Discuss the view that a policy of appeasement was the only practical policy for Great Britain in the

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

Discuss the view that a policy of appeasement was the only practical policy for Great Britain in the

According to Winston Churchill's later account appeasement prevailed because of the blindness of British politicians to Hitler's real intentions and because of their timidity in not standing up to successive acts of German aggression. Personal defects loom large in this explanation for, with the benefit of hindsight, it seemed so obvious what the outcome of a craven failure to stand up to Hitler's ruthless ambitions was going to be. As the Second World War has faded into history it is possible to make out a better case for those who favoured appeasement, and notably Neville Chamberlain amongst them, than Churchill would ever have allowed.

`Appeasement had so few critics and aroused no massive public hostility because as a policy it was well in tune with the public mood of the thirties. It was not just a question of a few pacifists or motions at the Oxford Union or a Fulham bye-election result, but something more widespread. The horrors of the First World War were much written about and were still a bitter personal memory for many, civilian newsreels from Spain nightly revealed the future horrors of aerial bombardment of civilian targets, for it was not just Baldwin who believed the bomber would always get through. In any case the burdens of unemployment and the enormous National Debt seemed to undermine any hope of resolute action in foreign policy. There was also a general feeling that Germany might have been harshly treated at Versailles and that on certain issues, for example the re-militarisation of the Rhineland, might have quite a good case. Without this prevailing mood the illusions of the political establishment might have been less firmly set.

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`Appeasement prevailed however because the political leadership of the National, really Conservative, Government and their leading advisers favoured it or indeed saw no alternative to it. The key figure was Neville Chamberlain. He fully shared the public horror at the thought of the destruction which another war would bring and how a vigorous, and therefore expensive, defence and foreign policy would distract from pressing problems at home. He was a decent man who held a sincere belief that reasonable negotiation and goodwill could overcome the diplomatic problems of the day. In any case there was no thinkable alternative. Some historians think Chamberlain's policy of appeasement made little sense. After all, Hitler made no secret of his aim to dominate Europe and the world. He was a ruthless tyrant who was prepared to use war to achieve his evil ends. In consequence the only correct policy was to stand firm against him at the earliest opportunity. They argue that appeasement simply whetted his appetite and encouraged him to make fresh demands. With each surrender Germany grew stronger and more dangerous. However, after 1935 Germany could not have been challenged without the risk of a long and bloody war, a war for which Britain was woefully unprepared and which she might not win. Britain had little to gain even from a successful war; it would also be ruinessly expensive and seriously damage Britain's economic position.

`If the policy had been Chamberlain's alone it would not have survived for long. It did prevail, through to at least the spring of 1939 and, for a few, into the months of the Phoney War, because it was embraced and promoted by so many figures of the political and media establishment. Only Reynolds News amongst all the national newspapers, and owned by the Scottish Co-op, spoke out against the deal struck at Munich. ">The Times<-" under Geoffrey Dawson manipulated both news and opinion columns to pursue an appeasement policy but almost all papers maintained at best a craven policy of not rocking the appeasement boat by being nasty about Hitler. Newspaper proprietors were to the fore in creating this climate of opinion which so effectively and for so long enabled appeasement to prevail.

`There were good reasons, and bad, why this state of affairs came about. The Press was dominated by right-wing proprietors who were deeply suspicious of the 'Red menace' from the Soviet Union and from communists at home. They saw Hitler's domestic achievements and saw him as a bulwark against communism. They were not alone. Some, like Mosley and perhaps Lloyd George, saw lessons which could be applied to English problems. Hitler flattered and deluded them and, until very late in the thirties they closed their eyes to the stories coming out of Germany about the treatment of the Jews. Strong latent anti-Semitism in British society made the Jews, in any case, an unlikely rallying point for national outrage. So the unattractive features of National Socialism were glossed over and German territorial ambitions were made to seem a reasonable response to its treatment at Versailles. The Anschluss was acceptable because the Austrians were Germans and clearly wanted it, but those same sentiments could, in September

`1838, be cruelly exploited to undermine any will to help the Czechs. Not that many, if it meant war, had that will.

`A Parliamentary Opposition challenging appeasement might have brought it to an end earlier but the Labour Party, natural enemies it might have been thought of fascism, did little to stiffen Chamberlain's resolution. Some members were pacifists, others had a muddled belief in collective security under the League of Nations, but had little will to provide the arms to back the League. Churchill was the voice in the wilderness and for this there were good reasons in his political record. From Tonypandy to the General Strike he had done nothing to merit any support from the Unions or the Labour Party. His extremism over granting some measure of self-rule in India and his attempt to create a 'King's party' at the time of the abdication isolated him from the mainstream of the Conservative Party. He appeared a bellicose troublemaker, the soundness of whose judgement was increasingly open to question.

`Few men of political stature questioned the need to avoid war and for most of them a deal with Hitler was a small price to pay, especially as it would be the Czech nation and not they who would be paying. The men of power manipulated the public mood unscrupulously as the decade advanced but essentially public opinion was on the side of peace and, until his policy had eventually failed and this only as late as the spring of 1939, this meant supporting the efforts of the Prime Minister. In many ways Chamberlain was the most honourable of the appeasers, deluded but not lacking courage. His views would not have prevailed of they had not had the support of the vast majority of the politically powerful and had not caught the public mood.