in human beings simply by virtue of their having been born into a free state of nature. Immanuel Kant further elaborated this notion by looking at it from a social perspective, his theory was that human beings automatically deserve to be treated with equal dignity, and that this justifies the imposition on others a duty to respect that dignity.

Similar justifications to those of Locke and Kant have become the basis of almost all subsequent deontological theories of rights. However few other jurists have proposed alternative bases for natural rights ,out of them  Ronald Dworkin's is perhaps the most notable. However Dworkin himself acknowledges that his is not a complete theory of moral rights, merely one which is necessary to preserve the practical coherency of utilitarianism. Thus to this day, there is no generally accepted basis for natural rights more concrete than the intuition that human beings ought to possess them.

Natural rights have met with a change of nomenclature since the time of Locke and Kant, with the rise of secular legal realism it has become untenable to justify moral decisions by appeal to the pre-moral natural order. To accept the realist view, as most jurists do, entails the recognition that natural rights are only as natural as the moral attitudes implicit in liberalism. For this reason the term "autonomy rights" instead of "natural rights", has been commonly adapted by most jurists because doing so acknowledges a common formulation for the basis of such rights - the individual's moral interest in leading an autonomous life.

There is school of thought (Teological Liberals) that does not believe in either natural or autonomy rights, they bealive that the develpoment of rights is an instrumental process. Moral rights will arise whenever the operation of a posited moral principle justifies the protection of recognised interests. The most common such principle, of course, is utilitarianism, and so these rights are conveniently refered to as "utility rights". An example is the right to private property, which has been justified because it encourages effecient investment decisions.  A question which has not yet been addressed is, what exactly is this notion of autonomy which rights are designed to protect? Formulations differ; some authors couch it in the language of liberty,  and others in the language of equality. The preferable view seems to be that these are merely differences of form. Autonomy is a way a measure of liberty in the sense that it is prerequisite to one's ability to pursue one's own conception of the good life. However it is also a fundamental liberal principle that the opportunity to seek one's own good  can be accorded equally to every human being, and in this sense the protection of individual autonomy promotes formal equality.

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Development of rights

  In the last few centuries we have seen an explosion of rights. "Human rights'' seem to have multiplied endlessly.  Each individual is asserted to have a right to welfare, a right to self-esteem, a right to health care, creating a new breed of “positive” rights to be provided with things. Unfortunately, these rights often conflict with the older human rights that classical liberals like John Staurt Mills had fought for: the rights to life, liberty, and property (or the "pursuit of happiness''). Such classical liberal "negative'' rights do not conflict with each other, whereas "positive'' ...

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