Chechen conflict
(Institutional solution)
Introduction
The Chechen conflict is not a recent issue. It has been a problem for quite a long time due to many underlying causes and reasons. The Chechen rebels call it a "war of liberation". They say that Chechnya has never voluntarily joined the Russian Federation and has only been conquered by military force. For them the 1994-6 war fought with Moscow and the latest campaign to crush Chechnya's struggle for independence, which began in the autumn of 1999, prove that the Russians only consider the language of war as means of solving the conflict. On the other hand, the Russia President Vladimir Putin calls the conflict an "anti-terrorist operation". He claims that the Chechens use terrorist tactics to attack Russian soldiers and they have to be crushed. In this paper, I will try to discuss the conflict itself, emphasizing on background history and developments. Furthermore, I will argue about the underlying causes of the conflict and what pushed both sides to such a bloody war. In addition, I will try to propose an institutional solution to the problem and argue whether institutions can settle the dispute between the Russian government and the Chechen rebels. We will see how those institutions might work in the Chechen context.
The conflict:
The Chechens are indigenous people of the North Caucasus. They speak a distinct Caucasic language, which is neither Slavic, nor is it Turkic, but is closely related to the language of neighboring Ingush. The Chechens and their ancestors have lived in their North Caucasus homeland for several thousand years. All of their territory has been overrun for long periods by the Iranian Alans in the 9-12th centuries, by the Golden Horde in the 13th-15th centuries, and then by the Russian Empire, which in a competition for domination of the North Caucasus that began in the 16th century, finally out dominated its Ottoman and Persian rivals. The Chechens have traditionally been fiercely independent and democratic mountaineers. Their Muslim religion plays an important role in Chechen society, even though the ancient clan structure of Chechen social and political life still persists, as do blood feuds and other traditional customs. The area of Chechnya is approximately 6,000 square miles. Its western border with the Ingush Republic has still not been settled. Georgia, now an independent state, lies over the mountains to the south. Dagestan, a Republic of the Russian Federation, is to the east and north, and the Stavropol Krai and the North Ossetin Republic lie to the northwest. Moreover The Chechens have been primarily herdsmen and farmers. According to the 1989 census, 70% of all Chechens still lived in rural areas. The rich oilfields surrounding Grozny have been exploited since 1893. Although recent petroleum production is declining (in 1992 slightly exceeding 3.5 million tons), Grozny has remained a major center of refining (about 6.5 million tons of petroleum in 1992) and of petrochemical production. It is a hub for rail and road transport, as well as for important oil and gas pipelines (there is speculation that Russia's interest in controlling the pipeline for Caspian oil may have been a major factor in the decision to send the Russian army into Chechnya.) Employment in Grozny's oil industry attracted many Russians -- the city's population grew from 97,000 (68,000 Russians) in 1926 to 397,000 (210,000 Russians) in 1989. The Russian Constitution (Article 65) lists the Chechen Republic as a part of the Russian Federation. However, in 1990 a secession movement began to gain force, and on November 2, 1991, Chechnya proclaimed its independence. On March 17, 1992, a constitution was adopted, which defined the Chechen Republic as an independent, secular state governed by a president and a parliament.
On December 11, Russian troops invaded Chechnya from the north, the east, and the west. The first two months of the war in Chechnya was reported in detail by television and the press, both in Russia and abroad, even though coverage fell off sharply when the Russian troops occupied Grozny's Presidential Palace. Despite forecasts of a quick victory, Russian troops made slow progress in advancing on Grozny, held up by unarmed civilian protesters as well as by Chechen troops and a lack of supplies and soldiers. The Chechen forces were made up of the National Guard and other regular army units, including many soldiers with Afghan war experience, the volunteer militia, subject also to central command and discipline, in which a great proportion of Chechen males participate, some on a part-time basis, and "the avengers," individuals or small groups, whose relatives have been killed, and who, acting on their own, seek blood vengeance in accordance with Chechen custom. The Chechens' weapons, which included some artillery and armor and plentiful supplies of sophisticated anti-tank weapons, Kalashnikov automatic rifles, ammunition, and grenades, are Russian in origin. They were handed over to them in 1991, seized during raids on Russian arms depots in 1992, or bought at various times from corrupt Russian officers and other arms dealers. The Chechens lack American Stingers or equivalent Russian anti-aircraft weapons, which left them vulnerable to Russian helicopter gun ships. Russian air raids and artillery fire were employed, in accordance with traditional Russian military doctrine and practice, to prepare the way for ground offensives against their positions. Initially, their use was relatively restrained. As Chechen resistance stiffened, however, the bombing and shelling of Grozny and of other population centers (including some in Ingushetia), as well as of military and industrial targets, escalated. Frederick Cuny, in his article Killing Chechnya, describes the Russians' tactics: "To put the intensity of firing in perspective, the highest level of firing recorded in Sarajevo was 3,500 heavy detonations per day. In Grozny in early February, a colleague of mine counted 4,000 detonations per hour. Only in early March did the Russians diminish their shelling and adopt a strategy of starving out the local population." (The New York Review, April 6, 1995).
An all-out Russian assault on Grozny was launched on December 31, but it failed to achieve its main objective, the taking of the President's Palace. Russian armor and troops found themselves trapped in the city streets, leading to fierce battles and heavy casualties --many Russian soldiers were trapped in armored personnel carriers and incinerated. It was not until January 19, after more than a month of hard fighting and the total destruction of central Grozny that Russian troops were able to occupy the President's Palace. After another three weeks of combat, the Russian command claimed that it controlled the city of Grozny, but its control was still tenuous and was contested nightly by Chechen snipers and patrols. In mid-February, a brief respite was arranged, after which the war resumed. On Monday, February 13, in Ingushetia, MVD Colonel General Anatoly Kulikov, commander of Russian forces in Chechnya, and Russian army commander General Anatoly Kvashnin met with Dudaev's chief of staff, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov, and agreed on a heavy weapons cease-fire. In further meetings, on February 15 and 17, the two parties negotiated a 48-hour total cease-fire permitting an exchange of prisoners, recovery and burial of the bodies of dead Russian and Chechen soldiers, as well as the first delivery of humanitarian aid to Grozny by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on February 18. Unfortunately, hopes that this limited truce might become a starting point for a settlement of the conflict were dashed when talks were broken off. Chechen forces regrouped to the east of Grozny around the towns of Gudermes, Argun, and Shali, and also in the hills to the south of Grozny. Until mid-March, fighting was sporadic, with Russian forces slowly consolidating their positions, sometimes by negotiating agreements with local Chechen authorities, sometimes by air and ground attacks on Chechen positions. On March 20, Russian forces began a new offensive to take Shali and Argun. Heavy bombing, strafing, and shelling of Chechen positions in and around the towns were followed up by tank and infantry attacks. Even if the Russians' offensive succeeded, however, Cuny (in the article cited above and written on March 9) noted that at some point "the Russians must turn south ... and confront the Chechen forces massed in the south. Undoubtedly, the Russians can inflict major damage on the Chechens. The question for Yeltsin is how far he is prepared to go ... to win, the Russians will have to force half a million or more people into the mountains, cut off their food supplies, and starve them into submission." However, what happened was exactly what Cuny predicted. Millions of Chechens fled to the neighboring countries in order to escape from the fierce fighting inside and outside the cities. Both sides were using all types of weaponry available so that to undermine the other sides' military capabilities. On January 11, Sergey Kovalev issued proposals for a ceasefire and a peacemaking effort in Chechnya. Kovalev has repeatedly stressed that negotiations must include General Dudaev's representatives, since they alone have authority with Chechen combatants. Ceasefire was agreed but, unfortunately, not for a very long time.
(Institutional solution)
Introduction
The Chechen conflict is not a recent issue. It has been a problem for quite a long time due to many underlying causes and reasons. The Chechen rebels call it a "war of liberation". They say that Chechnya has never voluntarily joined the Russian Federation and has only been conquered by military force. For them the 1994-6 war fought with Moscow and the latest campaign to crush Chechnya's struggle for independence, which began in the autumn of 1999, prove that the Russians only consider the language of war as means of solving the conflict. On the other hand, the Russia President Vladimir Putin calls the conflict an "anti-terrorist operation". He claims that the Chechens use terrorist tactics to attack Russian soldiers and they have to be crushed. In this paper, I will try to discuss the conflict itself, emphasizing on background history and developments. Furthermore, I will argue about the underlying causes of the conflict and what pushed both sides to such a bloody war. In addition, I will try to propose an institutional solution to the problem and argue whether institutions can settle the dispute between the Russian government and the Chechen rebels. We will see how those institutions might work in the Chechen context.
The conflict:
The Chechens are indigenous people of the North Caucasus. They speak a distinct Caucasic language, which is neither Slavic, nor is it Turkic, but is closely related to the language of neighboring Ingush. The Chechens and their ancestors have lived in their North Caucasus homeland for several thousand years. All of their territory has been overrun for long periods by the Iranian Alans in the 9-12th centuries, by the Golden Horde in the 13th-15th centuries, and then by the Russian Empire, which in a competition for domination of the North Caucasus that began in the 16th century, finally out dominated its Ottoman and Persian rivals. The Chechens have traditionally been fiercely independent and democratic mountaineers. Their Muslim religion plays an important role in Chechen society, even though the ancient clan structure of Chechen social and political life still persists, as do blood feuds and other traditional customs. The area of Chechnya is approximately 6,000 square miles. Its western border with the Ingush Republic has still not been settled. Georgia, now an independent state, lies over the mountains to the south. Dagestan, a Republic of the Russian Federation, is to the east and north, and the Stavropol Krai and the North Ossetin Republic lie to the northwest. Moreover The Chechens have been primarily herdsmen and farmers. According to the 1989 census, 70% of all Chechens still lived in rural areas. The rich oilfields surrounding Grozny have been exploited since 1893. Although recent petroleum production is declining (in 1992 slightly exceeding 3.5 million tons), Grozny has remained a major center of refining (about 6.5 million tons of petroleum in 1992) and of petrochemical production. It is a hub for rail and road transport, as well as for important oil and gas pipelines (there is speculation that Russia's interest in controlling the pipeline for Caspian oil may have been a major factor in the decision to send the Russian army into Chechnya.) Employment in Grozny's oil industry attracted many Russians -- the city's population grew from 97,000 (68,000 Russians) in 1926 to 397,000 (210,000 Russians) in 1989. The Russian Constitution (Article 65) lists the Chechen Republic as a part of the Russian Federation. However, in 1990 a secession movement began to gain force, and on November 2, 1991, Chechnya proclaimed its independence. On March 17, 1992, a constitution was adopted, which defined the Chechen Republic as an independent, secular state governed by a president and a parliament.
On December 11, Russian troops invaded Chechnya from the north, the east, and the west. The first two months of the war in Chechnya was reported in detail by television and the press, both in Russia and abroad, even though coverage fell off sharply when the Russian troops occupied Grozny's Presidential Palace. Despite forecasts of a quick victory, Russian troops made slow progress in advancing on Grozny, held up by unarmed civilian protesters as well as by Chechen troops and a lack of supplies and soldiers. The Chechen forces were made up of the National Guard and other regular army units, including many soldiers with Afghan war experience, the volunteer militia, subject also to central command and discipline, in which a great proportion of Chechen males participate, some on a part-time basis, and "the avengers," individuals or small groups, whose relatives have been killed, and who, acting on their own, seek blood vengeance in accordance with Chechen custom. The Chechens' weapons, which included some artillery and armor and plentiful supplies of sophisticated anti-tank weapons, Kalashnikov automatic rifles, ammunition, and grenades, are Russian in origin. They were handed over to them in 1991, seized during raids on Russian arms depots in 1992, or bought at various times from corrupt Russian officers and other arms dealers. The Chechens lack American Stingers or equivalent Russian anti-aircraft weapons, which left them vulnerable to Russian helicopter gun ships. Russian air raids and artillery fire were employed, in accordance with traditional Russian military doctrine and practice, to prepare the way for ground offensives against their positions. Initially, their use was relatively restrained. As Chechen resistance stiffened, however, the bombing and shelling of Grozny and of other population centers (including some in Ingushetia), as well as of military and industrial targets, escalated. Frederick Cuny, in his article Killing Chechnya, describes the Russians' tactics: "To put the intensity of firing in perspective, the highest level of firing recorded in Sarajevo was 3,500 heavy detonations per day. In Grozny in early February, a colleague of mine counted 4,000 detonations per hour. Only in early March did the Russians diminish their shelling and adopt a strategy of starving out the local population." (The New York Review, April 6, 1995).
An all-out Russian assault on Grozny was launched on December 31, but it failed to achieve its main objective, the taking of the President's Palace. Russian armor and troops found themselves trapped in the city streets, leading to fierce battles and heavy casualties --many Russian soldiers were trapped in armored personnel carriers and incinerated. It was not until January 19, after more than a month of hard fighting and the total destruction of central Grozny that Russian troops were able to occupy the President's Palace. After another three weeks of combat, the Russian command claimed that it controlled the city of Grozny, but its control was still tenuous and was contested nightly by Chechen snipers and patrols. In mid-February, a brief respite was arranged, after which the war resumed. On Monday, February 13, in Ingushetia, MVD Colonel General Anatoly Kulikov, commander of Russian forces in Chechnya, and Russian army commander General Anatoly Kvashnin met with Dudaev's chief of staff, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov, and agreed on a heavy weapons cease-fire. In further meetings, on February 15 and 17, the two parties negotiated a 48-hour total cease-fire permitting an exchange of prisoners, recovery and burial of the bodies of dead Russian and Chechen soldiers, as well as the first delivery of humanitarian aid to Grozny by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on February 18. Unfortunately, hopes that this limited truce might become a starting point for a settlement of the conflict were dashed when talks were broken off. Chechen forces regrouped to the east of Grozny around the towns of Gudermes, Argun, and Shali, and also in the hills to the south of Grozny. Until mid-March, fighting was sporadic, with Russian forces slowly consolidating their positions, sometimes by negotiating agreements with local Chechen authorities, sometimes by air and ground attacks on Chechen positions. On March 20, Russian forces began a new offensive to take Shali and Argun. Heavy bombing, strafing, and shelling of Chechen positions in and around the towns were followed up by tank and infantry attacks. Even if the Russians' offensive succeeded, however, Cuny (in the article cited above and written on March 9) noted that at some point "the Russians must turn south ... and confront the Chechen forces massed in the south. Undoubtedly, the Russians can inflict major damage on the Chechens. The question for Yeltsin is how far he is prepared to go ... to win, the Russians will have to force half a million or more people into the mountains, cut off their food supplies, and starve them into submission." However, what happened was exactly what Cuny predicted. Millions of Chechens fled to the neighboring countries in order to escape from the fierce fighting inside and outside the cities. Both sides were using all types of weaponry available so that to undermine the other sides' military capabilities. On January 11, Sergey Kovalev issued proposals for a ceasefire and a peacemaking effort in Chechnya. Kovalev has repeatedly stressed that negotiations must include General Dudaev's representatives, since they alone have authority with Chechen combatants. Ceasefire was agreed but, unfortunately, not for a very long time.
