Building Cooperation with Russia- An Emerging Voice Outside of the European Union.

The European Union – Political Science 451

Building Cooperation with Russia – An Emerging Voice Outside of the European Union

For: Professor Haskel

By: Aaron Tepperman 110132229

Establishing peace on the European continent is an ultimate goal of the European Union (EU). It sees a secure and flourishing Russia “…free of new dividing lines….” (Common Strategy, pg. 2) as an absolutely necessary prerequisite in order to achieve this objective. Issues that affect the continent of Europe as a whole are best resolved through greater cooperation between Russia and the European Union. The EU and its member states anticipate an opportunity to share with Russia the expertise to build modern economic, political, social and administrative structures. The experience brought to the table by the EU will greatly contribute to a successful transformation. All the while, the EU understands that Russia’s future is ultimately the responsibility of Russia itself. In examining the nature of this relationship, I will provide background information, use it to shape the present context of the partnership, and then focus on theoretical reasons behind EU-Russia relations. Finally, I will consider the latest EU-Russia Summit as a mini case in determining their progress.

Background to cooperation

During the time of the Cold War, the international scene was bipolar, and the world was dominated by two hegemonic powers, Russia and the United States. (Motyl 2003, pg. 119) At this time, Western European nations were in a position to develop relations among each other, essentially free from entanglement in the escalating threat from the two powers. What further reassured Western Europe’s sense of security, in an insecure world, was the ideological alignment they shared with the US.

The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union crumbled this bipolar world, and brought about a completely changed international scene that could be characterized as anarchic and full of disarray. But even during this uncertain and unstable time, both Russia and the US remained dominant forces, mainly due to their possession of nuclear weapons. (Motyl 2003, pg. 121) This led to the beginning of a Russia-Western European relationship that really began at the end of the Cold War.

In hindsight, it is easy to understand the combination of reasons that led to the Soviet Union’s demise. A poor economic performance, to put it lightly, the inability of Russian government officials to be seen as legitimate, and the growing discontent among the 15 Soviet Republics all played an integral role in the Soviet Union’s collapse. (Motyl 2003, pg. 125) As this occurred, the Soviet Union immediately became weak in all areas, as they were no longer able to depend on their autarkic system of self-sufficiency. The reforms instituted for the economy, directly following the collapse, were quite unsuccessful because of rampant corruption and the degree of ineptitude in the Russian government.

Quickly, it was realized that, if Russia had any hope of survival as a stable and prosperous nation, it needed to open up its borders to the international arena. Putting aside concern for Russia’s economic and political troubles, Europe, at the time when Russia conceded on the need to cooperate, expressed a great deal of interest in merging security positions, and stepping up security dialogue with Russia. Europe’s main motive behind desired cooperation with Russia was their possession of nuclear weapons. In effect, this was a threat that allowed Russia to hold on to whatever bargaining power it had left.

The timing of the fall of the Soviet Union was extremely relevant to the timing of the EU’s Maastricht Treaty. Included in this groundbreaking treaty was the decision for eastward expansion. Regardless of whether EU aspirations were for Russia’s inclusion, eastward expansion translated into a need for deepened EU-Russia relations. The Maastricht Treaty mandated the EU to take a leading role in developing and restructuring a new Europe, including Russia, free of Cold War threats. It is also very important to examine the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) that was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty because it laid the foundation for a common security policy, independent from security policies of the US or NATO. This is extremely important as it illustrated to Russia that the EU was committed to security dialogue specific to Russia and the EU, and not influenced by the underlying interests of the US or NATO. (Motyl 2003, pg. 129)

When Russia finally turned to the EU for help in reorganizing their economy, and in building relations with the international community, the EU was only getting stronger, more productive, and certainly in a position to help. The EU was establishing itself as a permanent force on the European continent and only further strengthened itself by instituting a united foreign policy. The prosperous time for the EU and the absolutely dismal situation of Russia provided for a perfect environment for the thriving EU to help ‘rebuild’ Russia by building its trade networks and allowing economic development to become a reality.

Perhaps slightly self-interested, benefits that the EU saw in cooperating and helping to rebuild Russia, aside from the need to coordinate security, were benefits from extended trade, industry, and to the tackling of problems common to both the EU and Russia. A mutually advantageous relationship was born.

It is this point of departure that acted as a stepping stone for Russia and the EU to hammer out their first official treaty, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The PCA was drafted in 1994, but did not come into force until December of 1997. The agreement was initially concluded for a period of 10 years. In light of establishing the PCA, both sides saw the potential in designing an institutional framework that advanced bilateral relations, established principal common objectives, and encompassed procedures and dialogue in a number of policy areas. Broadly speaking, the PCA covers: trade and economic cooperation; cooperation in civil sectors; political dialogue; and justice and home affairs. (Pinder 2002 pg.105)

Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia

A general understanding of how the EU-Russian relationship manifested and grew into legislated cooperation is necessary in order to analyze more recent agreements. Subsequently, I will focus on a document titled the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia (CSR). This agreement was concluded in June of 1999 and will remain until June of 2004. The Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia complements the work of the PCA, and is a document that lays out updated and more concrete approaches to relations with Russia. The CSR, intended to be beneficial for both sides, was developed by the European Council and highlights a working relationship between Russia and the EU.

Areas of priority center around: consolidation of democracy, the rule-of-law, and public institutions; integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space; stability and security in Europe and beyond; and common challenges on the European continent. (Pinder 2002 pg. 107)

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The European Union and the Member States will work to achieve the objectives of the CSR by using all appropriate channels and institutions. The role of the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Member States consists of evaluating, according to their area of expertise, existing procedures, strategies, instruments, and policies in order to ensure that the implementation of the EU-CSR is consistent across all Member States. In the event of inconsistencies between EU institutions and Member States, necessary adjustments will be made as early as possible.

Under their respective jurisdictions, the Secretary-General of the Council and the High Representative for CFSP will assist the Council in implementing this common strategy. Moreover, the European Council mandates the Council of Ministers to assess and consider the development of the strategy as a whole, from the side of the EU, and to report to the European Council, at least annually, on the progress in achieving the designated objectives. The Council will also be responsible for reviewing Russia’s progress and for ensuring cooperation, from the Russian’s, in their continued effort to execute the CSR. Further requirements include frequent reports, by EU diplomats, detailing recommendations to the European Council for amendments to the strategy, and for accession countries to align their actions within the realm of the CSR.

Consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions in Russia

Within this first objective, the Union supports the fortification and push for transparency of public institutions and modernization of their administration. Predominantly, the revamping of their executive, legislative and judicial bodies, as well as striving for a police force that is accountable, is the goal. Accomplishing these measures will strengthen democratic principles within Russia. The EU envisions the implementation of these aims through increased contact between “…judicial authorities and law enforcement bodies of the EU Member States and Russia.” (Common Strategy on Russia, pg. 4)

The emergence of a strong civil society is a vital component to not only compliment but to reinforce democracy in Russia. First and foremost, to build an affluent civil society, the EU, on their end, will increase exchanges in cultural and educational programs. The EU also proposes “…direct exchanges between civil society actors in Russia and the Union.” (Common Strategy on Russia, pg. 2) Another plan of action proposed by the EU is the development of training programs, in Russia, for students aspiring to be politicians and civil servants. In this respect, the EU is committed to enhancing scholarships and student exchange programs. An added factor that will help Russia develop a strong civil society is EU support for non-governmental organizations.

Integration of Russia into a common European economic and social space

“ The basic idea of the common economic space is the improvement of conditions surrounding the free movement of goods, services, capital, and also people between the EU and Russia.” (Common Strategy on Russia, pg. 4) The reciprocal nature of the EU-Russia relationship is illustrated through the EU’s dependence on Russian energy supplies and through the fact that the EU is Russia’s main trading partner. Lowest common denominator bargaining in the aforementioned areas of dependence explains the general need for a common economic space and for economic cooperation. However, as are obvious prerequisites for accession countries of the EU, a functioning market economy, “…sound domestic policies and economic management…” (Common Strategy on Russia, pg. 3) are all necessary before any economic cooperation with Russia is initiated by the EU. Therefore, to ensure that Russia’s transition to a market economy is successful for the newly emerging private business sector, the EU plans to expand programs designed to train Russian managers and entrepreneurs.

Obstacles that the EU believes would inhibit a closer trade and economic union are Russia’s customs procedures, their need to harmonize the standards and the certification of goods and services to the level of the Union, and to coordinate competition policy. (Pinder 2002 pg. 119) Notably, the EU points to a revamping of Russia’s border crossing procedures as a move that will significantly facilitate trade. In exchange, the EU will agree to examine obstacles they have in place limiting Russian access to EU markets. The EU has pledged to help Russia make their most important economic sectors more competitive. This will benefit Russian industrial, agricultural, and energy producers. Further limitations that will pose as road blocks to economic and trade cooperation are a monetary program followed by the Russian government that is both erroneous and unsustainable. To counter this potential inefficiency, the EU suggests that Russia follows an economic plan drafted by the IMF. The plan should address problems of enterprise restructuring, land privatization, public finance, and the banking system. (Pinder 2002 pg. 122) Within these areas, the EU is willing to provide financial and technical support. For example, the EU proposes to introduce a functioning land register so that the transformation to private land ownership is smooth and successful. (Pinder 2002 pg. 123)

The EU hopes Russia’s new economic policy will have an impact. To ensure this, high level policy dialogue, between the two sides, will continually ensure that Russia remains on the right track.

The EU believes that Russia needs to remove their barriers to investment with EU member states. A credible banking sector is central to this point. To accomplish this aim, the EU will assist Russia in consolidating and executing a visible regulatory framework that endorses economic activity and increased investment, both domestic and foreign. (Pinder 2002 pg. 130) Moreover, Russia’s potential benefit from access to European financial markets is significant as it would also contribute to greater levels of investment, an element Russia desperately needs in order to continue its transitional development. If properly executed, reforms that institute fair conditions for domestic and foreign investment will greatly work to Russia’s advantage.

The inevitable and necessary transition to a democratic capitalist society must consider the social aspect. The most deprived Russians will suffer greatly and, as such, the EU will provide expertise in order to ensure a rapid and smooth transition. For example, the EU recommends immediate reforms to vital social services and health care. (Pinder 2002 pg. 132) The EU is also encouraging the rise of employee unions, employer organizations, and adherence to labour standards, such as ISO 9000, in order to give a voice to those directly affected by the transition to a full-functioning market economy.

The long-term goals outlined by the EU in the CSR include necessary conditions for the creation of an EU-Russia free trade zone. But this can only be achieved following Russia’s harmonization with WTO membership requirements. At that point, the EU will lobby support for Russia’s accession into the WTO.

Cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe and beyond

The EU proposes that a strategic partnership “…develop within the framework of a permanent policy and security dialogue designed to bring interests closer together and to respond jointly to some of the challenges to security on the European continent.” (Common Strategy on Russia, pg. 6) As well, security cooperation will be broadened by elaborating certain aspects of the European Security Charter, and by the EU potentially allowing Russia to participate in the Western European Union (WEU) meetings that deal with issues under the Petersberg Tasks. (Pinder 2002 pg. 139) The EU Member States and Russia are all members of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Dialogue on security issues will take place within this institutional framework. The EU desires substantial cooperation between the two sides in international conflict prevention and resolution, and in crisis management. This move will provide a better climate for ensuring that the EU and Russia are on the same page when dealing with issues of diplomacy and international relations. A final area that the EU would like to coordinate with Russia is that of arms control and disarmament. The EU expects existing agreements to be extended in order to further control arms exports.

Common challenges on the European continent

Problems faced by more than one actor become common problems to all those involved. Evidently, common responses and coordination will make possible quicker and more effective resolutions. Central to this objective is the fight against the underground economy. Organized crime, money laundering, illegal trafficking in human beings, and drug trafficking threaten both sides. The Union suggests that appropriate tools and resources be accessible at meetings in order for effective cooperation between the designated bodies. A key component of these meetings will be the exchange of expertise from EU representatives to Russian officials, mainly for the improvement of legislation, and the establishment of competent institutions. (Welfens 1999, pg. 63)

To combat the fight against organized crime, the EU proposes working within the framework of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. (Welfens 1999, pg. 65)

In an attempt to stop money laundering in Russia, the EU plans to implement informative seminars on its various types and methods.

Actions to put an end to the illegal trafficking of human beings and drugs are seen in the form of developed cooperation between Europol and the appropriate Russian authorities. (Welfens 1999, pg. 65) Moreover, the EU plans to hold information campaigns in conjunction with Russian agencies that will make more people aware of this crime, and in effect, reduce its extent.

Reforms to border control and improvements to the customs system hold true not only for a mutual economic space, but also to help combat illegal trafficking in human beings. The EU is initiating “… advanced training courses for staff members of border and migration authorities.” (Common Strategy, pg. 7)

Another area of concern for the European continent is the negative externalities associated with a widespread Russian energy sector. Leading the way are trepidations focused on nuclear safety and environmental protection. Consequently, the EU proposes specific improvements to the safety of Russian nuclear power stations, and supporting the safe storage of nuclear and chemical waste. To accomplish this goal, the EU and Russia will work within the framework of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, through the Nuclear Safety Account Agreement, and the EU will also work to help strengthen the Russian Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority. (Welfens 1999, pg. 66) The latter concern calls for EU assistance in energy conservation and efficiency, as anything else is quite damaging to the environment.

Russia’s Response to the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia

The nature of the relationship, according to Russia, will be based on the established PCA. What is most important to Russia is that the intended objectives from cooperating do not imply “…Russia’s accession to or “association” with the EU.” (Russia’s Response to the Common Strategy, pg. 2) Russia assumes it is a world power, and as a state situated on two continents, it should be left to determine and execute its own domestic and foreign policies.

Russia concurs with the Union that the OSCE should be the foundation for security dialogue. However, Russia proposes that the relevant OSCE institutions should be given specific mandates in dealing with security issues and upon new proposals, ratification by the Member States should be decided by unanimity. (Russia’s Response to the Common Strategy, pg. 4)

Favorable investment legislation and guaranteed security for foreign investors are two aspects of the CSR that Russia both agrees with and wishes to implement. On the road to mutual and beneficial trade Russia adds to the CSR by proposing a review and eventual dissolution of antidumping practices, the protection of existing trade preferences, and the issuing of new ones, and the elimination of quotas on Russian steel products entering the EU. (Russia’s Response to the Common Strategy, pg. 8)

In the energy sector, Russia compliments the EU proposals by strategies that will attract European capital to Russia for the building of nuclear generation stations. In turn, Russia will repay those creditors in the form of energy supplies. It is hopeful that these major investment projects will act as the groundwork for the integration of the energy sector. Russia’s goal is a long-term energy policy, between both actors, that establishes a common European energy space.

Russia hopes to promote contact between Russian and EU enterprises, and their associations in order to ensure continued development in trade, economic and investment cooperation. The Russian proposal of an EU-Russia industrialist roundtable will be effective insofar as it could be consulted on key issues, decisions, and in attracting foreign capital into Russia. Businesses will be given a voice and, consequently, an opportunity for their interests to be heard. The roundtable will also be useful in that it could expand Russian exports. Here, Russia’s aim is to gain experience in dealing with private enterprises, as they are a relatively new addition to the country, and to prevent disputes. This type of structure is completely new to Russia because, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, enterprises were state owned and completely controlled by the government. As a result, businesses had no say in industrial and economic development.

Examining the theory behind EU-Russia relations

When the relationship of the EU and Russia is examined, I believe, it becomes quite clear that no other major policy alternatives, for either side, other than partnership agreements to cooperate, were viable or realistic. The EU could not ignore the presence of Russia in light of a historic expansion eastward that will see the EU share a border with Russia. For this reason, cooperation policies were imperative. From the perspective of Russia, the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia as an international pariah with little choice but to cooperate with the EU and their dominant polices. The extent of the relationship between both sides now goes far beyond limited cooperation in only a few areas. It is possible to explain the ever increasing union between the EU and Russia by political theory.

From the article that I read by Bomberg and Peterson, I would hypothesize that they would attempt to explain the nature of this relationship by the fact that states form relations in order to accomplish what they would not be capable of doing alone. This undoubtedly holds true for the EU-Russia relationship. Look no further than Russia’s export reliance, in achieving economic prosperity, on the EU’s markets, and conversely, the EU’s dependence on Russia in controlling their borders to eliminate drug smuggling that would eventually end up in member states.

Keohane reaffirms the assertion that this relationship is not a zero-sum game. By EU-Russian cooperation, both sides are reducing transaction costs, reducing uncertainty, sharing information, and thus, building credible relationships. This is quite apparent through the energy dialogue currently taking place between the EU and Russia. The potential agreement would see the development of infrastructure on both sides to lower transportation costs, a formal agreement on quantities imported and exported that would reduce uncertainty on both sides, and the pooling of human capital in order to share knowledge and expertise in the developmental process.

Sandholtz advances my argument by stating that international cooperation gives different options to states that they didn’t have before. The EU is now in a position, from helping Russia to reform, to benefit from increased economic activity that was highly dependent on a stable and democratic Russia. On the other hand, Russia will gain from the EU’s aid by being able to explore many more options for foreign investment than they ever had before.

In an article by Sandholtz and Zysman, a possible explanation for EU-Russia relations can be attributed to structural change. The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of the European Union were absolutely major changes that drastically altered the international arena. It was these two events that first stimulated the need for cooperation.

The character of this relationship would be incomplete without a discussion on the effects of spillover. I believe that it would be useful to highlight some theory described by Moravcsik. He was an intergovernmentalist who believed that it was not spillover that led to the development of the EU, but instead it was a result of interstate bargaining. I am in accordance with Moravcsik in thinking that interstate bargaining and not spillover played the principle role in the development of EU-Russia relations. Negotiations between the EU and Russia are specific to certain areas while being limited to these areas. For example, enhanced cooperation for economic integration can only move as fast as Russia’s implementation of reforms. From this, it is safe to infer that, even if spillover from one area of the economy to another was desired, it would not be possible to occur, even through negotiations, because Russia’s economy would not be capable of cooperation in an area currently at a level of development far less than that of the EU.

EU-Russia Summit

Rome, November 2003

This was the most recent EU-Russia Summit. Heading the EU delegation is the President-in-office of the European Council, President of the Commission, Commissioner for External Relations, and the EU High Representative for CFSP. For the Russians, President Putin will be accompanied by other Russian officials including the Foreign Minister, and the Chair of the Duma Committee on International Affairs.

The first issue to be discussed at this Summit was the importance of extending the PCA to acceding EU Member States before May 2004, the time at which they will become official EU Members. The meeting reassured Russian concerns that all accession countries will accept the terms of the agreement and, accordingly, ratify the PCA. (Twelfth EU-Russia Summit, pg. 1) Other topics included on the agenda are the development of the four ‘common spaces:’ economic; freedom, security and justice; research, education and culture; and external security. (Twelfth EU-Russia Summit, pg. 1)

In the domain of the economy, positive steps were taken by both sides to advance Russia’s accession to the WTO. Russia was provided with a complete list of criteria for membership, designed by the WTO community, and at this Summit, EU officials drafted a report on Russia’s progress to accession. Moreover, recommendations were included on how to implement areas of the criteria that had yet to be executed. On Russia’s part, new offers on services and agricultural products demonstrated their seriousness in pushing forward with WTO accession.

This Summit also yielded progress on the EU-Russian Energy Partnership. A concrete definition and arrangements were established as the framework for this partnership. The agreement will encompass all areas within this sector that are of common interest to both sides. Energy saving, rationalization of production and transport infrastructure, European investment possibilities, and relations between producer and consumer countries topped the agenda for negotiations. (Twelfth EU-Russia Summit, pg. 2)

In the second ‘common space’ agreements on the need for Russia to conclude border accords with Estonia and Latvia were discussed as vital steps for EU-Russian border management. This Summit narrowly missed the finalization of the Readmission Agreement, a document highlighting cooperation in all border issues, especially illegal immigration. The EU did however; call on Russia to ratify the agreement as quickly as possible.

A deal was put in place that would step up work against organized crime. To that end, an agreement will be signed between Europol and the Russian Interior Ministry. The final area of discussion in this subset was the proposal for a long-term aim of visa-free travel between Russia and the EU.

In the third ‘common space, both sides were proud to announce the renewal of the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, “…as well as Russian participation in the Bologna process, which provides for the mutual recognition of diplomas.” (Twelfth EU-Russia Summit, pg. 2)

For external security, the EU and Russia will build on the actual progress made in the area of disarmament and the non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Leaders will also look to advance cooperation in crisis management and civil protection.

Issues not included in the four common spaces but of significant relevance, are common challenges with nuclear safety, and the environment. The EU is mounting pressure on Russian officials to submit the Kyoto Protocol to the Duma for immediate ratification. The EU delegation also raised points concerning domestic issues going on in Russia. Specifically they pointed to securing a political atmosphere that is conducive to a long-lasting peace agreement in the region of Chechnya. The EU also stressed the need for Russia to facilitate access, in Chechnya, to humanitarian aid.

Relations between the EU and Russia started with the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that point, the one sided nature of the relationship was exemplified through Russia’s dependence on the EU. Providing reforms and restructuring advice in order to make the transition to a democratic society and market based economy as rapid and efficient as possible was the aim of the EU, as well as expected benefits for the EU from a developed Russia. From the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, the playing field is slowly becoming leveled as Russia is experiencing more and more gains, in a plethora of industries and sectors, from cooperation. It is my belief that cooperation will continue to be expanded and the nature of this mutually beneficial relationship will flourish in the coming years.

Bibliography:

Lewis, Ann, eds. 2002. The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels. London: The Federal Trust. (McGill Library)

Motyl, Alexander. 2003. Ukraine, Europe and Russia: Exclusion or Dependence. In Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO, and the Price of Membership. eds. Lieven, Anatol, and Trenin, Dimitri, 117-137. Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (McGill Library)

Pinder, John, and Shishkov, Yuri. 2002. The EU and Russia: The Promise of Partnership. London: The Federal Trust. (McGill Library)

Welfens, Paul. 1999. EU Eastern Enlargement and the Russian Transformation Crisis. Berlin: Springer. (McGill Library)

Europa. External Relations. 2003. The EU’s relations with Russia. “Overview.”

Europa. External Relations. 2003. The EU’s relations with Russia. “EU Assistance to Russia.”

Europa. External Relations. 2003. The EU’s relations with Russia. “Russia’s Response to Common Strategy of the European Union of June 4 1999 on Russia.”

8. Europa. Official Journal of the European Communities. 2003. “Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia.”

Europa. External Relations. 2003. The EU’s relations with Russia. “Summary of Political and Economic Situation in Russia”

Europa. External Relations. 2003. The EU”S relations with Russia. “Twelfth EU-Russia Summit.”

Building Cooperation with Russia- An Emerging Voice Outside of the European Union.

Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia

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