One can argue, however, that the UK has one of the finest and oldest parliamentary traditions in the world, and that the present bicameral arrangement works well. It has on countless occasions been a voice of the people against unpopular government policies e.g. introduction of tuition fees for students. This shows that it is possible for the hereditary and appointed peers to be in touch with public opinion, undemocratic as it may seem. Since the Lords are not elected, they are not obligated to anymore for their positions, and are able to speak their minds freely in Parliament. Furthermore, being a responsible second chamber, filled with experts in numerous fields (appointed peers include lawyers, doctors, scientists etc.), this arrangement allows it to concentrate fully on its role.
Furthermore, with regards to the hereditary element of the House of Lords, making it a fully elected chamber may not be the exact solution to the problem. A compromise has to be reached on one hand; the Lords can expel this tradition from itself, and on the other hand; still maintain its current role in Parliament.
Reforms carried out to on the House of Lords have so far been piecemeal and very gradual in making substantial changes. Following the Lords’ rejection of the Liberal Government’s budget of 1909, the Parliament Act of 1911 ended their power to reject legislation. A power of delay was substituted, which was further curtailed by the Parliament Act of 1949. The House of Commons can present a bill (except one to prolong the life of Parliament) for Royal Assent after one year in a new session even if the Lords have not given their agreement. There is also a convention (known as the ‘Salisbury’ convention) that the Government’s manifesto commitments, in the form of Government Bills, are not voted down by the House of Lords at second reading. These have made some headway in limiting the powers of the House of Lords.
Currently, the functions of the House of Lords are to revise legislation passed by the Commons and to keep a check on Government by scrutinising its activities through select committees. The Lords acts in a limited role as a Parliamentary watchdog to ensure that power is not abused, as it still has the ability to veto any legislation aimed to extend the life of Parliament beyond five years. They can also propose amendments to Commons Bills, and many of these amendments are accepted, either because they genuinely improve the quality of the Bill, or for political expediency. Generally, its functions are rather similar to those of the House of Commons in legislating, debating and questioning the executive. The exceptions are that it does not represent constituencies, and are not involved in matters of taxation and finance. It is recognised to play a complementary role to that of the Commons. The Lords is also the final court of appeal for civil cases in the UK and for criminal cases in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Making the House of Lords a fully elected chamber will solve its problems as a legitimate democratic chamber. Democracy requires a political system to be democratic. By doing this, it is indeed a very large step to make, and there are definitely consequences which will result in this change. For all the good to promote social equality, there are constitutional issues which need to be addressed.
Democratic legitimacy is an essential constitutional principle. Most democracies in the modern world have two fully elected chambers. Making the Lords fully elected will be beneficial in this sense, and consistent with world democracies. It will no longer be representative of only the upper class of society, but of all people in the UK. Its mandate will come from the support of the public rather than tradition. All too often, tradition of the Lords has expressed itself in the form of a huge, in-built Conservative majority. It is clearly wrong for one group to exercise undue and unaccountable influence on British politics. This is indicative of the shamefully unrepresentative nature of the Lords; its numbers of women peers and those from ethnic minorities are disgraceful. These problems will no longer be at the forefront of public criticism, especially with regards to its composition, making the legislative process much easier. It will also be more likely to represent the interests of the minorities in the government.
There are setbacks in adopting this idea of legitimacy. Although the UK Constitution will become truly bicameral, the House of Lords may lose its valuable role as the objective scrutiniser of legislation as a result of elections which may introduce partisanship into the chamber. It is perfectly possible to imagine that an elected House of Lords, newly empowered with a democratic mandate just as valid as the Commons’, would become increasingly bold in their activities and less wary of continual defiance of the Commons, to the point of making the system unworkable. Hence, with politics influencing the Lords, its objective view will be skewed and it may no longer be effective in its traditional role. Certainly, this is not appealing, nor as effective as an independently appointed chamber, devoted to scrutinising bills from the other House. However, it can be argued that the Lords will be no more politicised than it is already, and at least the people will pick the members, rather than have ex-politicians foisted on them. An American-style dead-lock between the Houses will not happen because the Lords’ role is to scrutinise bills and send them back a limited number of times. Even if there were clashes, they would be an expression of the democratic process, which made them possible. The present system of appointment is also absurd as it allows politicians to appoint their own watchdog.
Even the first-past-the-post voting system (also known as simple majority voting) used in the UK to elect its parliamentary members, which requires a winning candidate to secure a higher total of votes than any other candidate, not necessarily an absolute majority, is not without problems. This is known as “plurality”. It is advantageous in the sense that it makes counting votes quicker (more efficient), promoting a two-party system ensuring stability in parliament, allowing minor parties or independents to win against major parties without needing to secure 50% of the votes, and making informal voting negligible. However, it is disadvantageous because a winning candidate may only secure a minority of the vote, and that the majority of the voters may have supported someone else. Also, minor parties and independents can find it difficult to win against the combine weight of major party candidates. By introducing a voting system to the House of Lords, it still may not solve the problem of democratic legitimacy because the outcome may not be proportionate to the votes cast in any case. It may not accurately represent the voice of the people to be elected into the House.
Moreover, the additional expenses incurred and red-tape involved in revamping and introducing a new system to the House of Lords, with a new electoral system and designing a fresh set of rules, and the time involved in making all these changes will indeed be substantial.
The most recent reforms proposed by the Labour Government in its 2003 Consultation Paper on Constitutional Reform: Next Steps for the House of Lords offers some solutions. Following the 2000 Wakeham Report, where a Royal Commission suggested introducing limited elections for the House of Lords for the first time in its 700 years history, the paper proposed to remove the remaining hereditary peers, establish a new independent statutory Appointments Commission that answers to the Parliament instead of the Prime Minister, and bring the provisions on disqualification into line with those of the Commons. A majority of the members in the House of Lords should be appointed and a minority be regionally elected. The reforms also proposed to limit the number of members to 600 and appoint 20% of them from non-political party backgrounds so that a non-partisan view can be heard in discussions. The other appointees will be selected on the proportion of the number of seats the political parties achieved in the most recent General Elections. These reforms, together with the House of Lords Act 1999, will give the Lords substantive democratic legitimacy. It also avoids the problems that partisanship will bring to the chamber and thereby helping the House of Lords maintain its essential roles without compromising any constitutional principles.
Hence, in the process of bringing about substantial changes in the constitution, it is vital to consider the constitutional implications that will arise. In my opinion, I believe that the House of Lords should not be fully elected, but rather, partially elected so as to provide some democratic legitimacy within the House. It is still possible for more reforms to be carried out to achieve greater efficiency in the constitutional machinery.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
A W Bradley and K D Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 13th Ed. 2003, Pearson Education Limited
Neil Parpworth, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 3rd Ed. 2004, LexisNexis Butterworths UK
Peter Wallington & Robert G. Lee, Statutes on Public Law & Human Rights 2004-2005, 14th Ed. 2004, Oxford: University Press
