Kelley then went onto explain that the type of attributions that are made come from a quick combination of the three critical factors. When there is a combination of high consistency, high distinctiveness and high consensus, an explanation reflecting situational conditions are usually depicted. If the behaviour is low in distinctiveness, low in consensus and high in consistency, the behaviour is inferred to be internally caused. A circumstantial attribution is where there is low consistency and high distinctiveness and consensus. Kelley recognised however that there were many shortcomings to the basis of the theory, and if the situation arises where there is only a single occasion to go by, then a deviation into general knowledge is made to help locate a cause. Kelley explained this by hypothesising two more specific causal models, multiple necessary causes and a model of multiple sufficient causes.
A multiple necessary causal schema is used when an action requires at least two different causes to have an effect. Sometimes however, it is believed that the effect will occur if either of the two causes are present. This is called a multiple sufficient causal schema. Kelley claims these causal schemata ‘can assist us with our causal reasoning when we can’t apply the sure method of covariation analysis.
However, despite Kelley covering an extra dimension with the causal schemata hypothesis, when empirically tested, the covariation theory appears not to be as accurate in practise as in theory. McArthur was the first to experimentally test Kelley’s theory. Although the results did indicate support for the theory in which people make internal, external and circumstantial attributions, there were some results that did not correspond accurately with the theory. McArthur found that participants made more internal than external attributions overall. Distinctiveness information was perceived to be the most important type of information by subjects, while consensus was the least important when making either an internal or external attribution. This contradicts the covariation model which claims that people use all three types of information equally.
Work by Garland et al has also suggested that there are some more flaws in Kelley’s theory. It seems that when people are allowed to ask for any type of information they wish, only 23 per cent of requests were for consistency, distinctiveness and consensus information. Twenty nine percent of requests were for other types of dispositional information. Research by Hansen also hints at flaws in the covariation theory as he concludes that ‘Kelley was unclear if the processes perceived were used to arrive at a causal solution from data gathered and entered into the three dimensional matrix specified in the model’.
Critics of the theory have also noticed that Kelley’s theory is more suited to the explanation of occurrences which are not fully under control of an actor, but not suited to actions, which are incidents that are under the control of an actor. Another criticism made of Kelley’s covariation theory is that people don’t make attributions to seek causes, but to direct responsibility. Kelley claims that people making attributions act as scientists do, in that they analyse an event and make a statistical analysis to explain a cause, but recent research by Alicke seems to indicate that when subjects were asked explicitly causal questions, ‘their broader moral reactions influenced the reactions they gave’ Criticisms have also been directed at the methods used in testing the covariation model. The format in the experimental design doesn’t seem to reflect real life circumstances. Research by Major indicated that when the covariation principles are called into effect in more realistic settings, people tended to focus on just one or two types of information, and not all three.
Although McArthur’s 1972 study does not depict the covariation theory as very accurate, it has to be remembered that the method employed to test the theory had some flaws. As noted by McArthur herself, the experiment only allowed for attributions made about other people, despite Kelley intending his model to apply to one’s own behaviour as well as that of another person. McArthur’s information was also made in neat information inputs that do not reflect real life, and thus may not actually generate information on consensus, consistency or distinctiveness.
Despite the obvious short comings of McArthur’s research, her empirical findings reflect that of other researchers, where the basic criticism is that people do not tend to equally proportion the information covaried, as the consensus, consistency and distinctiveness are all heavily disproportioned as research by Major and Garland pointed out. It may also be noted that perhaps Kelley’s theory is too simple considering the complex cognitive structure of humans. Even though Kelley claims that the covariation theory reflects our scientific attitudes, the theory does seem to have a robotic dimension. To expect people to rigidly covariate the three factors of information in Kelley’s theory is a bit naïve, and Garland’s research reflects this as 29% of participants asked for dispositional information instead of any of the three Kelley hypothesised they would. Alicke’s research augments this case when his research indicates that there is also a moral influence when making a causal attribution. Even though it seems easier to negatively criticise Kelley’s theory, it has to be remembered that many of the criticisms are based on McArthur’s flawed research as regards depicting the covariation theory. Even still, it does appear that many of the criticisms do have sound merits and therefore Kelley’s Covariation theory is just that; a theory. But there is little doubting the fact that it is a ground breaking theory and it is easy to see why when making a causal attribution, recognition of the covariation theory is acknowledged as a logical way to scientifically attribute the cause of an action effectively.
Bibliography
Pennington, Essential social psychology
Hansen, Common sense Attribution
Social psychology
Pennington, Essential social psychology
Hansen, Common sense Attribution, P996
