In the committee’s report, which recommended that the bill pass, the committee further elaborated on the need for heightened security policy in American airports. The report stated that according to the General Accounting Office (GAO), approximately 2 million passengers and their baggage go through airports every day in the United States. Between May 1998 and April 1999, according to the GAO, turnover averaged 126 percent and one airport actually reported a 416 percent turnover rate (Airport). The committee further stressed the need for more training and the certification of screening companies. The result of which would be higher pay and benefits due to the expertise of the job. This would make the mundane job more appealing and make workers more eager to keep their jobs.
The committee also reported that in early 1999 during routine tests the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General (IG) accessed 68% of the secure areas they tested and boarded aircraft 117 times due to lapses in security (Business). The IG said that most of these could have been prevented if the employees would have been less careless and followed correct procedures.
The report further addresses the estimated costs of the bill, and such aspects as the number of persons covered, the economic impact, privacy issues, paperwork and outlines the major provisions of the bill. Each of these was considered reasonable results of the bill. For example, the costs on the economy would only in the purchasing of equipment such as fingerprint scanners (under sections 2 and 6) and the possibility of suspension without pay or termination of workers who fail to adhere to procedures, which the committee predicted would be offset by the lower cost of background checks and reduced costs associated with incidents due to security lapses. With the concern for privacy, the committee agreed that passengers already know that their baggage may be checked and that the increased precautions would not be an issue.
Committee report’s outline of the issues:
Section 2 of the bill requires the FAA to “expand and accelerate the current pilot project know as the Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Pilot.” This would reduce the time needed to process ink fingerprints from two weeks or more to about 3 days. This project is required under section 2 to be in place and functional within one year of the bills enactment. Section 2 would also require a background check for all screening applicants beginning at least by a one-year period following the bill’s enactment along with and expanded list of disqualifying offences.
Section 3 covers the improved training requirements. Subsection (a) states that the FAA is to have a proposed rule for certification of screening companies be 30 days following the bill. It also requires a deadline for the final rule by May 31, 2001 and the public comments be taken into account when making the rule. Subsection (b) addresses the 40 hours of classroom training and 40 hours of practical on-the-job training, or (if allowed by the FAA’s rule) an on-the-job training test for certified screeners.
Section 4 requires the FAA to work t improve security area access control. The Committee stressed here, that the lapse of security could cost lives. The recognized that the employees’ jobs require focus and urge the FAA to make sanctions that would be clear, strong and imposed in proportion to the impact of the lapse. The Committee also recommended that employees who breach the security policy be punished in a “meaningful” way.
Section 5 requires the FAA to improve security at its own facilities, which was recommended by the GAO.
Section 6 says that the gradual increase of if the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) use in airports with EDS technology. The Committee realized that EDS takes more time and this would help that problem. This would allow passengers to continue to walk through metal detectors and have their carry-on baggage screened. However, only those that fit the profile will be subject to higher levels of scrutiny including EDS screening.
Section 7 makes technical changes to preexisting laws.
There were no debates on the validity and necessity of this act. There were never any clear objections to the bill during the floor debates. Instead all of the testimony was in favor of the improve security in airports. After the introduction of the act and the testimony in favor of it, it went back to committee without protest and was soon brought back to the floor for a vote.
Senate votes on the bill:
On October 3rd 2000 Senator Roberts made a motion that the Senate consider Calendar No. 764, S. 2440 (S9770). There was no objection and the clerk read the bill. Following the reading Senator McCain once again expressed his desire to see that the bill be passes. He reiterated that airport security seemed to be in a good state. “But as I have said before, we cannot relax our efforts, especially given the significant growth in air travel. The threats to our nation remain real, and that airline industry unfortunately remains and attractive target” (S9771).
Senator Hollings (SC) then stood and expressed his interest in the bill. He reminded the Senate that “airport security is our first line of defense against terrorist attacks or other dangerous acts” (S9772). He then informed them that the average wage for an airport screener in the Untied States is $5.75 per hour with minimal benefits. “We can’t expect security personnel who are receiving minimum-wage or near-minimum wage to realize just how important their jobs are to the overall security of the airport and to have a commitment to their jobs” (S9772). Although there is not provision in the bill that would raise their wage, Mr. Hollings used this argument to persuade his colleagues that the increase in training is needed as well as discipline for those who fail to comply with security rules.
Senator Roberts then made a motion that the bill read for a third time and voted upon to be passed in the amended form submitted by the Committee. There was no objection and so the presiding officer ordered it. The committee’s amendment was agreed to and the Senate passed the bill with a unanimous vote after the third reading.
House of Representatives:
The message was sent to the House of Representatives and received on October 4, 2000. It was referred to that House committee on Transportation and Infrastructure that same day. On October 23, 2000, Mr. LaTourette (R-OH) introduced S. 2440 to the House (H.R. 4529). The clerk read the bill with the amendments made by the House Committee (H10523).
Mr. LaTourette began by informing his fellow representatives that the GAO testified, in a Subcommittee hearing that took place the March 2000, that security screeners detected about 10,000 guns in five years and that even more weapons still pass thought airport check points undetected (H10525). Like the Senators, he reminded his colleagues that a screener at an airport makes little more than minimum wage and specifically said that they could make more at a fast food restaurant. He also reported the number of turnovers in the last year.
In addition to these facts, he told the House that the DOT Inspector General reported that even though Congress authorized $350 million for the EDSs that are not used as often as they could be (H10525). Then, he conveyed the list of 25 crimes that would exclude an applicant and the lack of such crimes as bribery on the list. Finally, Mr. LaTourette encouraged a vote in favor of the bill by saying, “[it] attempts to plug some of the other holes in our aviation security system that hearing have revealed” (H10525). “…In short, while security in this country is good, it could be better…this bill will make it better, and it will do this at very little cost to the FAA, the airlines and, the airports” (H10525).
After Mr. LaTourette’s address, a summary of the bill was read and the floor was passed to Mr. Shows (MI) who further elaborated on Mr. LaTourette’s points. Then Mr. Oberstar’s testimony is inserted. He, like the others reflected on the Pan American World Airways Flight 103. He recalled that on December 21, 1988 a terrorist bomb tore apart the Boeing 737 killing 259 passengers and crew along with 11 residents of Lockerbie, Scotland, the town the plane was over when it exploded (H10526). He then reminded them that the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism responded to the incident. Mr. Oberstar (D-MN) served as the commissioner and he told the House of some of the results of the Commission in attempt to further persuade them t vote in favor of the bill.
The balance of Mr. LaTourette’s time was then yielded back. The rules were then suspended and the Senate bill, as amended, was passed by two-thirds of the House.
Returned to the Senate:
On October 24, 2000, the Senate received the message from the vote in the House and the amended bill as passed. On October 25, 2000, the Senate once again brought Calendar 764 up and it was discussed. After the amended bill was read, Mrs. Hutchinson asked unanimous consent from the Senate in agreement on the amendments of S. 2440 and it was passed without objection. Senator Hutchinson than gave her thanks for such quick and well supported action, reiterated the major provisions of the bill and confessed her confidence that the S. 2440 would be signed by the President of the United States.
The White House:
On November 14, 2000 S. 2440 was presented to the President. Eight days later, President William Clinton signed it into law and it became Public Law No: 106-528.
Incremental Model - Charles Lindblom 1959 “The Science of Muddling Through”:
For the for formation of the policy I chose to apply the Incremental Model designed by Charles Lindblom in his 1959 work “The Science of Muddling Though.” This model uses the assumption that the people forming the policy are looking for a quick, safe and precise fix to the problem they have committed themselves to solving. In this model there are six assumptions to maximize the outcome as well as minimize the risk and work needed to find the correct solution.
Six Assumptions:
1. The selection of goals and the means to achieve them are related.
The goals that they set out to achieve in the ASIA were simply defined and the means to achieve them were related and practical. The changes that were intended by the bill were very similar to the original goals of The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996. For example, the FAA was to upgrade technology and screening processes under The Federal Aviation Reauthorization. Senator Hutchinson stated herself that the new bill would basically force the process to speed up and include a couple more restrictions that would increase security in the airports.
2. Decision-makers consider only some alternatives for dealing with a problem, but these alternatives differ only marginally from the existing policies.
Because the entire purpose of the bill was to strengthen the results of The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, no drastic alternatives were discussed in either the committee hearing or during congressional debates. In fact, the Senator Hutchinson’s biggest leap was recommending the increase of training for screeners, which would increase to the norm of the time for such expertise work. The only other real changes were the recommendations to the committee that the list of disqualifying offences be increased.
3. For each alternative, only a limited number of important consequences are considered.
By researching the statistics, the committee found no real reason why any of the provisions in the bill should not be supported. The additional cost of the fingerprint scanners, screener training, etc were expected to be minimal and would be offset by the time and money saved by the new procedures for background checks as well as in the amount of lives saved.
4. The nature of the problem is continually redefined. (does not fully apply)
For the most part, the problems that this bill addresses are not continually being redefined. Statistics form investigations after 1996 and prior to the bill both revealed the problem with security in the same areas. For example, in early 1999 during routine tests the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General (IG) accessed 68% of the secure areas they tested and boarded aircraft 117 times due to lapses in security. The problems would be redefined again in 2001 after 9-11, but still they would be based on the same glitches in the airport system.
5. There is no such thing as the optimal solution because in a group context the characteristics of a good decision are that everyone agrees on it. (does not apply)
The bill faced little or no objections, as there are not any published statements against it. This fact may or may not mean that this assumption is correct. There was never any consideration on other decisions. In my opinion this assumption would imply that there was more than one option and a compromise had to have been met. If there was one alternative that everyone agreed upon without any compromise, I would consider that the optimal solution. For this reason the assumption does not apply.
6. Incremental decision-making is essentially geared towards correcting immediate and concrete problems.
Though at the time, the problems that the bill sought to correct were not immediate because of crisis, they were important and needed to be addressed. The problems were also concrete and had concrete solutions to them.
This model applied for the most part to the policy. Senator Hutchinson did outline specific goals in the introduction of the policy that were clearly addressed in the formulation of the policy. The changes were also obviously incremental. The wording and the deadlines were changed from the original policy signed in 1996 with minor extensive changes including the training guidelines and the increase of disqualifying offences. Making such small changes was a safe way to get the optimum results without scaring the public.
The consequences were minimal. The changes made to the policy were so small that consequences were of almost no concern. The technology needed for provisions like the electronic fingerprinting were already purchased so monetary issues were minor.
The problems with this model were the last three assumptions. The incremental changes were so small that the problem was not being redefined. It would not be until 2001 after the attacks that the problems would be redefines significantly and the policy would undergo extreme changes. This also effects the sixth assumption. Though the problem was concrete, it was not immediate. This model is wrong in this case when it assumes that it can only be applied to crisis situations. Here it is used for a policy that could have waited for an outcome because there were no specific dangers at the time. Though there was evidence that a threat existed, there was no way that they could have known that a catastrophe was ahead.
This model makes sense. Outlining the problems and making slight tweaks on the policies that came before is an affective way of narrowing down the options to create the best possible policy. Unfortunately, this model also takes a long time to get the desired outcome. It is ineffective because the time it takes to complete the implementation, the problems could have changed as in the case of the ASIA. This model may be too safe because it takes to long to come to an end.
Implementation:
The FAA had the responsibility of forming and carrying out the final rules for the complete implementation of the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000. In the last section of the law, section 9, it states, “Except as otherwise expressly provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act”(ASIA). Because the act was signed into law on November 22, 2000, that meant that the airports should have been in compliance with the new regulations by December 22, 2000. This provision makes the act self-implementing.
There were other due dates that Congress included in the Act. The first one was for the expansion of the FAA’s Electronic Pilot Program. It stated, “Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall develop, in consultation with the Office of Personnel Management and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the pilot program for individual criminal history record checks (known as the electronic fingerprint transmission pilot project) into an aviation industry-wide program” (ASIA Section 2). That meant that the data from the Category X airports that were testing electronic fingerprint transmission pilot project would have to be completed and processed so that the system could be effective and in place in the other airports around the nation by November 22, 2003. This also included a report due no later than November 22, 2001, that would be submitted to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation as well as the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of House of Representatives, which described the “status of the Administrator’s efforts to utilize the program described in section (a)” (ASIA Section 2).
The second appointed date was for the final rules for the implementation of the Improved Training, which were due by May 31, 2001, as stated in section 3 of the act (ASIA). For this, the FAA was to have outlined the rules and curriculum for the training and they were to have included all of the specified requirements that were outlined in the act. In making these rules they were also specifically instructed by congress in the act to take in the considerations of the comments that would be published as of January 5, 2001 in the Federal Register (ASIA Section 3).
Section 4 of the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 is concerned with the improvement secured areas. The date concerning these provisions to correct the weaknesses found in reports and stated before in this paper, was January 31, 2001 (ASIA 2.2.A). By this date, the Administrator should have “work[ed] with airport operators and air carriers to implement and strengthen existing controls to eliminate airport access control weaknesses” (ASIA). This requires the strengthening of security concerning airport operators and air carriers and access to control points in secured areas.
Section 5 requires the airports and FAA to ensure the physical security that house air traffic control systems. This involves the Administrator correcting weaknesses and insuring the granting of physical security accreditation not later than April 30, 2004 (ASIA). In the meantime, there are to be reports filed with the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation as well as the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of House beginning on April 30, 2001 and continuing each year until 2004 (ASIA 5b). These reports should have the data on the progress of improvement as well as the percentage of such facilities that have been granted the physical security accreditation.
The final due date requirement of the Act is in section 7. It says that after no more than 18 months after entering into the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century agreement, the National Academy of Sciences has to give a report to the Secretary on the results of the noise study (ASIA 7c). When the Secretary receives this report, he is instructed by the act to submit a report to the respective committees in both the House and the Senate (ASIA 7c).
There was a meeting April 19, 2001 to discuss the status of the expansion of the Electronic Fingerprinting Pilot Program and the implementation of the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000. This meeting was open to the public. In attendance were people from many parts of the Airport and Transportation Organizations including: Jan Brecht-Clark, designated federal official director of Aviation Security Policy and Planning, Al Lomax representing Airport Council International, North America, Bob Monetti, from the Victims of Pan Am Flight 103, and Duane McGray president of the Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network, as well as representatives of areas such as: Jerry Moriarty with the Secret, Mike Bregman, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and Bob Hutnick, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Minutes).
Lieutenant General Mike Canavan from Aviation Security, for the most part, directed the meeting. He presented the major points that were being discussed concerned with security improvement in the airport. He admitted that to get into every detail of the actions would take days, so he just highlighted the important points. In his presentation, Mr. Canavan talked about the explosive detection saying, “In terms of checked baggage, our explosive detection systems right now, we have 137 deployed. We want to have 1,100 out there by 2009”(Minutes p.12). He seemed optimistic in his remarks claiming that while improvements will be made from the inside, a campaign for help with safety from the public will be in full swing with spokes people like Harrison Ford already signed up for the job.
Following Mr. Canavan’s presentations, Mr. Karl Shrum, Civil Aviation Security Office of Policy and Planning spoke on the progress of the rules. His purposefully admitted that the “changes that are involved [are] massive” and set out to inform the other attendees that the amount of information needed to absorb and understand the rules increases in implementation (Minutes p.15). The most interesting part of his presentation was when he discussed the status of the rules. Basically, he said that the previous administration had sent a number of rules to the Federal Registrar’s office before the end of their term. Because of that, the Federal Registrar became extremely overwhelmed and was not able to clear documents for publication before the Bush administration took over. He said that Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, put out a policy stating “that all regulations that had not yet been issued must be reviewed under the new administration and specifically reviewed by an official appointed in that administration….The effect of this review is that random rules being issued individually and sequentially, 108 first, then checked baggage, then at some later point screening company certification, is that all of these things are now accumulating on the secretary's desk” (Minutes p.16). The delay of the final rules was at least partially due to this problem.
Next they discussed the baggage area. “Security at checked baggage by a computer-assisted passenger pre-screening, essentially information in the reservation system. If that information is inadequate, the passenger's baggage would be subject to further scrutiny, which would be an explosive detection system where they've currently been deployed or will be deployed in the future or subject to a passenger baggage match”(Minutes).
On the companies doing the screening they said that “Existing companies are required to apply for certificates within 90 days. In essence, we're temporarily grandfathering all people conducting screening on the effective date of the rule under a provisional certificate. The provisional certificate will be good for one year. Any new entrants in the field of screening would have 60 days to apply, must apply 60 days before they intend to begin screening, and they, too, would be issued a provisional certificate. At the end of the one-year, the five-year certificate would be issued for those who qualify under the certification standards themselves. So, in essence, the existing screening companies and air carriers, if they'd like to continue screening, would be grandfathered for one year and, at the end of that one year, would have to become fully certificated under a five-year -- what we used to refer to as a "standard certificate" (Minutes 28).
This meeting turned out to be more of an update about the formation of the rules, than a meeting to form rules. It gave the different representatives a chance to ask questions and say what they thought on the subject. Mr. Shrum later said that it was going to be very difficult to get the rules published with all of the delays (Minutes p.31). He stated that meeting the May 31, 2001 deadline was achievable depending on when the secretary approves the rules. If they were published on time, there would be a 120-day window for comments (Minutes p.33). This would push implementation of most of the rules back to late September 2001. As you may know, the events on September 11, 2001, shook the airport industry and as a result these rules were never fully implemented. Instead, Congress passed a number of new policies in an attempt to heighten security.
Implementation is Evolution -1973 Jeffery Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky:
The model I chose to apply to the implementation stage of the bill is Implementation is Evolution by Jeffery Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky. It includes five assumptions that collectively make up a model for implementation that requires the procedures or at the very least, guidelines for the procedures, to be written into the policy during formulation. The purpose of this seems to be to create a model that would almost guarantee complete and successful implementation of the policy. A second attribute is that it follows closely with the Incremental model because it uses a step-by-step format. I applied the model as follows:
Five Assumptions:
1. Implementation must not be separated from policy making. Policy formulators must consider how a policy will be carried out.
Part of the reason for the bill in the first place was that Senator Hutchinson felt that the implementation of The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 was too slow. In the drafts of The Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000, the goals were clearly defined and the desired way of achieving them was outlined. For instance, Section 2 of the bill requires the FAA to “expand and accelerate the current pilot project know as the Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Pilot.” The formulators also put clear and immediate, but reasonable deadlines into the bill that would require action.
2. The policy designers must consider direct means for achieving their goals.
To achieve the desired results of their goals, the policy designers put specific details such as the number of hours of training a screener was required to have or the specific offences that would disqualify applicants. In most cases these were a minimum that Congress felt was necessary to reach the desired results. The FAA was given the job of defining the final rules and exact ways to reach the goals.
3. The formulators and implementators should carefully consider the theory that underlies their action.
When writing The Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000, it was clear that they knew what they wanted out of the policy. The goals were directly stated both within the bill and during discussion. The main purpose of this bill was to increase security in American airports. The FAA was to have had the final rules no later than three years following the signing of the bill. However, more immediate results were required by other deadlines.
4. Successful implementation depends on continuity in leadership.
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, who introduced the bill, has been involved with transportation and aviation for most of her Congressional career. She, along with other members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, The Senate Aviations Subcommittee and the Senate Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee as well as the committee’s in the House were very capable of outlining a bill that would meet their needs.
5. Simplicity is desirable. The most successful policies are ones that clearly define goals, singular responsibility and a singular purpose.
As stated before, the goals were clearly outlined as wells as the means to achieve them. Responsibilities for further the rules and implementation was given solely to the FAA, which was to report back to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation yearly.
The policy followed all of the assumptions. Still, implementation was incomplete. What this model ignores is in fact the actual implementation of the policy. Though it outlines a good way to begin the implementation, it does not describe the events that should take place after the construction of the policy. This model’s attributes are solely that has the capabilities to create successful implementation.
In the case of the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 implementation was never completed. Because of complications in clearing the rules through the Secretary’s office and the events of 9-11, Congress changed the policy with the ratifying of more acts. This shows that one of the faults of this model is the fact that implementation can still remain a slow process allowing more time for difficulties.
Perhaps this model is over simplified in assuming that simplicity and an outline of ways to meet the goals is enough to achieve them. To more accurately assure the successful implementation this model would have to apply also to the formulation of the rules and the implementation of them by the agency in the systematic way it does with Congress. It has the ability to be a good model, it is just simply incomplete when it assumes that the policy will be successful if it is formed in a specific way that meet all of the assumptions. It does not account for spontaneous problems or disasters like the ones that occurred with ASIA.
Evaluation:
The Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 was introduced to the Senate on April 13, 2000 and signed into bill by the President of the United States on November 22, 2000. Its purpose was to update and reform Title 49. Because the proposed changes simply instructed the FAA and airports to utilize the technology that they have to a larger extent and to increase training of the baggage screeners to the norm of business training, it met very little opposition. However, implementation of these new provisions was not completed. The terrorist security breaches on September 11th put implementation to a halt as Congress and the American people scrambled to point fingers and find a solution to the security problems.
Following the 9-11 attacks, as they are now commonly called, several bills were introduced and passed by the House and Senate in an effort to increase security of the US airports both for safety and as a response to the public’s outcries. One of these was the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub.L.107-71, November 7, 2001. Its primary purpose was the federalizing of airport security functions and the screening of passengers and baggage. The act also created the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation. A new Undersecretary for Transportation Security heads the TSA. The first head of the TSA was John W. Magaw. He was fired in September 2002, and since the position has been filled on an Acting basis by the retired Coast Guard Commandant, Paul Loy. In addition, Public Law 107-296 made the TSA part of the new Department of Homeland Security, on November 25, 2002.
The TSA, during a declared National Emergency, may coordinate domestic transport, oversee other departments and agencies transportation related activities, and alert authorities of possible threats (ATS). Since there is no direct command over the personnel, programs, functions, or activities of other departments and agencies, it remains to be seen as to how this will work. For example, the final rule for civil aviation security was issued as a joint FAA and TSA regulation on February 22, 2002 (14 CFR Parts 91 and 49 CFR Part 1500). In the first year after September 11, 2002, this was the most substantive rule issued by any federal department or agency modifying a pre-September11th system.
Because the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000, which required background investigations for airport staff had not been fully implemented by September 11, 2001, the TSA in Public Law 107-71 received added authority to carry out the previous policy. For example, section 120 commands the Secretary DOT to maximize the use of technology and equipment designed to detect and stop potential chemical or biological weapons used to attack transportation systems (ATS).
Still security remained a concern. In another CBS news story dated January 9, 2002, they restated that “International passenger areas at major U.S. airports are so poorly designed that passengers could easily sneak through or hide contraband” which was taken from a Justice Department report (CBSnew.com). The same article also said that “the department's inspector general blamed inadequate oversight by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which is supposed to make sure airports that receive international passengers have secure inspection areas. Such areas at 42 international airports across the country were poorly designed and had numerous monitoring problems, said the report. Holding rooms where potentially inadmissible foreigners were detained were too small; 13 airports had no holding rooms at all” (CBSnews.com). "As a result, airports were vulnerable to illegal entry, escapes, injuries, health hazards and the hiding or disposing of contraband or documents," said an executive summary of the report by Inspector General Glenn Fine.
On July 23, 2002, CBSnews.com reported that the airports are “way behind on hiring federal screeners and getting bomb-detecting machines into airports, and with complaints pouring down on him, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta blamed Congress for not providing all the emergency funds he's asked for, reports.” The reason for this was because Congress did not feel that the TSA's efforts so far to improve security were good enough. They cited TSA tests that found that fake guns, bombs and other weapons got past screeners almost a forth of the time in 32 major airports.
In the last six months, travelers’ feelings concerning airport security in the United States seem to echo those that followed the attacks. As a public signal that airport security was lax, the events triggered major and obvious changes in airport security. Initially, if fliers were even willing to fly, they were accepting of the long lines and invasive searches. However, just a few months later, the passengers began to be more annoyed and angry than understanding. There were reports of three hour waits in long lines of people going through metal detectors, removing shoes and even being pulled aside to special rooms for more thorough inspections. People were told to arrive at the airport more than four hours prior to their flight and frequent delays were becoming a problem.
The result of all of this was a loss of patience. More and more former airplane passengers began to drive to their destination instead. As we just saw, papers published stories of airport security breaches on the third page of their daily editions. As time continued, the American public became increasingly intolerant until finally it either became a norm for frequent travelers or simply quicker. Despite time, relaxed concern from the public and greater efficiency, for many, the problem has not yet been solved.
On September 23, 2003, a publication of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer contained a response to a recent article about airport security and the inconvenience, prejudice and embarrassment people regularly deal with to catch a flight. Readers wrote in saying things like, “I don't mind the hassle, but … I do not receive the attention that some one who looks Middle Eastern would. This racist aspect of the whole 9/11 thing is still troubling to me” (Seattle, Jeff Douthwaite) and “On a recent trip to California, our short-haired 10-pound dog was hand-frisked outside her kennel by the airport security stating that you can't be too sure. As a law-abiding American citizen, I feel as though I am being treated as a criminal every time I enter any airport” (Seattle, Dana Rasmussen). If the reader continues on, he/she will only find a tiny sprinkling of understanding and appreciation amongst more anger and resentment.
It is difficult to decide if the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 had any real impact at all. Yes, it was a concern that in less than a year later was proved to be very valid and built upon, but the act itself was not the final product. Instead many others were created and signed in the last three years. Three years is not enough time to judge the effectiveness of a policy. It really is not easy to judge a policy at all. To listen to the public is one strategy, but when you consider the fact that they are rarely objective, but driven by anger, annoyance and ignorance, you realize they are not the correct tool for evaluation. If you look at the statistics you will see that since the attacks, terrorists have not hijacked a plane. However, it has been documented that many breaches of security both by professional and amateur assessments have occurred. The best result would be derived from a combination of these and governmental evaluations.
All in all, the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 is a success because it led the way to further improvement of airport security in the following laws. After all, if you are going to judge a policy, it should be based on the effect it had at achieving its stated goals. Though the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 did not meet its goals alone, it did take steps toward reaching them and served as a base for further improvements that have aided the policy.
Bibliography:
Airport Boardings. May, Lucy, Dan Monk and Rachel Melcer. Airport Will Step Up Security Inside and Outside Terminal. Buisness Courier
Airport Report Express. American Association of Airport Exacutives. April 12, 2000.
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ASIA. Airport Security Improvement Act Of 2000. Public Law 106-528 [S. 2440]
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ASSH. Aviation Security Screening Hearing. Aug. 16, 2000. (Sept. 15, 2003).
ATS. Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub.L.107-71, Nov. 7, 2001
CBSnew.com.
Minutes of the Federal Aviation meeting. (Nov. 28, 2003).
PanAm. PanAm History. June 13, 1997. (Sept. 12, 2003).
Seattle Post-Intelligencer. More readers respond to airport security. Sept. 20, 2003. (Oct.
29, 2003).
Title 49. Legal information Institute. (Sept. 12, 2003).
White house commission report. Abrahamson, James A. Nov. 12, 1997. (Oct. 24, 2003).
