This essay will examine the assumptions of the structural Marxists and positivist epistemologies and ontology’s. Positivism is a philosophy of science developed by August Comte. This philosophy follows the belief of the supremacy of science as the only form of knowledge. Although this philosophy was born of the natural sciences, it has also very influential in the field of social research as well. Positivism is based on an objectivist epistemology. It approaches knowledge with the view that the world is a structured place independent from human existence, and observations through direct sensory experience form the way of constituting knowledge of that world. The adequacy of this knowledge is determined through replication of the research, through rigorous testing of theories that can be falsified through repeated observation. The ontology follows that only what is directly observable (and measurable) can be accepted as evidence (Johnston, 1986). Positive methodology is thus primarily quantitative in nature, although qualitative studies do exist. The studies use replicable experiments to rigorously test hypothesis and enable empirical generalisations, this enables the accumulated Knowledge through identifying empirical regularities which are used to create theories and scientific laws.
The second philosophical position is Structuralism. Associated with mainly Marxist traditions, structuralism is in part derived self-consciously in response to many of the shortcomings of positivism. Structuralism is defined as “the study of the theory of the processes and structural forces that underlie and determine empirical events” (Holt-Jenson, 1999). The structuralist epistemologies is that the world of observations yields knowledge of surface appearances but are inadequate at revealing the general structures which underpin all phenomena and observations. These underlying structures are not directly observable, so instead valid knowledge is generated through identifying from the observable features of a given historically specific phenomenon, the essential underlying mechanisms which themselves inform the reconstruction of the surface appearances (McLean, 2002). These underlying structures provide understandings of our experience within that society. It is therefore necessary to have an ontological distinction between the surface observations and the underlying reality that cannot be observed directly but only through thought (Johnston, 1986). The methodology aims to identify underlying structures through empirical observation followed by the construction of theories that can account for what is observed but cannot be tested directly as evidence for their existence is not available. The articles chosen use a more specific epistemology of structural Marxism which forms part of the literature referred to by Johnston (1986) as ‘structure of processes’. Marxism aims to understand how the mechanism of the economic base are gradually changed in dialectical processes between society and individual agents (Holt-Jensen, 2005). This position recognises the social constitution of the human subject, assuming that actors themselves have no say, and individuals are merely puppets who are manipulated by the economic mechanisms (Hoyt-Jensen, 1999).
The different practical outworking of each philosophical position will become obvious as the two empirical papers are compared below. The first two papers are from a positivist perspective. The first paper is by Wyly and Hammel, (1998). ‘ Modelling the context and contingency of gentrification. The second is Bostic and Martin (2003) ‘Black Home-owners as a gentrifying Force? Neighbourhood Dynamics in the context of Minority Home-ownership’. Although these two perspectives are discrete in their philosophical position the articles are inherently and unmistakably positivistic in nature. The second two articles are from a structualist perspective and both by the same author, Neil Smith, who was prolific in the much of the theoretical debates intertwined with the study of gentrification. The first structuralist article was extremely influential, ‘Towards a theory of gentrification: a back to the city movement by capital, not people,’ (1979). The second is ‘Of Yuppies and housing: gentrification, social restructuring, and the urban dream’ (1987). Both approaches are inherently self aware of their philosophical positions. The first article has adopted certain aspects of Marxist thought (particularly those related to the economic workings of a capitalist society), however the article has not embraced a full Marxist approach. This approach has been criticised for separating production and consumption (emphasised throughout the article) which Marxist writing maintains are inseparably linked. As a result the second article (1987) attempts to integrate the two, although it gives presidents the former.
Positivism and Structuralism form fundamentally different epistemological and ontological perspectives and consequently take different approaches to the topic. The first article (Wyle and Hammel, 1998) define gentrification is as “relating to changes in class structure to conspicuous housing investment and new consumption patterns in the built environment.” The second article (Bostic and Martin, 2003) describing gentrification as being characterised as a “neighbourhood evolutionary process with an influx of new affluent, young households which displace original residents”. Both definitions entail a positivist ontology of a reality which can be defined, categorised and measured and which exist objectively. Thus the articles epistemology is objectivist, research measures surface phenomenon which are separate from the subjectivity of the researcher. This is inherent throughout the articles and explicitly stated in the second (Bostic and Martin), 2003: “the paper... uses a straightforward, independent objective approach” (Pp. 2447) The first paper objectively measures “signs of reinvestment that typically precede in tandem with gentrification processes”. The second article maintains that these ‘neighbourhood characteristics (which define gentrification) are observable by viewing the correlation between gentrification and neighbourhoods growth of black home ownership in a historical context.’
Positivism holds that the only claim to knowledge is that which is empirically viable as such both articles demonstrate methodologies in adherence with the scientific method. The data, from the census statistics, is purely quantitative in nature. The analysis is based on statistical testing against hypothesis in order to verify the results. The hypothesis is stated in both articles, in the first (Wyly and Hammel, 1998), the null hypothesis is: “gentrified neighbourhoods are not a distinct neighbourhood type” (pp. 305). This is analysed using models and multivariate statistical methods to “permit a rigorous quantitative assessment” (pp. 306) of the degree to which the ‘gentrified neighbourhoods have developed ‘significantly different’ neighbourhoods in relation to surrounding urban neighbourhoods’.
In the second paper (Bostic and Martin, 2003) “the working hypothesis... is minority households have been a gentrifying force in the US” (pp. 2438). Regression analysis is used to test whether Black home-owners were attracted to gentrifying census tracts, and enable them to state that “A comparison of the statistics provides an indication that Black home-owners have been a gentrifying force”. Thus, in both cases the statistical analysis enables them to accept the alternative hypothesis. The scientific method used in the research also aims to be ensure generality and be repeatable, as demonstrated in the first article, (Wyly and Hammel, 1998) “the technique must be generalizable and replicable to facilitate comparison among cities and time periods” (pp. 315). In order for it to be accepted by the scientific community as a whole (Johnston, 1986).
Contrary to the first two articles the structural Marxist approach takes as axiomatic a broad Marxist position in defining gentrification and class. Smith first paper identifies gentrification to be a ‘structural product of the land and housing market’. The second paper (1986) aims to identify the influence of new middle class on gentrification, defining class according to ‘peoples relation to the means of production’. Therefore the ontology’s (positivism and structuralism) share communality in that each assert that the social world, and more specifically the process of gentrification are identifiable fields of social reality. However, structuralism makes an ontological distinction between the surface observations and the reality which structures such appearances. For example in first article (Smith 1979) the underlying mechanism is found in the theoretical formulation of the rent gap. This Smith claims this is able to explains and predict the surface observations : “If the rent gap is correct, it would be expected that rehabilitation began where the rent gap was greatest... Empirically this seems to have been the case”. However the theory is itself not directly observable, thus, it is formed through the abstracting from the empirical evidence.
The structural Marxist methods for gathering data do not differ from those of positivism, as both articles use empirical observations. The first of Smiths articles (1979) uses a case study of society hill in Philadelphia (supported by data from Baltimore and Washington), from data sampled from case files by the redevelopment authority in Philadelphia. From this a statistical breakdown is performed. Additionally he uses economic observations from ‘property value, sale price, conceptualised ground rent and potential ground rent’. The second article uses slightly more detailed empirical data derived from census data from a total of twenty-four census tracts from which statistical analysis is performed to provide evidence for the existence of the new middle class and the changing social roles of women in causing gentrification. Different value is given to these empirical evidence to that of the positivist methodology, this is due to the structuralist epistemology that knowledge is produced not through the accumulation of evidence but by the development of theories. Consequently the evidence is evaluated in ‘theoretical terms’ (Smith, 1987) this is very different from the positivist approach which is based on empirical observations and hypothesis testing of correlations found in the results. As a consequence, by unquestionably accepting as a given the observable reality the positivist claims to knowledge are very different from the conceptions of the structural Marxists (which is in itself a criticism of positivism).
Both structuralism articles unlike positivism do not use clearly stated testable hypothesis, rather they submit the empirical data to interpretations. The structuralist approach maintains “this is not the place to attempt a comprehensive empirical investigation, but... will provide statistical documentation of the role of women in gentrification” (Smith, 1987 pp.157). Referring to his results Smith (1987) states that “correlation is not causation”, and “this should not blind us to less visible but more truncated effects”. Instead Smith aims to identify through theoretical debates and abstractions from the evidence the mechanisms which explain the occurrence of gentrification, which is found in the rent gap (in the first article) and “political and structural changes in the labour market and in styles and modes of reproduction which have loosened previously oppressive social bonds” (the second article). The identification of these theories have power in explaining and predict surface observations and thus explaining gentrification.
Another crucial difference is that where positivism aimed to generalise its results, the structural Marxist articles acknowledges the importance of distinctive times and space to each of the levels of social construction. This is recognised by Smith (1987) who states. “Whether these findings are replicable in other cities or whether New York City is in this as in other respects unique remain to be shown” (pp.158). These article maintain that mechanisms themselves are not fixed but rather social products created by societies as means of organising the reproduction of human life (Johnston 2000).
It is also important to recognise the structural Marxist understanding of the social constitution of the human subject. Both articles doubt that social life can be explained in terms of unbounded capacities of human agency. By way of comparison, it is useful to contrast this perspective to the humanist work emphasising the changes in the “social and spatial divisions of labour and the supply of potential gentrifiers” (Ley, 1978). Humanism was in part created in response to positivisms, which has no room for human agency. Indeed structuralism maintains a profound suspicion of humanism. Smith contests this notion instead emphasising the role of producers; ‘the relationship between production and consumption is symbiotic, but it is a symbiosis in which production dominates’ (pp. 540). He sees gentrifiers as ‘merely the passive handmaidens of capitalist’s requirement’ (Hamnett, 1991). This polarisation of theoretical perspective is debated at length by Hamnett (1991). This serves to demonstrate firstly the distinctive structural Marxist perspective, and secondly how the different approached produce fundamentally different claims to knowledge.
In the process of producing claims to knowledge some believe there is a ethical dimension, not simply to add to research but to improve the scientific explanations and change the world for the better (Flowerdew and Martin 2005). Both positivist papers aim to improve the discipline, this is demonstrated in the second article, “An important contribution of the current work is the development methods for identifying gentrification neighbourhoods... marking a departure from much of the extant literature... enhancing the ability of future research on gentrification” (pp. 2447). This clearly demonstrate the authors considered effort to produce action-orientated knowledge from this research, which are made explicit from the start. The structuralist article take an oppositionist ethical stance to that of positivism. The difference is demonstrated by Harvey (1973, in Holt-Jensen, 1999) who stated that “positivism simply seeks to understand the world whereas Marxism seeks to change it” this expresses political and ethical aims inherent in Marxism. In Smiths second article he emphasises the “bifurcation of the consumption dream, producing a city of ‘haves and have-nots’... the yuppies and mushrooming gentrification... and the burgeoning homeless” (pp. 170). Thus the approach, in seeking to identify the structures that constrain people’s lives, thus enable people to change them.
The presentation of the research is also influenced by the philosophical positions. The body of the text in both positivist articles have clearly defined conventions, following an standard scientific way of reporting experiments. The structural Marxist articles also followed logically from the initial presentation of observation to the final conclusion, however, the articles are less formally structured and more theoretical, building on the past work and shaping the abstract interpretations into theoretical knowledge. The presentation of data is represented far more explicitly in the positivist articles. For example, in the first positivist paper Wyly and Hamel (1998), tables occupy five pages and forms a much more central role in the body of the text itself, where it is reviewed in detail within lengthy results sections. This is because empirical analysis form an integral part of the methodology and in reaching verifiable conclusions. In contrast, the structural Marxist approach presents tables and data far more subtly with only two very small and uncomplicated tables presented in each article. Although the empirical observation are important to producing claims to knowledge, the research is not aimed to be replicable and verifiable, and as such data forms a less central part in convincing the reader to the validity of the article.
The neat philosophical characterizations presented in this essay should not obscure the rather blurred conceptions prevalent within the topic of gentrification and social science as a whole. In reality a vast amount of diversity and disagreement is prevalent within each. The presentation of these two philosophical perspectives and how they generate knowledge is obviously a simplistic representation of the work on gentrification. The analysis has demonstrated the substantial commonality between Positivism and structural Marxism. These two philosophical positions share much more than their interest in generating knowledge about gentrification, each maintain that the social world is real and that the progressive accumulation of knowledge about that reality is possible. It follows then, in each philosophy that the researchers enjoys a privileged status in comparison to their research subjects. However within each philosophy are fundamental differences, which are often actively contested, as each set of assumptions speak an fundamentally different language they have trouble understanding or at least recognising the legitimacy the each other’s alternative expiations. I would argue with Rose (1984) that the study of gentrification should not be solely reliant on the assumptions of the positive perspective. Nor should research be so narrowly conceived on Marxist work. By doing so “is to make epistemological and methodological errors which both truncate and distort our understanding of gentrification” (Rose, 1984). It should be recognised that there is no single correct epistemological position or mode of explanation, rather each position has benefits and flaws which hold particular values to the study of geography.
Finally, and most importantly, the essay has served to emphasise that the practice of research cannot be divorced from questions of philosophy (Graham in Flowerdew and Martin, 2005). The implications of these philosophical underpinnings make it hugely important to provide careful considerations of the fundamental epistemological and ontological assumptions in the way the research question is framed. The two philosophical positions informed dramatically different methods and consequently (as demonstrated using these articles) create extremely different claims to knowledge. Furthermore these assumptions provided, in part, the justification of the research questions. Crucially for one’s own future research it is essential these positions are made explicit to ensure a coherent epistemological stance.
References:
R. Bostic and W. Martin (2003). Black Home-owners as a Gentrifying Force? Neighbourhood Dynamics in the Context of Minority Home-ownership. Urban Studies, Vol. 40, pp, 2427-2447
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