Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery

University Degree Linguistics, Classics and related subjects

Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery

The institution of slavery is, in modern times, almost universally condemned and abhorred. Much of the ancient world, however, regarded slavery as an indisputable fact of life. While it had its critics, the institution of slavery was never seriously challenged in the ancient world. Even cynical and stoic philosophers, who ostensibly believed in the brotherhood of mankind, were more or less mute in their opinion. Aristotle, in Politics, qualifies and defends certain forms of the institution of slavery, identifying two distinct forms of slavery, one illegitimate, one legitimate.

According to Aristotle, superiority and inferiority are inherent in all systems and relationships, and human slavery is a case parallel to many in nature. The soul rules the body like a master rules a slave, and reason governs the appetites like a king governing a city. It is natural and advantageous for the soul to rule the body, just as it is better for animals to be ruled by man, and the relationship of male to female is a relationship of superior to inferior. The relation of master and slave is simply a manifestation of the law of subordination.

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A so-called “natural” slave is, according to Aristotle, one who does not possess the full use of reason. The natural slave participates in reason to the extent that he perceives of it, but he does not himself have use of it. He therefore lacks in his capacity to perform civic duty and lead an ordered life. He compensates, however, by being possessed of a body suited for labor. Nature “[intends] also to erect a physical difference between the bodies of freemen and those of the slaves, giving the latter strength for the menial duties of life, but making the former upright in carriage and…useful for the various purposes of civic life….” (1254b27) Aristotle’s rhetoric depicts slavery as a mutually beneficial relationship, symbiotically cooperative in its ideal manifestation. The master envisions tasks the slave cannot reason himself, and the slave executes tasks the master cannot execute. Aristotle does not advocate or justify brutality in the master/slave relationship. Whenever the relation is in accordance with nature's ordinance, there is mutual helpfulness and friendship between master and slave.

A mutually beneficial association does not, however, manifest in cases when the master/slave relation does not follow nature’s ordinance. In the world evoked by most history and Greek literature, slaves were customarily obtained through piracy, kidnapping, or warfare. It is this form of slavery that Aristotle finds illegitimate. Aristotle takes issue with the non-discriminatory nature of this forceful subjugation. The psychical and metaphysical definition of the “natural slave” makes it difficult to identify them from freemen, as the order and beauty of the soul is not easily seen. Aristotle understandably believes it unjust for an individual who is not a natural slave to be subordinated to a master, and enslaving one’s vanquished foes will inevitably not only subordinate natural slaves, but also natural freemen. The inability of “legal” slavery to satisfactorily distinguish natural slaves from natural freemen by necessity disqualifies it as a legitimate institution.

One would be hard-pressed to attribute Aristotle’s position to a “blind spot” in his methods or ethics. Aristotle’s argument is cogent and more or less accurate; there are those who must let themselves be “mastered” by others in order to survive, those who are far more suited to performing menial labor than to performing civic duty. The form of slavery that Aristotle legitimizes is not the form that was institutionalized in the West for thousands of years, but rather an idealized, natural form. Aristotle does not advocate slavery through subjugation, but slavery arising from a natural condition of inferiority and superiority, whereby masters and slaves are codependent and even have amicable relationships. In this way, the justifiable form he delineates seems to be more akin to a Marxist interpretation of modern capitalism, whereby workers subordinate themselves to capitalists, rather than to an archetypal system of brutal oppression.