Nuclear blackmail; while some theorists and policy-makers advocated planning for nuclear weapons use, others believed that merely threatening the use of nuclear weapons could achieve political benefits. In Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, Richard Betts described many instances in which the U.S. threatened to use nuclear weapons in situations which were clearly not vital to U.S. national security interests as a way "to convince the enemy that any war could turn into all out war."1 He defined "nuclear blackmail" as "coercion by the threat of punishment, a threat designed either to deter or compel action by the opponent."2 These events included Truman's threatening the use of the bomb in 1946 if Soviet troops did not leave Iran; announcing that "atomic-capable" aircraft were being sent to Germany during the 1948 Berlin Blockade, claims from Truman and Eisenhower that atomic bombs could be used in the Korean War; and threats to use nuclear weapons against China in 1958 to defend the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Although these and other attempts at atomic diplomacy and blackmail may not have been totally successful, it is important to note the frequency of the threats. Ellsberg provides examples of every president from Truman to Reagan (except Ford) threatening the use of nuclear weapons and writes that the effect of the threats on the opponents' policies is not the issue:
Nuclear bargaining- not all the uses of nuclear weapons for political purposes involved threats. Nuclear weapons were also used for bargaining and negotiation.
_____________________________________________________________________
1: Richard Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance
The Brookings Institution, Washington DC. 1987
2: Richard Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance
The Brookings Institution, Washington DC. 1987
Throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons provided a foundation for U.S. and Soviet negotiations. During tense periods of U.S. Soviet relations, discussions regarding nuclear weapons offered a chance for returning to a diplomatic relationship, for example, the "Hot Line" agreement and Limited Test Ban Treaty were signed in 1963, shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The past few decades of using nuclear weapons for diplomatic purposes has led to what Emanuel Adler calls a "growing international understanding that arms control and diplomatic measures are closely intertwined and that conflict resolution, wherever needed, requires a measure of arms control." 3
It is important to recognize that there are positive and negative effects of using nuclear weapons as a foundation for negotiations. While communication and information are important for maintaining good diplomatic relations, there is the problem of developing a "bargaining chip" mentality. Many believed that having a deployed system that could then be given up was essential to negotiating a favourable arms control deal in the more important realm of strategic weapons an example being the strategic defence initiative (SDI). Strobe Talbott called SDI "the greatest sting operation in history,"4 describing how the "arms control potential" of SDI brought in powerful supporters such as Robert McFarlane and Paul Nitze.
Deterrence; despite repeated efforts to the contrary, many scholars and policymakers contended that nuclear weapons had but one use--to deter a nuclear attack with the threat of a nuclear response.
3: Emmanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, Security Communities WIBERG Cooperation and Conflict.2000; 35: 289-298
4: , Inside Moves, TIME, (Monday, May 30. 1988)
Much of the debate has entered on what is necessary to achieve effective deterrence. Bundy writes:
The more we learn about living with nuclear arsenals, the less we are able to find any good use for them but one--the deterrence of nuclear aggression by others--and the more we are led to the conclusion that this one valid and necessary role is not nearly as demanding as the theorists of countervailing strategy assert.5
Bernard Brodie realized the value of nuclear weapons as a deterrent early in the nuclear age, even when the U.S. was the sole nuclear weapon state. He wrote these famous words in the autumn of 1945:
Thus, the first and most vital step in any American security program for the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind...Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars.
From not on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose. 6
5: Bundy, "The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy," p. 53.
6: Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," in The Absolute Weapon, Bernard Brodie, ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946), p. 76.
In the same year, Jonathan Schell's The Abolition used the theory of existential deterrence as an argument for disarmament rather than merely arms control. He wrote that "the capacity for retaliation would consist less and less of the possession of weapons and more and more of the capacity for rebuilding them, until, at the level of zero, that capacity would be all."7
Based on the above logic here is presented an example, and also a significant turning point in the definition of deterrence; that is a world-famous bipolar situation.
During the Cold War, strategic stability was based on the balance of power between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., and nuclear deterrence was the crucial element of security. Attempts to gain unilateral advantage whipped up the arms race. As a result, each side accumulated tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. Today, in spite of the reductions of strategic arms carried out by Russia and the U.S., deterrence is the foundation of their nuclear policies.
The magnitude of unacceptable damage is one of the most important elements of the concept of deterrence. It is not rigidly fixed and is determined by opponents under conditions of a specific geo-strategic situation, depending on the objectives they set in a conflict.
During the Cold War, when the United States' goal was the destruction of the Soviet Union as a social and political system, Robert McNamara's criterion was used.
_____________________________________________________________________
7: Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (London: Picador, 1984), p. 153
According to it, the damage is considered unacceptable if 30 per cent of population and 70 per cent of industrial capacity are destroyed, which requires the delivery to targets of 400 to 500 megaton warheads. Soviet strategic planning used similar approach. Later on it became clear that this criterion is excessive.
Because of the vagueness of the notion of "unacceptable damage," the term "prerequisite damage" is used in the practice of strategic planning. It seems logical that the magnitudes of both unacceptable and prerequisite damage will go down along with strategic weapons reductions, the decline of tension and development of better relations between the countries.
Deterrence-based stability can be maintained only if, under any circumstances of an initiated military conflict, the attacked side will be able to render unacceptable losses to the aggressor in a retaliatory strike. The nature of deterrence is largely determined by the structure and size of strategic nuclear forces, and by the type of military actions to be used. In addition, for the Russian strategic nuclear forces it can not be considered separately from nuclear planning, the status and development prospects of the U.S. and its allies' nuclear forces and other strategic systems.
During the Cold War, launch on warning was one of the types of use of both the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces in the case of a military conflict. Strategic nuclear forces had to be maintained in a state of high combat readiness, and to have reliable command, control and communications, and early warning systems. For the Soviet strategic nuclear forces (SNF) the choice of launch on warning was determined by their structure, which was based on large number of ground-based ICBMs with relatively low survivability if attacked by nuclear missiles. However, the risk of an accidental nuclear conflict increased because of possible errors of the early warning system and a very limited time available for assessing the situation and making a decision. At the same time, the concept of the launch on warning is also stabilizing in nature because a threat of the launch on warning deters the potential adversary against aggravating the relationship. 8
Lately, due to changes in the geo-strategic situation and the nascent partnership between Russia and the U.S., there have been repeated calls to put nuclear deterrence aside. It should be noted that the concept of deterrence adequately reflects the relationship between the two countries. While nuclear weapons exist, deterrence cannot be abandoned by a directive. Nevertheless, the concept of nuclear deterrence in the sense shaped during the Cold War should be modified taking into account the reductions of strategic weapons and improved political and economic relations between the two countries, into a nuclear deterrence that corresponds to new reality.
From this point of view it would be expedient to give up the concept of launch on warning and move to a more stabilizing concept of retaliation. However, the orientation of strategic nuclear forces exclusively towards the retaliatory strike requires high levels of their survivability.Evaluation of strategic nuclear forces' survivability should take into account not only counterforce strategic potential and capabilities of the adversary's anti-ballistic missile defense, but such factors as tactical nuclear and high-precision weapons potential, conventional systems and forces, threat of sabotages, acts of terrorism and other covert operations aimed at strategic nuclear forces' facilities.
8: Vladimir Dvorkin, "Nuclear Deterrence and START II Treaty,", No. 3, 1997.
Hence, some of the consequences of reliance on deterrence in the areas of: our inability to control the arms race, the lack of defensive capabilities, the primacy of the iron, and the seeds of self-destruction inherent in deterrence ideology.
Similarly, one cannot completely rule out a possibility of war initiated against Russia by means of conventional weapons and assaults on strategic nuclear forces facilities. In the course of such warfare Russia may find itself under pressure to make a first nuclear strike. Consequently, the composition and structure of SNF and their readiness must, depending on circumstances, permit a certain flexibility in the choice and conduct of all forms of combat operations.
Thus we see that there are many factors affecting the area of deterrence, and hence the action to be taken with much caution, rather than merely “jumping on the bandwagon” following other nuclear states. Quite obviously, there is the concern of other states possession posing an almost imminent threat to those without, but by attaining them you are blacklisted. The conclusion seems almost oxymoronic while the most logical advice to provide these states is the one thing they are most incapable of- thinking for themselves.
Bibliography:
-
Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, Richard Betts, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC. 1987
-
Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, Richard Betts, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC. 1987
-
Security Communities: Emmanuel Adler, Michael Barnett and Anomalous Northerners,WIBERG Cooperation and Conflict.2000; 35: 289-298
-
Inside Moves, TIME, Monday, May. 30, 1988 By
- Bundy, "The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy," p. 53.
- Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," in The Absolute Weapon, Bernard Brodie, ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946), p. 76.
- Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (London: Picador, 1984), p. 153.
-
Vladimir Dvorkin, "Nuclear Deterrence and START II Treaty," NVO NG, No. 3, 1997.
