How useful is the concept of the balance of power for understanding international security today?

by manhio (student)

How useful is the concept of the ‘balance of power’ for understanding international security today?

The concept of the ‘balance of power’ is considered as one of the oldest propositions in the field of international relations, attracting more scholarly effort than any other single hypothesis about international politics (Wohlforth, 2007, p.155). In terms of international security today, it is a theory which is becoming increasingly debatable as America rises to prominence in a stable system defined by unipolarity. The aim of this essay will be to assess the utility of the concept to the contemporary student of international security. The first part of the essay will focus on a historical analysis of the balance of power theory with the aim of scrutinizing its ability to account for the past. The second part of the essay then goes on to try and reformulate the concept in order to rejuvenate its modern relevance. Finally, the third part of the essay will then deal with issues which still plague the concept.

If we are to analyse the utility of the concept of the balance of power for understanding international security today it is first imperative to see how adequately the concept of balance of power can account for events of the past. It is logical to assume that if a theory cannot satisfactorily explain the past then there is little hope for it to comprehending the present. Whilst the balance of power outlook has many variations, we can attribute some main premises to the general theory which can be assessed in line with past security issues to give a greater insight into the plausibility of the theory. These are succinctly summed up by Wohlforth (2007, p.157) who states that the theory argues that ‘since units in an anarchic system seek to maximise their long term security, they will check dangerous concentrations of power through…balancing’. As a consequence, the international system is most stable when a balancing effect prevails. Using historical analysis, if it can be proved that this ontology is true then we can say that the balance of power theory is useful for understanding international security today. Similarly if the concept fails to stand up to historical analysis then it must be concluded that balance of power theory lacks contemporary relevance. In terms of modern history, the past century is ideal for analysing the balance of power theory as it contains multipolarity, (1900-1945) bipolarity, (1946-1991) and unipolarity (1992-2012). Therefore it is possible for us to see under which structural conditions peace and stability prevail.

As Claude (1989, p.79) states, if there is an orthodox position among balance of power theorists, it is that the stability and order of a multistate system ‘is endangered by the rise of any state to preponderance’. However in the case of the past century this is clearly not convincing, with the period from 1900-1945 being the most unstable phase in terms of actual conflict. This acts to severely undermine the suggestion that the balance of power concept is of sufficient use to understanding international security today. Moving onto bipolarity, the scenario which according to balance of power theorists is second most conducive to a stable international system, it is true to assert that a ‘long peace’ as defined by Gaddis (in Lemke, 1997, p.25) did exist. However this peace is not one that can be blindly attributed to bipolarity due to the fact that the period is also inextricably linked with the rise of nuclear weapons. Therefore whilst we can postulate that a bipolar balance of power was important in maintaining peace in this period, it is bad scholarly practice to cite it as the only or even main factor. As Lemke (1997, p.26) states ‘there has never been another period in which the unique joint occurrence of bipolarity and nuclear weapons has occurred’, therefore it is impossible to comprehensively argue which factor is responsible for peace. However, crucially there have been periods whereby bipolarity existed in the international system. Two examples Levy (1998, p.147) highlights are the cases of the Habsburg-Valois rivalry and the Athens-Sparta rivalry. His assertion that both of these periods contained numerous wars suggests that it is not the structure of the international system that dictates peace as the balance of power theory suggests, but rather there are other more important variables specific to individual scenarios. Arguing methodologically against this claim Eilstrup-Sangiovanni’s (2009) attempts to rescue the balance of power theory by limiting its scope to modern Europe, however this only acts to undermine utility of the balance of power concept in understanding global security studies by being overly Eurocentric. It is clear that in the globalised world we live in today, there is more to international security than the actions of European states and thus the balance of power concept has to account for this if it is to be of any use.

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The fact that relative peace has been maintained following the Cold War also suggests that focusing on bipolarity is not crucial in understanding the period 1946-1991. However, if we are to focus mainly on structure, then it should be concluded that unipolarity is the most conducive system to peace. Whilst the Cold War period saw no actual conflict between America and the Soviet Union, the levels of tension in that period which had the potential to break out into war, as shown in the Cuban missile crisis, marks it as a period which was less stable than the current unipolarity that exists. Therefore, if we are to use a systemic framework to understand international security today, it seems that the power transition theory which focuses on stability in terms of rising and falling hegemons is more appropriate. This theory suggests that war is most likely in bipolarity, and thus is likely to draw criticism from scholars who could cite the Cold War period as a period marked by bipolarity but which saw no actual conflict. However, in reality as Lemke (1997, p.27) states ‘the Soviet Union never achieved parity with the United States, and therefore war was not expected’. Such a claim is backed up by the fact that the Soviet Union rarely achieved a GDP of even half that of the United States (Ibid). However, even this is not a complete theory and like balance of power has its own methodological flaws. One of the main deficiencies is the fact that it predicts war at the exact point when it seems least likely. It seems dubious that two great powers whose probability of victory is .50 would fight each other at this point. A more appropriate theory would be to suggest that a declining hegemon would embark on a preventative war to halt the challengers rise However in comparison to the balance of power concept, the transition of power theory is superior in that it argues that unipolarity is key to peace in the international system, which from the previous analysis of the 20th century has proven to be true. This is a point to which even key ‘realist’ individuals have succumbed to, as Shlaim shows (1996, p. 237), ‘Richard Nixon…embraced the Israeli thesis that a strong Israel was the best deterrent to war in the Middle East’.

Having shown the limitations of the classical balance of power theory over the past century, the second half of this essay will attempt to reconstruct the theory in order to make it more relevant to contemporary international security. Ontologically, the balance of power theory needs to shift away from the classical realist focus on hard balancing among states. In contemporary security analysis, theorists most instead focus on soft balancing in terms of limited alliances, asymmetric balancing, and also balancing against threat rather than power. Starting firstly with the shift from hard to soft balancing, whilst Paul (2004, p.12) argues hard balancing still has relevance in conflict ridden parts of the world where limited warfare is practiced, in reality nuclear proliferation is making formal military alliances increasingly obsolete in the global arena. More important than focusing solely on states, as a classical realist might, is for balance of power theorists to acknowledge the role of soft balancing in institutions in order to keep the theory relevant today. It is arguably only through these institutions that we can see great power balancing today. Such behaviour is represented by Eastern European states cooperating with NATO to balance Russia, as well as Russia, France, and Germany cooperating within the UN Security Council against the United States in their plans to initiate war against Iraq.

Moving onto units of analysis, the balance of power theory must adapt to accommodating not only the balancing of states against non-state actors, but also the balancing of non-state actors against states. This is what is defined as asymmetric balancing. The rise of terrorism which Snyder (2004, p.55) sees as key to modern international relations is a crucial example whereby states are balancing against non-state actors. This is highlighted by Paul (2004, p.16) who argues that ‘balancing efforts since…2001, have been so intense that the resulting coalition comprises all forms of states, including potential adversaries’. Whilst strict realists may point out that the primary battles in the war on terror have been fought against the two states of Afghanistan and Iraq, it is impossible to argue against the fact that non-state actors in the Middle East are key players in terms of power balances. This is illustrated by the extent to which Osama Bin-Laden, an individual with no state authority was acknowledged as critical in US policy. Therefore this shows how balance of power theorists must shift their ontological view of what is important in the international arena in order to accommodate for the rise of non-state actors.

Finally, the third and most important change that balance of power theorists must make is in the acknowledgement of the concept of ‘threat’ usurping ‘power’ in terms of importance in international security today. The need for this reformulation is represented by the largely unchallenged rise of America, one of the most powerful states for generations. This is a point raised by Walt (in Wohlforth, 2007) who argues that the offensive capability and intentions of a powerful actor are what dictate balancing. Whilst the classical balance of power advocate may argue that states innately fear the rise of a hegemon solely because of power, the extent to which states in the modern system bandwagon with America disproves this point. Paul (2004, p.10) displays this by showing that most developing states in Latin America and Asia have been bandwagoning with the United States because economic concerns override balance of power concerns. Moreover whilst criticism could be leveled methodologically at the balance of threat theory in terms of measuring threat, it is undoubtedly easier to measure the military capabilities of a state than to measure a concept as broad as power.

As has been shown by these suggestions, if the balance of power theory is to be of contemporary relevance it needs to undergo some serious reformulations to make it more specifically applicable to international security today. However even after these changes, there are still flaws with the general theory of balancing which need to be analysed. Firstly, whilst Fukuyama’s (1992, p.45) claim that we have witnessed the ‘end of history’ has been criticized by many scholars, it is broadly true that in comparison to the previous centuries, states are becoming increasingly alike under the current American hegemony in terms of democratic and liberal values. This potentially nullifies the need for balancing as many states now share the same goals. As Owen states ‘if a country’s elites are liberal, they could perceive less of a need to balance against another liberal state’. Therefore, it is the democratic characteristics of states, not their power position, that is most decisive in terms of opposing balances. This is a point which is particularly pertinent in modern international security due to globalization and thus the increasing similarity between states. In such a system it is logical to assume that if states are rational actors, as the balance of power theory perceives them to be, then they are unlikely to partake in the intense competition which is associated with the balance of power politics. This is due to the economic detriments that come with having adversaries in the international system.

Moreover, the balance of power theory also needs to accommodate reasons why actors we might expect to balance together fail to. This is largely an ontological failure of the balance of power concept. In focusing solely on the state in a rigid system theorists may tend to overlook other important factors such as the individual motives of statesmen as well as prevailing norms in society. Whilst classical realists tend not to focus on the role of the individual, it is an important variable. As Claude (1989 p.81) argues, ‘statesmen…do not invariably regard all other states as potential enemies of their own state, or automatically support the weaker side, or take it for granted that the most powerful state is the most threatening one’. Therefore this shows that we must do more than just focus on states and institutions when analysing international security. In terms of prevailing norms, Mueller (in Lemke, 1997, p.29) puts forward a significant argument. Mueller states that following the World Wars of the 20th century, the general public see that conflicts of interest should be mediated through negotiation rather than hostility. Such a point is given strength by the extent to which protests against Western involvement in the Middle East escalated in the early 2000’s. Therefore to conclude, the balance of power concept is hindered by its reluctance to accept the role of individuals as well as prevailing cultural norms.

As has been shown throughout this essay, the classical balance of power concept is one that requires major reformulation if it is to have any utility to the modern student of international security. An analysis of 20th century international relations shows that the concept is one that fails to adequately explain the structural conditions that lead to either peace or antagonism. In terms of international security today the nuclear revolution, the end of the Cold War, and the spread of global capitalism and democracy only act to accentuate some of the problems with the concept. Whilst the second half of this essay has attempted to adapt the theory to increase its contemporary relevance, these adaptations move the theory so far from its classical outlook that it is debatable whether such a reformulated theory can be classified as being centred on some of the key principles that a balance of power advocate would adhere to. Moreover, even after this reformulation there are still some ontological issues with the concept which act to undermine it. Therefore the prospects for the balance of power concept for understanding international security today is severely limited.

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