There was also a rejection of the rest of the world. Any remaining ties from the Pahlavi era were cut, for example the alliance with Israel and links with the United States, especially following the hostage crisis and naval engagement of 1987. Only Syria was left as an ally because the world tended to view Iran as a hostile, destabilising state. However, especially following the disastrous war with Iraq, it had become clear the current policy was unsustainable.
From about 1988 onwards, Iran entered a new period of foreign policy thinking and became a less ideological and more pragmatic actor. A significant group of more moderate and pragmatic leaders have risen to the top of Iranian politics and marginalized the radicals. This pragmatic policy was pioneered by Hojatoleslam Rafsanjani and then followed by Hojatoleslam Khatami, the first presidents of the post-Khomeini era. The presidents made attempts to integrate Iran into the international system and improve relations with the outside world (Ehteshami, 2002, p294). Following constitutional reform in 1989, the president has taken the main responsibility for foreign policy making. Even the foreign minister is required to report directly to the president before any policy can be implemented (Ehteshami, 2002, p293).
For the state’s survival, it was essential Iran entered this new period of foreign policy thinking. When Rafsanjani became president, the economy was in an appalling state with negative growth, unemployment and very little investment. Iran could not afford to be cut off from the rest of the world. The policy of import substitution and self-sufficiency had been a terrible failure. Iran needed to start making friends to establish trade links and attract investment and aid (Ehteshami, 2002, p290).
What is more, it seems a ridiculous idea that Iran could isolate itself and survive because “it receives over 90% of its revenue from oil sales. Therefore it economy is intimately linked with the global energy market (Chubin, 2000, p13).” Despite Iran’s unwillingness, it was essential they did not isolate themselves especially when you consider the fortunes of other states which have isolated themselves for ideological reasons such as Burma, Cuba and North Korea (Chubin, 2000, p13).
Iran’s pragmatic foreign policy helped protect the regime from internal and external threats. The greater economic prosperity created by the policy has reduced the likelihood of the regime being challenged from disappointed groups within Iran. Unlike in the 1980s, the regime can no longer rely of fanatical support from an Islamic nation. The regime is subject to “performance legitimacy (Chubin, 2000, p21).” Therefore, the regime now derives its authority because it is providing, or being seen to provide, for the public, whose opinion is very influential in foreign policy making.
There is a threat from refugees inside Iran. Iran is a popular destination for refugees in the area, who flee from unstable countries. During the last twenty years Iran has hosted the largest refugee population in the world. 1.9 million of the world’s 13.5 million refugees were in Iran in 1998. Iran cannot support this refugee population alone and international assistance to help Iran is poor. The refugees are a great drain on the economy and the numerous different groups mixing could cause internal unrest. By becoming less hostile, Iran has helped create greater stability in the regions and therefore the flow of refugees may slow (Rajaee, 2000, p47).
Iran is also less likely to be attacked because its foreign policy makes it seem much less hostile and destabilising. Rafsanjani’s unconditional acceptance of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 is a good example of this. Ehteshami wrote “acceptance of SCR 598 opened the door to normalisation of relations with all Arab states, except Iraq and Saudi Arabia” and “Iran also indicated its interest in developing a viable scrutiny structure for the sub region in cooperation with all of its Arab neighbours (2002, p299).” The previous fanatical nationalist and Islamic policy was almost an invitation for other states to attack Iran. As the Iran-Iraq War demonstrated Iran did not have the capabilities for large military engagements.
Iran has also reduced the threat of an attack by building up its defences to act as a deterrent. Iran has acquired missiles and may well be creating a nuclear deterrent under the cover of a civilian energy project. The way the deterrent has been created is very pragmatic of the Iranian government (Chubin, 2002, p66). Firstly, the Iran-Iraq War demonstrated it was dangerous to rely on a steady supply of foreign arms. The missiles and the possible nuclear deterrent makes Iran almost self-sufficient and reduces the impact of embargoes. Secondly, as Eisenstadt wrote “nuclear weapons may be the only way for Iran to become a military power without destroying its economy. While a nuclear weapons programme could cost billions, rebuilding its conventional military would cost tens of billions (1999, p126).” Thirdly, the fact that Iran may be attempting to produce nuclear weapons under the cover of a civilian nuclear programme is a pragmatic move. Iran would get into great trouble if it openly developed nuclear weapons because it would threaten other nations and violate the commitments to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. This would be very damaging because it could create an anti-Iranian coalition and cause neighbours to join an arms race and sanctions could be placed on Iran, which would undermine years of economic rehabilitation (Eisenstadt, 1999, p129).
Proof of Iran’s pragmatic foreign policy is the extensive bilateral and multilateral links it has around the world. These links have been both economically and politically beneficial for Iran. It seems that the tactic of appealing to “both North and South,” which was popularised by Ramazani in 1992, has worked. Iran has forged links with China, Egypt, India, Japan, Morocco and Russia. There are even new links former enemies, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. Iran now has much closer links with bilateral institutions, such as the Caspian Sea Organisation, ECO and the EU. Iran has managed to exploit the growing gap between the US and the EU. President Khatami has even visited France and Italy to increase the bond (Ehteshami, 2002, p302-5).
The Iranian pragmatic stance on Iraq’s attack on Kuwait greatly improved the willingness of other states to engage with Iran. Ehteshami wrote, “Tehran’s neutralist and non-aligned stance and support for the UN position throughout, coupled by it condemnation of the invasion, brought the republic substantial kudos (2002, p301).” The whole episode was even more beneficial for Iran because it involved an allied attack on Iran’s Iraqi enemies.
It could be said that the radical rhetoric that still comes from Iranian leaders is proof little has actually changed and Iran is still a hostile and destabilising state. For example, Ayatollah Khamenei often spoke out about the corruption of Islamic Iran by the West. Despite being an ally of Rafsanjani, he has gone on record denouncing Iran’s policy of opening up to foreign investment because he believes it amounts to a cultural attack. However, as Ehteshami wrote “such perceptions have had an impact on Tehran’s foreign policy, but not enough to dislodge or derail the pragmatic foreign policy orientation Rafsanjani espoused (2002, p292).” The radical rhetoric may well merely be designed to silence domestic critics, who could feel that the Iranian government are compromising the principles on which the Islamic Revolution was based. This argument is supported by the fact it was Ayatollah Khamenei who said these comments. He is a man concerned more with domestic affairs whereas Rafsanjani has to actually formulate and help implement foreign policy.
Despite the arrival of a pragmatic foreign policy, Iran continues to sponsor radical Islamic groups abroad. This more of a radical Islamic policy and could threaten Iran’s links with other states. The Iranian government truly believe it is there duty to spread the Islamic Revolution, so in this case there is little room for pragmatism. However, the methods used to spread the Islamic Revolution are now much more subtle. Action has also been scaled down in strategically important countries, such as Saudi Arabia. This shows some pragmatism because it is now harder to show Iran is sponsoring radical Islamic groups and countries, such as Saudi Arabia, are a great threat to Iran, especially because of their extensive links with the United States (Ehteshami, 2002, p287).
From the Islamic Revolution until 1981, Iran was very introverted while the infant regime consolidated its domestic position. In 1981, Iran seemed to come out of its shell and foreign policy became aggressively nationalist and Islamic under the rule of radical Islamic clerics. This is demonstrated by the Iran-Iraq War, the blatant attempts to spread the Islamic Revolution and the severing of ties with pretty much every state except Syria. However, it became clear this policy was unsustainable and so since 1988 Iran has adopted a far more pragmatic foreign policy. A more moderate leadership has emerged with the aim of integrating into the international system and improving relations with the outside world. Eisenstadt wrote “the perception of Iran as an irrational, undeterable state with a high pain threshold is wrong. Iranian decision-makers are generally not inclined to rash action (1999, p135).” This approach has greatly benefited Iran. Its foreign policy from 1988 to the current day has ensured the survival of the regime and increased economic prosperity.
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Bibliography
Chubin, S. (2000) “Iran’s Strategic Predicament” in The Middle East Journal, vol. 54, no. 1
Chubin, S. (2002) Whither Iran? (London, Institute for Strategic Studies)
Ehteshami, A. (2002) “The Foreign Policy of Iran” in Ehteshami, A. and Hinnebusch, R. (ed.) The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (London, Lynne Rienner)
Eisenstadt, M (1999) “Living with Nuclear Iran?” in Survival, vol. 49, no.3
Gieling, S (1999) Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran (London, I.B. Tauris)
Rajaee, B. (2000) “The Politics of Refugee Policy in Post-Revolutionary Iran” in The Middle East Journal, vol. 54, no. 1
