The function of the cabinet is, in theoretical terms, to submit the policy to Parliament and to co-ordinate and control administrative action. However, Richard Crossman wrote the cabinet is “developing into a Prime Ministerial Government to which collective decision making has suffered”. Crossman wrote that Prime Minister’s had the power to sack Ministers in order to determine the cabinet agenda and membership of cabinet committees; it meant their control over the cabinet was the most important force within it. The Thatcher Government was a clear example of this. Prime Minister Thatcher used her available power to the full. In particular, she displaced important decision to small informal groups of ministers, convened by herself. Mrs Thatcher exercised her rights as a Prime Minister to appoint and reshuffle ministers to suite her own ideological outlook.
For example within the first two years of administration she managed to move five of seven ‘wets’ or ‘moderates’ out of the cabinet. Within the start of Mr Blair’s government it is obvious that little use as been made of the full cabinet. Key decisions are made by small groups of ministers and cabinet committees. A clear example is the decision in 1997 to give the Bank of England independence and the power to set interest rates was taken by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer with their special advisors. Other members of the Cabinet Committee were not even consulted. Blair’s style of governing takes the process of marginalising cabinet. The appointment of Jack Cunningham in 1998 as cabinet minister without a portfolio to oversee implementation of agreed government policy across the department is concrete of this.
As an institution, the cabinet has suffered a decline along with the doctrine of ‘primus inter pares’, it will appear that the basis of the doctrine of Ministerial Responsibility will also have been undermined. A further argument will be that it has been undermined by the failure of accountability of the cabinet to Parliament.
In theory Parliament keeps check on the Executive through the operation of the convention of collective Ministerial Responsibility. The classic expression of collective responsibility remains that of Lord Salisbury:
“For all that passes in cabinet every member of it who does not resign is absolutely and irretrievably responsible and has no rights afterwards to say that he agreed in one case to a compromise, while in another he was persuaded by his colleagues…It is only on the principle that absolute responsibility is undertaken by every member of it, that the joint responsibility of Ministers to Parliament can be upheld and one of the essential principles of parliamentary responsibility established”.(Official Report,HC Cols 8333-34, 8 April 1878.)
The fundamental reasons for the convention lie in the need for government to present a united front to Parliament and public in order to maintain confidence. A government which shows public disagreement over the matters of policy will be regarded as weak, and will be subjected to challenges to its authority to continue in office.
Ministers are collectively responsible to Parliament for their actions in governing the country and should account for any major questions. No minister can disclaim responsibility to government policy. If a minister was to disagree with a major cabinet question he should resign.
Procedures by Parliament in order to ensure supervision of government effectiveness include debates and questions as they are part of the continuous scrutiny forced to justify and explain their actions. However, questions are of limited value to the minister as he can not be compelled to answer matters; now defined by the exceptions set out in Part 2 of the governments code of practice to government information, 2nd edition.1997 where a minister will refuse to answer a question. Other matters which can be raised may also be evaded by certain tactics of answering parts of the question giving partial explanations in response. This has been criticised as explanations tend to become small debates. A Minister who is questioned about departmental policies will make modifications to policy if it becomes apparent that it evolved in a manner which was not originally intended. Written answers to questions are a more effective way for MP’s to obtain information.
Collective responsibility may further be undermined by the doctrine of individual Ministerial Responsibility. Lord Morrison viewed the doctrine of individual responsibility as:
“Each Minister is responsible to Parliament for the conduct of his or her department, and for the actions carried out by the department in pursuit of government policies or in the discharge of responsibilities laid upon him or her as a minister. Ministers are accountable to Parliament, in the sense that they have a duty to explain in Parliament the exercise of their powers and duties and to give an account to Parliament of what is done by them in their capacity as Ministers or by their departments. This includes the duty to give Parliament, including its select committees, and the public as full information as possible about the policies, decisions and actions of the government, and not to deceive or mislead Parliament and the public”. (Morrison (Lord), Government and Parliament, 3rd edition, 1964, London: OUP, p265).
If a decision announced by a Minister has been taken into the cabinet, the whole cabinet should accept responsibility. However, if a strict consequence arises out of collective responsibility an individual will sometimes be held responsible in order to divert an adverse consequence for the cabinet. An example would be the resignation of the Secretary for Trade and Industry, Mr Brittan, in 1986 during the Westland Affairs; his resignation deflected demands for resignation of the Prime Minister herself. Individual Responsibility may at times act as a proxy for collective responsibility. Individual Ministerial Responsibility means that ministers are responsible for the conduct of the Executive, and their departments [Carltona v Commissioner of Works] (CA, 1943).
Conversely, in 1991, Kenneth Baker, the Home Secretary was able to shelter behind his advisors when he failed to order compliance with a judicial order requiring the return of a Zairean teacher to this country following application for Judicial Review. Baker argued in the House that he had followed legal advice, legally, however he was responsible, the court held that he was in contempt of court.[ M v Home Office](HL,.1991). Ministers who feel personally to blame will normally resign.
Matters are less clear cut when maladministration has occurred. It is less likely that a minister will take responsibility for every mistake made in his department. The present administration of Robin Cook, regarding the Sandline Affair is that ministers will only resign if it can be shown that it was ministerial policy decisions rather than civil servants in their department.
In conclusion to Gladstone’s statement, Parliament has no real authority over Cabinet when the Government has a large majority. Although Parliament may have some form of authority, it is of inadequate nature. Prime Ministerial powers provide a cloak of power without accountability. The Prime Minister can present policies as was shown above with a small cabinet present and can expect other ministers to defend it as the product of cabinet discussion. Ministers also can disclaim responsibility on issues, and if the Executive is held responsible for collective responsibility, an individual minister will shelter the blame.
