Are states' foreign policies determined by the anarchical nature of the international system?

Collin Powel said about US foreign policy “We are selling a product”, implying that FP making is a complex task whose analysis entails the necessity of an inclusive nexus of causes that reconciles economic needs, geopolitical imperatives, domestic opinion, and state capabilities. At all times, forces in the international system are at work, eroding established interests and summoning nations to embrace new ones. Foreign policies, or “the use of political influence in order to induce other states to exercise their law-making power in a manner desired by the state concerned” are affected by this restless configuration of world-wide power. Anarchy is, in this context of “governance without government”, a key feature that finally determines, but does not monopolize states’ FPs. This will be demonstrated through an analysis of the nature of the anarchical system; the main relevant theories; the nature of the decisions in FP, and finally studying how the restless reconfiguration of the international situation has affected the relevance of anarchy for FP analysis.

The foreign policy arena is characterized by a competitive system of relations among sovereign “corporate-trust” states, in which the cardinal rule is “Do whatever you must in order to win”. Countries have many objectives, what trigger numerous conflicts of interest; however self-preservation is their primary common goal, determining a situation of no automatic harmony. As there is not a supreme authority, disputes can eventually be settled with the use of force, generating insecurity and a struggle for power. To achieve a favourable outcome from such conflict a state has to rely on self-help, as the gains of one state are at the expense of others. This zero-sum game makes impossible the reliance on others for security through a system of automatic sanction: departure from the rational model imperils the survival of the state. In the Middle East anarchy appears in big evidence: because it was imposed on a pre-existing cultural unity that still persists, there is a duality between raison de la nation (Pan-Arabism) and raison d’etat (sovereignty) in foreign policymaking. The latter imposes itself in the several conflicts existent in the region, such as the Syrian-Lebanese, the Arab-Israeli and the Gulf, that point at power accumulation and balancing as keys to regional order.

If moving from the Hobbesian “state of nature” to a “civil state” represents a material gain and the maximization of state’s rewards through collaboration, the election of the short-term reward is exemplified in Rousseau’s “stag hunt case” . Nevertheless, cases such as the UK’s four “Cod Wars” against Iceland, Rhodesia’s decolonization process under Thatcher’s government or US traditional proclamation of the absence of “selfish interests” in its FP, induces to think on the possibility of other factors also affecting state policies, and to take into account Waltz’s first and second images.

The conditioning effects of anarchy on the international system belong to the state-centric Neo-Realist Theory that identifies national interest –sovereignty and independence- as its core values. Security and national survival become the priority of FP, and states behave minimising their vulnerabilities and maximises opportunities, according with the “rational-actor model”. However aggressive behaviour is constrained by the distribution of capabilities within the international system and other elements that help maintaining order, reflected in the UN resolution after the Hostage Crisis in the US embassy in Teheran in 1979.

The Pluralist-Interdependence Model is focused on new global trends which have reduced the insulation of national governments and societies transforming old international issues into domestic populations’ concerns. This “complex interdependence” has augmented the links between governments, raising new areas of cooperation. Through new forms of international organisation such as cross-departmental and cross-national activities, a range of “private” organisations have become involved in FP making. States are still important, but their decisions cannot be removed from the interests of these groups. Interdependence implies “mutual dependence” and the reciprocal ability to harm each other by not fulfilling those needs, increasing the vulnerability of the states. National power is no longer measured in military strength and the use of force becomes obsolete due to the increased costs of war.

Marxist-inspired Structuralists focus on the world capitalist system and its hierarchy built on the structures of the former colonies. The function of the state is to serve the interests of international capital, and the ruling elites of the new states maintain an economic dependency that decapitalizes the countries and makes them dependent on the core, constraining their sovereignty. In sustaining regional subordination, a series of paternalistic leverages are used, and whenever radical movements try to gain control, military interventions might be launched. The dependency perspective concludes that less-developed countries have few realistic policy choices, their processes are characterized by a lack of stable structures and the implementation of FP is “a matter of reflexes”to core demands.

Several criticisms can be made on the three approaches: the realist geographic-determinism does not always work, as Japan’s shift from a Japanese-centred East Asia “Co-prosperity Sphere” in the 1930s to military dependence upon the USA, aggressive export-led growth and investment after WWII. Against pluralist expectations, relative democratization does not necessarily lead to less risky or more status quo FPs, as the actions of Nasser, Khadaffi, Iran under the clerics, and Saddam Hussein show, contradicting also the realist assumption that lack of great capabilities inhibit a regime from pursuing broad revolutionary objectives. At the same time, the economic liberalization of the ...

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Considering the possible natures of the international system, it is important to understand what factors affect state leaders when deciding policies. A country’s ethos influences its tendency towards FP, and in some occasions a dilemma between high principles and self-interest may also arise, being eventually solved through a hierarchy of vital interests. However it seems like certain countries hesitate between possession and milieu goals when defining national interest, while others do not: Power is the key to discriminate between FPs -in terms of characteristics and prospective success-. The distinction between great powers, middle powers and small states indicates the scope, responsibilities and potential of action and success of a country’s FP. Great powers’ superior capabilities and power imply a more diverse set of goals, including more freedom to acknowledge ideologies. The top and bottom ends of the hierarchy of power and influence are fixed over the short to medium-term; however in the middle the possession of certain resources and geographic position determine a temporary advantage, what creates considerable fluctuations. The relative situations of the different states explain the use of “double standards” by post-modern states and their seemingly broader freedom of choice. However, it is often only a short or medium-term goal that has been adapted from the flexible long-term national interest due to the interaction of internal and external pressures on the state. In many cases policy makers are constrained both by a “two-level game” between internal and external developments, and by other sources of internal disagreement on policy, arisen from the country’s governmental structures, what may affect the FP outcomes.

Finally, the relevance of the changes on the nature of the environment that policy makers have faced in the last decades was brought by the end of the Cold War and the consequent proliferation of new states and patterns of cooperation and conflict. The historical linkage between FP and national security represented by the “national security state” during the Cold War has suffered radical changes: With the end of the bipolar power structure, the US stopped organizing the defence of the non-communist world, forcing each country to confront its perils form its own national perspective. Assuming greater responsibility for their own security, the post-Cold War states have moved the system toward the equilibrium in the military field, even though collaboration is the continuing pattern. However, the emphasis on security has decreased as developments in military technology have made it less accessible, and the leakage of military capabilities to non-state groupings –such as terrorist organisations- have led to the erosion of the military “trump card” in FP.

Secondly, since the 1980’s processes of regionalisation, transnationalism and globalisation have accelerated. The FP agenda has given priority to more immediate and challenging economic and social issues -historically overridden by the primacy of security-, partially due to the new emphasis of the political system on the power of constituencies and the media world, that put a premium on emotion and the mood of the moment, increasing the importance of “soft power”.

In conclusion, as stated by neo-realist theory, anarchy is a principle of the society of states whose influence cannot be denied. Through the study of other perspectives, such as liberalism or structuralism, some aspects of a country’s FP and the nature of some regional subsystems of states can be better explained. However, it is undeniable that, in long-run policy making, the survival of a state is the primary goal of its leaders. It is true that in the last decades, processes of regional economic and political integration, and the emergence of major transnational policy issues are reducing the major role that security used to have, however this shift on the balance between warfare and welfare is only possible due to the secure and stable nature of the general international system, in which the survival of the states is not being challenged.

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When Colin Powell appointed Charlotte Beers as assistant secretary of state, he said: "I wanted one of the world's greatest advertising experts, because what are we doing? We're selling. We're selling a product".

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From a constructivist perspective, anarchy is rule by no one in particular and therefore by everyone in association, as an unintended consequence of their many uncoordinated acts.

Kubálková, Onuf & Kowert (Eds.), International Relations in a constructed world, M. E. Sharpe, NY, 1998, P.77.

Rousseau and Spinoza occasionally used corporate-trust and organismic analogies, which imply that the sovereign cannot do anything derogatory to the continued existence of the state.

Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State and War: A theoretical Analysis, New York; London: Columbia University Press, 1959, p.173.

Ibid. p.205.

The maintenance of the physical integrity of the country and the unity of its people; to what everything else will tend to be subordinated, including ideology, on the principle salus populi suprema lex.

Ibid. p.18-19.

The clue to the limitations of policy imposed by the condition of anarchy among states is contained in the maxim: “Everybody’s strategy depends on everybody else’s”, a statement that appears in John McDonald’s popularization of the game theory of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.

A good example of zero-sum game can be found in Neville Chamberlain’s policy in the late 1930’s: France and Russia, without the assured support of Britain, would not have felt strong enough to challenge the Central Powers; they in turn, not feeling threatened, would have behaved in more gentlemanly fashion. P220 Op.cit. Waltz (1959): p.202-3 &220

Bahgat Korany, quoted in Ibid. p.8.

The Arab world retains some features of an “international society”, a community bound by rules and norms; but it is sliding toward merger with the wider Middle East, a mere “system of states” mostly linked by power and interest. Ibid. p.10.

We can find examples in the different disarmament agreements along the last 50 years, in which the security dilemma is overcome when a state displays a willingness to pare down his military establishments, allowing other states to pursue similar policies. It emphasizes the interdependence of the policies of all states. Op.cit. Waltz (1959): p.171-172.

It shows how the tension between one state’s immediate interest and the general interest of the group is resolved by the unilateral action of the one state destroying the foundations of collaboration, and replacing the potential rewards of joint action by mistrust, defection and war. Op.cit. Waltz (1959): p.168-169.

Cod Wars 1958-73: The United Kingdom did not employ its superior naval strength and thus had to accept Reykjavik’s extension of its coastal waters to a twelve-mile limit. It was a matter of public image, in which imposing violence on a small country could not be risked if there was the chance of appearing to be in the wrong. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, NY 2003, p.180.

Rhodesia’s decolonization process: Several British policies, such as the “No Independence Before Majority African Rule” –NIBMAR- or the resumed control for a brief time in 1980 to oversee the first all-party multi-racial elections held in the country illustrate Britain’s choice between continuing to help maintain stability and social justice in the area from which she was withdrawing, and her economic interest in keeping a balance between means and commitments.

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US foreign policy: During the course of the twentieth century, one president after another have proclaimed that America has no “selfish” interests; that its principal, if not its only, international goal is universal peace and progress. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Touchstone, NY, 1994, p.621.

The first and second images describe the forces that determine policy in world politics, while the third image describes the framework of world politics, assessing the importance and predicting the results of the first two images. Op.cit. Waltz (1959): p.238.

In contrast to realism, that poses a big emphasis on the qualities inherent in the state itself, such as the quality of leadership or the quest of leaders for power and glory.

Yet, Morgenthau suggests that “the contingent elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference […] are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course”. Webber & Smith, Foreign Policy in a transformed world, Prentice Education Limited, UK, 2002, pp.53,55.

Distribution of capabilities include nuclear weapons-based deterrence and also more traditional forms of balance of power. Ibid. p.21.

Ayatollah Khomeiny’s Iran and Colonel Khadaffi’s Libya were ostracized and condemned by the UN when the Iranian revolutionary government did nothing to prevent the incident. This violation of the elementary rules of diplomatic immunity triggered a reaction of all governments, regardless of their ideological and other differences. Op.cit. Holsti (1992): p.70.

Op.cit. Webber&Smith (2002): p.23

The need of two or more actors to provide goods and services for each other. It suggests that a cannot meet its needs –for security, economic welfare, raw materials, food, and the like- without the cooperation of b. Op.cit. Holsti (1992): p.72.

That explains why the perennial trade wars between Washington and Tokyo have not turn into shooting wars to coerce Japan into more American-style economic practices: because of destruction but also in terms of long-run economic costs. Ibid. p.72.

Economic dependency means a major function of foreign policy must be to secure resource flows from external sources on which states’ revenues are mainly based, what makes them be more responsive to the demands of global powers than to domestic opinion in designing their policies. Op.cit. Hinnebusch & Ehteshami (Eds), (2002): p3.

In the form of foreign aid, grants of military assistance or other forms of indirect control and influence such as centre’s media and advertising. Op.cit. Holsti (1992): p.73. In America’s "hundred years war" to convert the Arab and Muslim worlds to American values, some of the initiatives will include”a fast-paced music channel aimed at the young who subliminally ingest news bulletins in between blasts of Britney Spears and the Backstreet Boys”, “backed by $900 million for promotional materials, cultural and educational exchanges and launching radio and television channels in the Middle East”.

Leonard, M., Velvet Fist in the Iron Glove, Observer Worldview, The Guardian, (16/06/02), on-line viewed: 14/03/05

Attempting to coerce all societies to adopt US values and to perpetuate the hierarchical world capitalist system, as in the cases of Vietnam, El Salvador, Grenada and Nicaragua. Op.cit. Holsti (1992): p.74.

They succumb to a form of economic servitude upon rich states and international financial institutions and, in regional terms, become preoccupied with immediate threats to their national security that arise from arbitrary borders (a legacy of the colonial period) and unresolved territorial claims. Op.cit. Webber&Smith (2002): p.23. According to Galtung’s influential “Structural Theory of Imperialism”, periphery states are dependent on and tied to the core powers while being only very weakly related to each other. Op.cit. Hinnebusch & Ehteshami (Eds), (2002), p.3.

Op.cit. Webber&Smith (2002): p.23.

Geographical and topographical characteristics made Japan face a severe mismatch between its growing population and the availability of resources. The idea of the military conquest of Manchuria in 1931 aimed to solve Japan’s island location, its rapidly growing population and the lack of resources. However, the same situation, after the Second World War had a fundamentally different solution. Op.cit. Holsti (1992): p.275

In the case of the Middle East, this situation is explained because populations have remained mobilizable by trans-state and irredentist ideology. Op.cit. Hinnebusch & Ehteshami (Eds), (2002), p.22.

The Middle East, once an independent civilization, has been turned into a periphery of the Western-dominated world system. According to L. Carl Brown, it is an example of penetrated system, one subjected to an exceptional level of external intervention and control by the West, motivated by its contiguous location and the exceptional concentration of great power interests –oil, transit routes and Israel-. Ibid. p.2.

“Ethos: the thoughts and feelings which come natural for a country on the particular piece of earth which it inhabit with neighbours, dispose a state to take the same things for granted about foreign policy.” In the UK’s case, it implies that no much has changed if Prime Ministers since 1945 are compared to the Lord Derby of a hundred years ago who said “we can trust none of these European governments”. A country will give unity of ideology to its politicians, having a British Conservative and a British Socialist more in common than two socialists one of whom is English and the other French. This different ideologies will impose themselves in the international system through a hierarchy: In many cases, US Foreign Policy has overridden that of the United Nations, however Nepalese foreign policy will probably have to comply with that of the other two actors, unable to impose its own will. Northedge, F. S. (Ed.), The foreign policies of the Powers, Faber and Faber, London, 1968, p.12.

Vital interest: a change in the international environment so likely to undermine the national security that it must be resisted no matter what form the threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate it appears. Op.cit. Kissinger (1994): p.812.

“Possession goals” is the defence of what one is or has, while “milieu goals” is the maintenance of broader international order or standards. Op.cit. Webber&Smith (2002): p.44.

Since the US tradition emphasizes universal truths rather than national characteristics, American policymakers have generally preferred multilateral approaches to national ones: the agendas of disarmament, non-proliferation, and human rights rather than essentially national, geopolitical, or strategic issues. Op.cit. Kissinger (1994): p.833.

An alternative classification includes pre-modern states - often former colonies such as Somalia and, until recently, Afghanistan - whose failures have led to a Hobbesian war of all against all; postmodern states which no longer think of security primarily in terms of conquest; and traditional 'modern' states such as India, Pakistan or China which behave as states always have, following interest, power and raison d'état. Cooper, Why We Still Need Empires, Observer Worldview, The Guardian, (7/04/02), on-line viewed: 14/03/05

Great powers have traditionally arrogated for themselves special responsibilities for arranging the main contours of the international system, as was the case after the Napoleonic wars, World War I and II. Under the charter of the UN, the five great powers have a special responsibility for maintaining “international peace and security” as seen in US intervention into the Korean War (1950) under UN auspices. Op.cit. Holsti (1992), pp. 276-277.

Op.cit. Webber&Smith (2002): p.31. States such as Cuba, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, which assumed a heightened importance during the years of Soviet-American competition, are now of marginal consequence. Others, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkey, have, acquired a new importance that reflects changing geopolitical and geo-economic concerns. Ibid. p.33.

Post-modern states operate among themselves on the basis of law as and open cooperative security, while when dealing with “modern” and “pre-modern” states they revert to the methods of an earlier era: force, pre-emptive attack, and deception. Op.cit. Cooper, Why We Still Need Empires, Observer Worldview, The Guardian, (7/04/02).

Robert Putnam (1988): A two-level game occurs when policy makers attempt to cope with the demands of their own political systems while simultaneously dealing with international developments. The attempt to satisfy domestic pressures may constrain the policy maker (in the US, public opinion and Congressional opposition has, since the Vietnam War, ruled out large-scale American troop deployments in war situations). Op.cit. Webber&Smith (2002): p.57.

As can happen between Ministers having civilian and those having defence responsibilities and viceversa: General MacArthur against Truman during the Korean War; and German General Staff against Hitler at the time of the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936. Op.cit. Northedge (1968): p.24.

Op.cit. Kissinger (1994): p.23.

The rare cases of self-sufficiency in national security affairs are represented by countries such as North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Cuba and, to some degree, China. Otherwise collaboration is the norm even for Great powers: the US through NATO and Russia through arrangements with partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Op.cit. Webber&Smith (2002): p.19.

Limiting truly modern and effective national defences to a handful of relatively wealthy states (US), or those willing to sacrifice civilian needs for military expenditure (India, Pakistan and Iraq). Ibid. p.42.

Ibid. p.43.

Ibid. p.42.

Keohane and Nye have termed it “multiple channels of contact among societies”. They exercise power through transnational relations that involve non-state actors as well as governments. Ibid. p.65. “Europeans are well-versed in how public opinion in other states affects their own politics - whether it is Danes or Irish who enjoy saying No in referendums, British Euro-scepticism, or French paranoia about British beef”. Op.cit. Leonard, M., Velvet Fist in the Iron Glove, Observer Worldview, The Guardian, (16/06/02).

Op.cit. Webber&Smith (2002): p.19.Op.cit. Kissinger (1994): pp.833-834.