Developments in post-war Europe demonstrate that states are at the heart of the conduct of international relations. Discuss using neo-realist theories of international relations. What problems does such an approach face?

The country most famous for its multi-national corporations, the USA, was one of the most important players in early post-war European affairs. It was a staunch supporter of European co-operation on as many levels as possible, to ensure lasting peace and prosperity on the continent; after all, having so many states so close together amid such disunity had led to two world wars that had been hugely costly for the US itself. In America’s support for European integration there can be seen a paradox. For Europe it saw that institutions and supranational authorities were the way forward, promoting the success of the bloc as a whole as the dominant force in European relations. The US took a neo-liberalist approach to post-war Europe, advocating the potential of the continent conducting international relations as a whole and not as separate states. However, its motives for taking such a stance were based on its own economic and security interests, for example: a common European trading policy would simplify and reduce the cost of transatlantic trade, and a unified Europe would help to prevent the spread of Communism and the likelihood of the USSR acquiring military bases in western Europe.

I believe that every member state of what is now the European Union (Kinsella 378) approached Continental integration with a similar attitude.  Co-operation was favoured because the economic benefits on offer were obvious, and it was thus in the direct interest of every nation to do so. It is because co-operation and the formation of institutions has been so profitable that states have signed up to the European project. The surrender of some sovereignty to the Union’s institutions is the cost of ongoing membership, but for the most part, this sovereignty concerns mainly internal affairs, and areas identified for action against barriers to trade, such as regulation, research and development. Attempts to form a body to provide a common foreign policy, security requirements, or a unified defence force have all failed. Unfortunately for the European federalists, and for proponents of the neo-liberalist theory of international relations, these areas are still the most important ones for the conduct of international relations, and crucially, the most important for the exercise of state-centred power.

The progression of the European Community has been commensurate with its success in merging the policy aims and interests of the member states. In the early post-war years, these interests did not converge, aside from the requirement to contain the USSR, and the existence of NATO and the influence of the US, which will be discussed later, mostly fulfilled this goal. Certainly, at that point, the prospect of the surrender of sovereignty to a supranational body was unpalatable to most, apart from the original “Six”, who stood to benefit from German resources and her economic recovery. The surrender of sovereignty in any area has long been a thorn in the side of European integration because it erodes the ability of states and governments to conduct international relations in a way that would suit their interests. To this day, the issue of sovereignty determines the pace of European integration, because ultimately, the member states still have the power to secede from the union. In practical terms, it would not suit their interests to do so, and would entail considerable economic and political difficulties, but the conduct of this branch of international relations still resides with individual states.

The current state of co-operation, especially regarding the single currency in the European market, illustrates how states’ perception of the relative benefits of co-operating affects their policy. Britain with its strong economy, favours delayed entry to the single currency for two main reasons: fears that common policies may damage the strength of the economy, and the degree to which economic affairs would be thus managed by a supranational body, the European Central Bank. This would buck the trend of economic co-operation. Until now, the pattern of European integration has been such that the day to day affairs of the Union are administered by its supranational elements, for example the European Commission, whilst any articles of Treaty change or substantial reform are dealt with by the concert of government ministers from each member state, with each state’s interests directly represented. This demonstrates the centrality of individual states to the conduct of European relations.  

The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was a way of increasing European states’ relative strength against a possible Soviet invasion of western Europe. From the neo-liberalist perspective, it could be argued that there was an “absolute gain” from the formation of NATO, namely that of peace. NATO can be identified as a factor in the prevention of full-scale world war in the second half of the twentieth century. However, at the heart of its creation was the desire to increase each state’s strength by guaranteeing its protection by American forces. Ultimately, although the net or absolute gain of NATO during the cold war was peace, it was a strategy for increasing the relative strength of states in the event of war.

The neo-realist approach faces problems in the area of post-war European affairs when non-state actors are taken into account. The success and expansion of non-governmental organisations since the war, and the liberalisation of trade have created significant power bases in European countries which act in the interest of profit and not the national interest. For example, if the UK left the European Union now, the economic consequences would be highly damaging, because of the network of interests that British business has with Europe. If the consequences of secession are disastrous, then despite the state’s legal ability to leave the Union, it would be practically impossible, and this would represent a transfer of state-centred power. It would make such corporations important factors in international relations.  

1,280 words

Bibliography

Maurice Keens-Soper, Europe in the World, MacMillan Press 1999

Bayliss and Smith, The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press 2001

Lundestad, East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945, Oxford University Press 1999

Russett, Starr and Kinsella, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, Bedford/St. Martin’s 2000