In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, public and government scrutiny in America immediately turned to Saudi Arabia. Although America began its military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, great attention was paid to Saudi Arabia. Many within the US began calling for a “divorce” with Saudi Arabia. The primary focus of such attention concentrated on several contentions of Saudi Arabia’s supposed involvement to not only 9/11 but also to the greater issue of terrorism. Aside from the Saudi link to the hijackers and former Saudi citizen Osama bin Laden with his terrorist organization Al Qaeda, the American government became vexed with one issue in particular: terrorist funding. Many US officials were highly critical of the Saudi regime for being either indirectly or directly financing terrorist organizations. Such accusations took the form of three possible types of involvement. The first accusation maintains that the Saudi government has directly provided funding to terrorist organizations as a means of “buying protection” (Hersh, 2001, p. online). The more common accusation made is that the Saudi government has been less than vigilant in its monitoring of the donations made by Saudi citizens directly towards groups such as Al Qaeda. The third type of involvement has been the argument that the Saudi government’s support of specific Islamic institutions and charitable organizations has allowed money to be siphoned off from such groups and transferred to terrorists (Gause, 2002, 46). In a Joint Congressional Report released in 2003, the House and Senate Intelligence Committees assessed the intelligence related to events before and after 9/11. Among its 900 pages are 28 pages which the Bush Administration has refused to declassify. Reports indicate that this classified section implicates many Saudi officials in the attacks by linking them with channeling hundreds of millions of dollars to charitable organizations with ties to Al Qaeda (CRS, 2003, 4). The Bush Administration’s continued refusal to declassify the material, on grounds of national security, has further angered many Saudis who categorically deny any link to 9/11. The effect has only been to further strain the relationship between both nations.
On the civil side, families of more than 600 victims of the September 11 attacks filed a lawsuit in a US District Court seeking approximately $1 trillion in damages. The lawsuit itself names three members of the Saudi royal family, along with the government of Sudan and Osama bin Laden (CRS, 2003, 3). For the Saudi royal family, such efforts were considered an attempt to extort Saudi money invested in America. In response, many within the Saudi media called for the withdrawal of such investments, which total almost $700 billion (CFR, 2002, p. online). Further dampening the relationship was the reaction of the American public toward Saudi nationals. Many Saudi citizens have endured harassment and a feeling of ostracism at the hands of some within the American public. Such harassment and scrutiny often centered on the Wahhabi doctrine of Islam that forms the religious foundation for Saudi society. Combined with hostile media reports, many Saudis have abandoned any desire to travel to America. As the Stanley Foundation points out, “The consequent decline in personal interaction and relationships may remove a barrier to anti-Saudi sentiment in the US and to anti-US sentiment in Saudi Arabia (Stanley, 2002, p. online).” With members of both the public and government skeptical of each other, the context surrounding 9/11 has created a tenuous climate. As a result, the impact of such scrutiny on part of many within the US government and public has translated into great tension for the US-Saudi relationship.
Having understood the context surrounding September 11 in the United States, it is also vitally important to place the event in context of developments within Saudi Arabia. The Saudi reactions to 9/11 can be viewed from the incident itself as well as the subsequent American reactions. In regards to the event itself, the Saudi regime expressed its condolences and horror at the attacks. Saudi Arabia joined the war against terror. However, despite such actions, there was a sense of distance to the attacks and the greater issue of terrorism. The Saudi regime was hesitant to acknowledge or accept that 15 of the 19 hijackers were indeed Saudi citizens. To the regime, 9/11 was an unfortunate event, but one that took place outside of Saudi Arabia. As the Economist pointed out, “As far as Saudis were concerned, the Twin Towers were far away (Economist, 2004, p. online).” What helped solidify this feeling initially were the regime’s perceptions regarding bin Laden. For the Saudi regime, the link between bin Laden and 9/11 demonstrated an important point in their mind: terrorism was an external matter. The attacks had been carried outside of Saudi territory, showing that efforts taken by the Saudi regime against bin Laden in the mid-1990s (stripping of his citizenship in 1994 included) were somewhat successful. “Bin Laden’s violent campaign against targets outside of Saudi Arabia was, indirectly, proof of the Saudi government’s success against him domestically…He [Bin Laden] was not an immediate threat to regime security. The attacks of September 11 did not change the Saudi calculus (Gause, 2002, 39-40).”
In response to the hostile US reactions after 9/11, the Saudi regime took small steps to cut off financial links to specific charitable organizations that might have terrorist links, and also attempted to purge any terrorist activity within its own borders. But it had to tread carefully. Public opinion was growing considerably anti-American and the Saudi regime was walking a fine line. Though for many years, undercurrents of anti-American feeling existed in Saudi Arabia, the US reaction following 9/11 only stirred that sentiment and helped it increase (Cordesman, 2004, 2-3). This can be accounted for because of several reasons. For one, the anti-Saudi rhetoric in US media generated a similar response against the US within Saudi Arabia. The accusations of terrorist links and mistreatment of Saudis by the US left many Saudis angry at brash judgments of their society and religion. Moreover, many new issues became much more salient to the Saudi public post-9/11. Issues related to the US military presence, US hegemony in the region, and the Saudi domestic sphere all contributed to the sentiment among many within the country. In particular, this last area related to the domestic sphere has precisely been why the Saudi regime has actually been concerned with public opinion.
Because Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, with no elections and a highly limited political system, the influence of public opinion on the monarchies’ decisions was often negligible. However, 9/11 rekindled many issues among the Saudi public, which is beginning to have a direct impact on the regime’s actions. Social and economic changes within the country have created a climate where people are beginning to express their opinions. Increased education, rapid urbanization, and the enormous population growth are the main factors that have contributed to the House of Al Saud’s political responsiveness to public opinion. “Between 1980 and 1997, the number of students in higher education quadrupled (Gause, 2002, 41).” Moreover, almost 83% of Saudi Arabia’s population is urban, a situation where more people have access to a variety of sources of information and lifestyles. The effect is the deconstruction of family and tribal loyalties, and in effect, exposure a broader range of ideas. With this increased urbanization has been the population explosion of the country. Annual growth rates are estimated at around 3-4 percent, placing an enormous strain on the country’s welfare system (Gause, 2002, 42). With this increased strain has been compounding economic opportunities for people. Some estimates indicate that almost 30% of the population of 20 million is unemployed – a staggering statistic when one considers that almost 5 million foreign workers live in Saudi Arabia (Pollack, 2003, p. online). As Gause notes, “These factors all point to an increasingly politicized and potentially restive Saudi population (Gause, 2002, 42).”
The increased politicization has placed the microscope within Saudi Arabia squarely on the regime itself. The House of Al-Saud, which is said to have more than 20,000 members in its family, has been the ruling family since they created the state. Since King Fahd became incapacitated in 1996 because of a stroke, Crown Prince Abdullah has been the de-facto leader. Part of the regime’s strength in power has been its long-standing relationship with the religious establishment, or ulama. For more than 200 years, the House of Al-Saud has had a formal relationship with the doctrine of Islam propounded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, or what came to be known as Wahabbism. The regime’s control over the religious establishment derives especially from infrastructural reasons. Funding for all religious institutions comes directly from the Saudi regime. “Everyone in the religious sector…is an employee of the Saudi state (Gause, 2002, 44).” Despite such infrastructural ties to the regime, some religious institutions began to splinter, a process within the establishment that began long before 9/11. It was from this splintering of extremist forces that bin Laden and members of Al Qaeda derived. Post 9/11, splintering among the main religious establishment has increased. On one hand, religious clerics who have long-denounced the legitimacy of the Saudi regime to rule over the country, have come together to denounce extremism in the Islamic world. “This coming together of the Saudi leadership and its former Islamist critics is the most interesting development in Saudi politics Since September 11 (Gause, 2002, 44).” On the other hand, some of the more extremist elements within the country that had remained somewhat silent, grew more vocal. 9/11 and especially the US reaction post the attacks, provided an impetus for them to express their anti-American feelings, and in doing so, project such feelings on the Saudi regime. This in effect, has left the Saudi regime with difficult choices regarding its relationship with the US, indicating that 9/11 has had many policy implications for the US-Saudi future.
Such policy implications can be divided into several areas. The first of these is the most ripe and yet also the most challenging for both countries: terrorism. Since September 11, this issue has come to the forefront of dialogue between and within both countries. Though the Saudi regime and many within the country felt distant to the attacks of 9/11, that sentiment changed greatly last year – a shift that could have a positive development on the cooperation between the two countries. Two terrorist attacks, in May and November 2003, awakened both the public and Saudi regime to the issue of terrorism. In May, a bomb exploded outside a housing compound, killing 34 people, mostly American. In November, another attack went off; however, this was different. Of the 18 victims, the majority were Arab. “The November bomb…appears, has changed and concentrated minds (Economist, 2004, p. online).” The overall effect of the more recent attacks has been to focus the attention on the issue of terrorism in the wake of 9/11. For the US and Saudi Arabia, their relationship will only continue to develop along this new front in an effort as part of the Bush administration’s “global war on terror.” For the US, its policy directives will be aimed at further pressuring the Saudi regime to clamp down on terrorist activities and financing, and also on intelligence sharing at combating internal and regional threats. For the Saudis, they need assistance from the US to modernize their internal security forces and operations (Cordesman, 2004, 2). The terror attacks in Saudi Arabia over the last year has provided some form of opportunity to convince the popular sentiment within both countries that the aim of the US-Saudi relationship is toward the same goal in this area – namely - eradicating terrorism. However, to win over the publics, both partners will have to make difficult choices to refine the diplomatic perceptions of the partnership.
One area in which such choices are being made is defense and military cooperation. Just last year at the beginning of the US invasion of Iraq, US Secretary Donald Rumsfield announced that the 5,000 US troops that had been stationed in Saudi Arabia would be permanently removed. Additionally, the US announced it would be moving its command and operations center that virtually covers all of the Middle East to Qatar (Daily Telegraph, 2003, p. online). Such actions on part of the US are in part of a larger effort, post-9/11 to recognize and react to public perception within Saudi Arabia. As the Asia Times points out, “Ironically, the US military presence was perhaps the most important catalyst in driving bin Laden – who saw it as a desecration of Islam and its holiest places – to launch his jihad against Washington (Asia Times, 2003, 2).” Though the US may be pulling back its military presence within Saudi Arabia, defense and military ties are expected to continue in other areas. The US will still be cooperating with the Saudis on strategic and military issues, including advising the Saudi government on further military modernization as well as regional security through the Gulf Cooperation Council. This is clearly evident especially in regards to the significant arms trade that has developed between both countries. The US will undoubtedly remain Saudi Arabia’s largest supplier of arms, with contracts expected to continue to bring in billions of dollars, though questions over how much money the Saudis are expected to defer toward the military have risen (CFR, 2003, p. online).
With a defense presence decreasing within Saudi Arabia’s borders, the US has had to deal with the consequences of an increasing military role within the region, specifically in regards to Iraq. Since September 11, the US efforts to fight a “global war on terror” have been seen as quite narrow in their scope and aim. Many within the Arab world see the US occupation in Iraq as another example of its efforts to dominate the region, and many simply don’t believe the US can or will bring stability to Iraq. Saudi Arabia’s public refusal to allow the US military to use bases within Saudi Arabia for the military campaign against Iraq has been seen as a step taken by the regime to distance itself from US policy in the region. The problem for US-Saudi relations now is how a continued US presence in Iraq and grim prospects for relative stability in the near future will affect the partnership. The issue of the US regional presence is all the more complicated by its close ties with Israel. “US policy is increasingly viewed as hypocritical in its emphasis on enforcement of UN resolutions dealing with Iraq but not those dealing with Israel…Saudi support for US efforts to oust Hussein is further undercut because, unlike in 1990-91, when there was an understanding that an effort to forge peace between Arabs and Israelis would follow the war, there has as yet been no similar US commitment in the current situation (Stanley, 2003, p. online).” It is perhaps in this issue where the US finds its greatest difficulties in both explaining and working through. The resumption of violence in the second intifada since 2000 has swayed Arab opinion. Many within Saudi Arabia view the US’ continued close relations with Israel, including its often implicit support of many Israeli military actions as being justified under the guise of “terrorism,” in highly negative terms. The Saudi regime’s highly supportive nature of the Palestinians is at odds with the US highly supportive nature of the Israelis. At an Arab League meeting in October of 2000, Crown Prince Abdullah created a $1 billion fund to help preserve the Islamic identity of Jerusalem and help the Palestinian people; at the meeting, it initially pledged $250 million. Money has been raised by members of the royal family as well as ordinary citizens and organizations within Saudi Arabia (CRS, 2003, 10). More recently, Crown Prince Abdullah submitted a peace proposal in February 2002, calling for full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in return for normalization of relations with Arab nations. The Bush administration, despite praising the efforts of Abdullah, found many areas of contention with the plan itself (CFR, 2003, p. online). Its decision not to pursue the Abdullah Peace Plan may hinder its objectives in other areas related to Saudi Arabia. “Many contend that embracing it [Abdullah Peace Plan] would not only have strengthened the peace camp and liberals throughout the region, but that it might also have sparked a transformation in Saudi Arabia itself (Stanley, 2002, p. online).” The detraction from the “road map” on part of the US as well as the recent shift in US policy just last week may add to differences between both countries. However, both nations need to realize the importance of moving forward with the peace process. The US must recognize the importance Saudi Arabia will have on any final solution to the conflict, and that progressing on the peace process with Saudi Arabia could mean progress diplomatically for the reconstruction of Iraq.
While such regional issues could continue to prove damaging to the future of the US-Saudi relationship, many more historical areas of linkage between both countries look to remain constant. Oil is at the cornerstone of such linkages. Though the partnership has evolved from one being characterized uniquely on oil to other concerns, energy and trade remain fundamental to the relationship post-9/11. With Saudi Arabia still having the largest oil reserves in the world, the US need for maintaining a strategic link is obvious. Despite calls within the US to distance our relations with Saudi Arabia, many see and understand that we simply need oil, and Saudi Arabia has it. From the Saudi Arabian perspective, they recognize this fact and also that Saudi Arabia needs the US. The US Energy Information Agency (EIA) estimates that in 2002, Saudi Arabia earned some $55 billion from petroleum exports, a large portion of which derived from the US (Cordesman, 2004, 8). This fact alone will ensure that our energy ties continue. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has had many opportunities to gouge Americans on oil prices. During the US invasion of Iraq last year, Saudi Arabia, instead of raising prices because of a dramatic increase in demand, pumped more oil to accommodate. Moreover, the same was true during the Gulf War of 1991, where oil production in both Iraq and Kuwait dropped off. As Gause notes, “There will remain the compelling fact that every American president since FDR has recognized: oil is a strategic commodity, and there is more of it in Saudi Arabia than anywhere else in the world. We ignore that fact at our peril (Gause, 2002, 49).” The mutually beneficial relationship in oil has translated into economic ties in other commodities. With Saudis having so much money invested in America and the US trading a great deal with this Gulf nation (in 2002, Saudi Arabia was the second largest trading partner for the US in the Middle East), the US will continue to work toward maintaining a framework for trade. Moreover, because Saudi Arabia has recently applied to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), calls within the US for greater economic transparency on part of the kingdom may end up producing some effect because of international pressures as well (CRS, 2003, 11).
The last area that has been impacted by 9/11 and will certainly affect the other policy areas is the internal stability of Saudi Arabia itself. Having already seen the enormous social and economic changes that have translated into desires for political responsiveness, it becomes important to evaluate how the US reacts and works toward internal stability within Saudi Arabia. The US focus on Saudi Arabia post-9/11 has led some to criticize the underdeveloped political structure, lack of democracy, in western notions, and the regime’s record on human rights abuses. The critics of Saudi Arabia contend that democracy must be supplanted in this desert kingdom. They argue that this must occur to prevent Saudi Arabia from producing more disaffected individuals, creating a “breeding ground for terrorists (Valenti, 2004, p. online).” Crown Prince Abdullah has taken gradual steps toward social and political change. The recent announcement that local municipal elections will be held in a year, was a sign of such changes. However both Saudi Arabia and the US must move carefully. The US should be supportive of such changes, but come to the realization that changes toward western notions of “democracy” cannot and should not take place overnight; change within the country must come at its own pace. The reason has to do with the implications it has on both the current Saudi regime and the future of US-Saudi relations. For one, the US should be careful in its approval of regime decisions; the Saudi regime is making painstaking efforts post-9/11 to somewhat distance itself from the US because of domestic popular pressures (CFR, 2002, p. online). Moreover, if change is to come to Saudi Arabia, some form of insulation is required to allow the regime to make changes at its own progress and prevent factions from splintering the country into different groups, or to further embolden extremist views within the country. This has to do with factions both in the royal family as well as country at large who are opposed to more democratic reforms (Doran, 2004, p. online; Economist, 2004, p. online). The US must recognize that the current regime is its biggest ally and that further calls to immediately make democratic changes may adversely affect its position with the country as a whole and even worse, destabilize the Saudi regime under control of Abdullah – a regime that still holds power and has been somewhat favorable to gradual changes in the political process. Gause summarizes the overall predicament with which the US faces in this regard:
“Any elections in Saudi Arabia now would be won by people closer to bin Laden’s point of view than to that of liberal democrats…in general, Washington ought to resist suggesting that it knows better than Saudis themselves how to manage their society. What would come after Al Saud rule, if reformists opening lead to revolutionary fervor, would not be an improvement from the point of view of either American interests of American values (Gause, 2002, 48).”
As a result, the US and Saudi Arabia must work together carefully on such developments to ensure that what they both value in their partnership can be maintained.
September 11 has in many senses, redefined the relationship for the United States and Saudi Arabia. The evolution of its ties historically, the context surrounding 9/11 itself in both the US and Saudi Arabia, and also the implications for the relationship’s future, all demonstrate the extent to which 9/11 has reshaped this grounds for future cooperation. With so much scrutiny placed on the relationship after the terrorist attacks of three years ago, leaders and citizens alike have been questioning the many facets of the relationship. The changes to the association beginning with common interests in oil to now including linkages related to fighting terrorism and regional security along with energy demonstrate its evolution. In light of the bombing attacks in Riyadh just two days ago, issues such as terrorism are certain to remain at the forefront of the partnership. The bigger question remains for each government’s development of foreign policy toward the other. The skepticism manifest in the last three years among the populaces in both countries will undoubtedly influence the further development of foreign policy in both countries. It will however, remain to be seen whether policies can be constructed that are both ingenuous and supported by the masses – and more importantly, whether such developments are enough to help the US-Saudi relationship succeed into the future.
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