`Initially post war Britain had a Labour government. There was a widespread suspicion within the Labour movement of the main instigators of integration, Roman Catholics and Conservatives. They saw any European community as a capitalist enterprise that was likely to inhibit any moves towards a more planned economy, and to insist on the rigours of the free market. It was under this government of Clement Attlee that Britain refused to allow the Council of Europe develop as the federalists would have hoped, into a federal European government. Also in this period Britain refused to join the newly European Coal and Steel Community only sending an observer to the negotiations. The official line on Britain's non-entry being ,"we are not willing to make prior commitment to a scheme whose terms of membership are unknown." This also underlines the fact that Britain wanted to continue 'as before' and thought it could, at the time Britain was producing about one half of the coal and steel in Europe.
`Hopes that the return of the Conservatives and Winston Churchill to office in 1951 would foster integration were soon dashed.
`Although Churchill had advocated a United States of Europe in a speech at the University of Zurich in 1946, it soon became apparent that he had not envisaged Britain being part of it. Churchill certainly wished to continue with the traditional route of British foreign policy, that of the 'three interlocking circles'. So if anything the existing policy was reinforced by the return of the Conservatives to office.
`I will now look at these 'circles' to shed some light on the historical considerations taken into account by British governments when dealing with European integration.
`First of all there was the British Imperial circle. It was clear that Britain could not 'abandon' these countries overnight, countries with which such strong trading and historical links existed, not to mention the peoples of which had been called to fight in two world wars at the insistence of the Crown. Even so in the immediate post war period important sectors of the Empire were clamouring for independence. Britain didn't have the resources to govern now, (it's resource base has been estimated to have been depleted by one quarter) and the Empire no longer wished to be governed. In 1947 Britain started to decolonize, peacefully unlike the turmoil the French endured, and later the Commonwealth was formed. The Commonwealth at the time continued to be Britain's most important trading partner, in 1950-54, 49% of all imports were from the Commonwealth and in the same period, 54% of all exports were Commonwealth bound. It is clear then that the British government saw the Commonwealth and the sterling trading block as crucial to the recovery of Britain.
`Mr Gorden Walker of the Commonwealth relations office was invited by cabinet to comment on the proposed Schuman plan and it's ramifications for the Commonwealth. He saw two factors that governed the discussions aimed at closer European unity. Firstly the need to play a full part in revivifying Europe, but at the same time, "not engaging ourselves in anything likely to do damage to relations with other Commonwealth countries."
`Commonwealth countries were always kept closely informed on any developments in the Schuman proposals, and it was also feared that if Britains steel industry was placed beyond the control of a UK government this would jeopardize the supply of steel and capital goods to Commonwealth countries. This, along with Britain's superior production of coal and steel went along way to the UK government not in the end joining the European Coal and Steel Community.
`The Anglo-American 'special relationship' was very important to Britain. Military co-operation obviously throughout the 2nd World War was immense, and when NATO was formed in 1949 it was Britain who the USA saw as their foremost ally.
`Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in the first post war Conservative government felt strongly about this issue. A brief sent to Mr. Eden read, "...although it is our aim to foster the idea of an Atlantic, rather than a purely European community, we believe that European arrangements can exist..."
`Eden underlined the word "Atlantic", and noted in the margin 'YES', indicating not just a continuation of British post war policy but a reinforcement.
`The USA was becoming an increasingly powerful nation internationally, but through the special relationship Britain thought she could dominate matters due to their experience and the relative inexperience of the USA in world politics.
`Britain also had good relations with European states, and Churchill stated that of these circles Britain was the only country with a good standing in all three, and he didn't think Britain should relinquish such a role by paying more attention to one or the other, i.e. Europe.
`Britain then appeared to have a 'Superiority complex' . Nationalism had been strengthened by the war by the successful resistance to invasion and ultimate victory, not discredited as it had been in Germany. There was more a desire for rebuilding and reconstruction of the nation along the same lines, rather than a desire for a new beginning as was felt in other European states. It was also felt that British government and institutions were superior to those in other states, and anything that meant a change to the 'British way of life' was strongly contested, as was supra-nationality which it was thought could mean the loss of the monarchical tradition, an essential feature for the Commonwealth. Along with this came an unwillingness to give up Britain's status as a world power. Britain tried to 'keep up with the big boys' in it's relations with the USA and Europe. Britain's relationship with the USA appears to have been badly miscalculated, even by July 1951 the USA was voicing it's disapproval over Britain's aloofness to Europe. In a message from Sir O. Franks in Washington he states the American displeasure at the way the UK has, "poured water on one of it's cherished ideals," i.e. European integration, and have let them down in the role of, "principle lieutenant on the other side of the Atlantic."
`There is one other factor which I think needs consideration when talking of Britain's attitude to Europe, that of the 'Channel complex'.
`Historically for Britain europe began on the 'other side' of the Channel, and a strong tradition had developed whereby Britain although remaining on good terms with states would try to stay as aloof as possible from European affairs. The Channel complex states that Britain feels closer to Calcutta than Calais, is this true? and if so why has Britain always been a reluctant European?
`Emigration has played a role in Britain's attitude towards Europe. Joel Kotkin, a Los Angeles journalist and academic states that between 1832 and 1932 the British Isles accounted for on third of all European emigration, twice as much as any other European territory.
The size of this emigration has continued to many areas of the globe, between 1945 and 1990 1.6m people from the British Isles settled in Australia. The British consulate-general in Los Angeles estimates 50,000 British passport holders in southern California and up to 500,000 people there who identify themselves of a member of their family as British.
`These figures could explain why for Britons it is more difficult to see themselves primarily as Europeans, unlike perhaps the Germans, French or Italians. British emigration has never stopped, many countries seem to have shorter period or spurts of emigration. For example German emigration to America slowed considerably after Bismark unified the country over a century ago. Between 1881 and 1915 2.2m people left Germany contrasted with the 9m that left the British Isles. Many Germans then would more than likely know of a relative who emigrated to America, but a Briton today is very likely to have a living relative who has settled there or in Canada, Australia or New Zealand.
`This could be said to be a tenuous link to the theory that Britain doesn't want to be primarily European and is certainly very difficult to evaluate. But the fact that the numbers involved in emigration throughout the years has been, and still are, so large must have especially in the immediate post war period kept Britain closely linked with these areas of emigration at the expense of wholehearted commitment to Europe.
`There is then an underlying theme in British policy in the early years of European integration. A broad agreement with the concept of European unity, but governments increasingly made it clear that it would be quite impossible for the UK to join any schemes that made moves towards European unity. Economically it was thought Britain was string enough to stand alone, and traditional Foreign Office policy would continue. The Commonwealth would remain the major trading partner, and it's special relationship with the United States meant Britain would still play a dominant role in world politics. Britain wished to continue as before the war, no change in the 'British way of life' was wanted or expected, and therefore Britain did not wish to risk loosing any of this by European unification. This was the direction in which Britain believed Europe was moving, and these factors along with the element of emigration go some way to explaining why it was that Britain remained aloof during the early years of European integration.
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`REFERENCES
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`1 : "Documents on British Foreign Policy 1950-52"
H.M.S.O. series II vol. I , (no. 257).
`2 : "The United Kingdom" by Alec Cairncross (page 30)
in "Government & Economies in the postwar world"
by A. Graham & A. Seldon (Routledge, London)
`3 : "Britain in Europe" by W. Wallace (page 8)
(Heinemann, London)
`4 : "Politics and Policy in the EC" by S. George (page 50-51)
(Clarendon press, Oxford)
`5 : as ref : 1 (no. 130)
`6 : as ref : 1 (no. 392)
`7 : as ref : 1 (no. 348)
`8 : "The Economist" Dec. 26th 1992-Jan. 8th 1993
(page 32-34)
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`REFERENCES
`1 : Thomson, D. : Europe since Napoleon
`(Penguin books Ltd., 1966 p.536.542)
`2 : Talmon, J.L.: The Myth of the Nation and the
Vision of Revolution
(Secker & Warburg, London, 1981, p.507)
`3 : Thomson, D. : Europe since Napoleon
(as above, p.732)
