Why was Richelieu's foreign policy so politically divisive from 1624-42?

The outcome of the crisis in the Valtelline valley also posed another significant problem to Louis XIII and Richelieu. The Treaty of Monçon signed in 1626 alienated important French allies including Venice, Savoy and the Dutch. This was a significant diversion from Richelieu’s overall idea of how lasting peace would be achieved. French expulsion of papal troops a year earlier did assert that she would not be subjugated by the Habsburgs. The Treaty of Monçon however, was an agreement with Spain which increased the risk of Habsburg encirclement. Moote highlights that initially the treaty appeared a victory, however its terms were not adhered to by the papacy in terms of dismantling fortresses, and the Spanish were still able to use the passages to send troops to the Dutch and German wars. 

The crisis in the Valtelline was thus not a victory for either Richelieu or his critics in the early years of his ministry. The dévots gained ground in terms of a closer relationship with Catholic Spain; however, Richelieu’s true intentions were made clear by his expulsion of papal troops in 1624. Marillac, Marie de Médici and the rest of the dévot faction were concerned by the influence Richelieu had on Louis XIII. They were particularly anxious over Richelieu’s willingness to defy Pope Urban VIII and what this meant for the future of both Catholicism in France and French foreign policy thereafter. Their suspicions were justified by next significant event in Richelieu’s ministry; the War of Mantuan Succession.

France and the War of Mantuan Succession

The French agreement with the Spanish in 1626 was particularly short lived. Tension arose in Mantua following the death of an heirless Duke Vincent II in 1627. The first stage of the War of Mantuan Succession began when the French Duke of Nevers claimed the duchies of Mantua and Montferrat. The governor of Milan, Don Gonzalo de Córdoba was given orders by Spain to lay siege to the stronghold of Casale. This agitated the French, and in February 1629 Louis XIII and Richelieu sent an army across the Alps, defeating Charles Emmanuel of Savoy and forcing Gonzalo de Córdoba to raise the siege of Casale. Richelieu’s aggression in the early stages of the Mantuan War of Succession greatly increased animosity between Spain and France. This animosity also manifested itself in the King’s council, which was divided over the question of Richelieu’s policy.

Richelieu’s critics, namely the Queen mother, Marillac and Cardinal Bérulle were opposed to a foreign policy which involved confrontation with Spain. Their argument was that heresy in France had not been quashed, and thus the question of intervention in Mantua and Montferrat should not be considered until it was. Although Louis XIII and Richelieu’s decisiveness had pleased the dévot faction at La Rochelle, the Protestants in Languedoc remained a significant threat. Marillac was also particularly concerned about the fiscal implications of French intervention; the introduction of new and unpopular taxes was causing widespread domestic unrest in France. 

Richelieu justified French foreign policy in terms of securing peace through access to her neighbours and curbing the influence of the Spanish;

It is necessary to stop the progress of Spain, and contrary to this nation, which has as its goal to augment its domination and extend its limits, France must think only of fortifying herself and obtaining portals from which to enter into all its neighbouring states and protect them.

The dévots however, remained unconvinced by Richelieu’s stance. They were particularly disappointed because of the concessions Richelieu made at Monçon and the prospect of peace with Spain became more likely. It did seem in 1626 that he was beginning to conform to Marillac, Bérulle and the dévots, however it is more likely that the Treaty of Monçon was signed for immediate practical reasons, rather than a shift in Richelieu’s allegiance in terms of foreign policy. The dévot hope also existed because of Richelieu’s imprisonment of his adviser and publicist Fancan because of his support of an anti-Spanish policy, together with the development of alliances with Protestant powers. Richelieu was struggling to maintain the domestic status quo and the political division in France over the War of Mantuan Succession continued into its second phase.

The strong opposition Louis XIII and Richelieu were faced with after the first siege of Casale prompted the quelling of the Huguenot rebellion in Languedoc. The situation in Italy however, was far from resolved. By May 1629, imperial forces had joined the Spanish; Casale and Mantua were besieged, and much of the Mantuan territories were desecrated. The worrying news of imperial involvement forced Louis XIII and Richelieu to intervene for a second time, and French forces once again entered Savoy and captured Pinerolo in February 1630. 

Although a welcome addition to Richelieu’s plan, the successful capture of Pinerolo caused significant political division in France. In late 1629, the French court was divided over the lack of money available for a second intervention in Mantua. Richelieu argued for an aggressive policy to Louis XIII because of the need to maintain his reputation, and that the abandonment of Casale would appear weak. The criticism Louis XIII and Richelieu faced following the capture of Pinerolo was far more severe. Elliott has emphasised the importance of Louis XIII’s decision to hold on to the strategically important Pinerolo. Retaining the town meant the abandonment of domestic reform, and the alienation of the dévots. It also meant an inevitable prolonged war with Spain, which at a meeting in Lyon was denounced by Marillac, the Queen Mother, the duke of Montmorency and the governor of Languedoc. The dévot argument was that the king’s reputation could be won domestically, and the threat of rebellion because of increased taxation was a real threat.

Despite the reservations of the king’s council Louis XIII and Richelieu continued the campaign and by July 1630 fortune began to favour the French. The deaths of Charles-Emmanuel in Savoy and Spinola at Casale, and the encroachment of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany weakened France’s enemies. By October it appeared the status quo in Europe was reinstated, but it was Richelieu’s rejection of this which caused enormous political divisions in France. Richelieu’s unexpected rejection of peace came as a result of his belief that it would compromise his plan for a European coalition to counterweigh Habsburg influence. The continuation of the march on Casale and direct confrontation with the Spanish was extremely controversial. Richelieu’s critics argued that his actions meant the prospect of a potentially endless conflict with the Habsburgs. The criticism culminated in the Day of the Dupes, in which Louis XIII’s faith in Richelieu was reinstated and eventually the Treaty of Cherasco was signed in 1631; a far more favourable agreement than that which had been proposed a year earlier. Richelieu’s subsequent purge of his political opposition tightened his grip on French foreign policy.

The War of Mantuan Succession is vital because it embodies division in France over both the practical and religious issues involved in confrontation with the Habsburgs. Richelieu’s retention of power after the Day of the Dupes in 1630 is of great concern to understanding French foreign policy thereafter. Louis XIII and Richelieu’s rejection of the terms at Regensburg defined subsequent foreign policy. The negative responses to Richelieu’s foreign polices and alliances continued in the 1630s, and the French alliance with Sweden in the form of the Protestant Gustavus Adolphus embodied the new direction in which France headed. The prospect of open war with the Habsburgs increased; and with it the fear of the destruction of French political and religious power in Europe.

The alliance with Sweden and the significance of Lorraine

The years between 1630 and the formal entrance of France into the Thirty Years’ War were characterised by the determination of Richelieu to avoid open war. Following the Day of the Dupes, Richelieu was also able to shape his policies with less regard for his critics. The signing of the Treaty of Bärwalde with Sweden in 1631 represented Richelieu’s defiance of those who disagreed with his foreign policy. The terms of the treaty were that Gustavus Adolphus II was to maintain an army of 30,000 foot soldiers and 6,000 cavalry, whilst France would pay Sweden 1 million livres per year for maintenance of the agreement. David Sturdy described the formal alliance as an ‘unambiguous expression of raison d’état’. Sturdy is correctly asserting that Richelieu did not consider the Thirty Years’ War to be a religious affair. His outright approval and alliance with Gustavus Adolphus was deemed an insult to Catholic France.

It is important to note however, that it was not the alliance with Sweden which the dévot faction was most disappointed with. By 1631 Richelieu’s intentions in terms of foreign policy were very clear. It was the devastation in Catholic Germany which the dévots were concerned about. Knecht highlights Richelieu’s anxiety that Gustavus Adolphus’ success in Europe posed a dangerous threat to the religious status quo. Knecht ominously describes the Swedish army ‘as rapid as it was destructive.’ Bireley agrees with Knecht over disapproval in France over the alliance with Sweden. He highlights the view of Nicholas Caussin, the confessor of Louis XIII. Caussin argued that the issue was that the promise of respect for the Catholic religion was not observed in the alliance. Caussin agreed that allying with heretics could be acceptable, but only if the German church could avoid ‘horrendous devastation’. 

The death of Gustavus Adolphus at the Battle of Lützen in 1632 was a devastating blow to Richelieu and his anti-Habsburg policy. Sturdy describes Gustavus Adolphus as ‘the one commander able to hold together the disparate collection of German princes, territorial rulers and city states which were aligned against Ferdinand II.’ His death was certainly disappointing to Richelieu, as he relied on the Swedish to contain the imperial threat whilst preparing France for open war. It was a great relief however, to Richelieu’s Catholic critics like Caussin, who favoured a move towards peace with the House of Habsburg.

Louis XIII and Richelieu also found difficulty in the duchy of Lorraine before the French entrance into the Thirty Years War. The crisis concerning Lorraine is important to consider because it directly addressed Louis XIII’s lack of an heir. The Treaty of Liverdun of 1633 was signed after it emerged that Charles IV, duke of Lorraine had provided support to the Spanish a year earlier. Lorraine was of great strategic importance to the French in the 1630s. It was a buffer state between France and the Habsburgs, staunchly Catholic and one of the few remaining unsecured gateways into France. The secret marriage of Gaston d’Orléans and Charles IV’s sister Marguerite was one of the reasons used for French invasion and occupation of Lorraine in 1634. 

Gaston d’Orléans’ actions were deemed totally unacceptable, and an heirless Louis XIII used an aggressive foreign policy to assert his control over an increasingly absolutist France. Foreign policy was divisive in this sense because it appeared that Richelieu and Louis XIII used aggression to dispel its critics. Bercé focuses on the importance of Gaston d’Orléans’ rejection of Richelieu prior to his illegal marriage to Marguerite;

Gaston’s manifesto accused Richelieu of usurping royal authority for his personal benefit and of making his already legendary fortune out of public funds. To achieve his ends, Richelieu had oppressed the royal family, deprived the Parlements of their role as a constitutional check and a channel for grievances, and reduced the people to a condition which the manifesto summed up as death, death and beggary.

Gaston’s damning remarks about Richelieu’s ministry, although not initially concerned with foreign policy, are certainly important. By 1634 Richelieu was conducting French foreign policy in a more absolutist manner; Gaston’s observations of domestic policy began to cohere with foreign affairs.

The Thirty Years’ War and financial changes

Since the death of Gustavus Adolphus in 1632, the formal entrance of France into the Thirty Years’ War became inevitable. The question of foreign policy after this date was primarily an exercise in determining the most opportune moment to directly confront the Habsburgs. The trigger cause of the Franco-Spanish war in 1635 was the forcing out of the French garrison at Trier and the imprisonment of the Archbishop-elector. The French declaration of war however, was still met with widespread criticism. Richelieu had spent five years consolidating his position after the Day of the Dupes, but opposition to his foreign policy peaked in 1635 and 1636.

William Church emphasises the fact that the dévot faction remained, even when Richelieu was at the height of his power. The publication of the Mars Gallicus by Cornelius Jansen in 1635 and the subsequent imprisonment of Saint-Cyran are important examples of the criticism directed towards Richelieu. Jansen rejected the common French argument that the Spanish used Catholicism as a cloak for territorial ambition;

The primary objective of the Swedes and the Dutch was religious in that they sought above all else to advance their heresy by injuring the Spanish, the defenders of Catholicism. The predominant force in the present conflict was therefore religious, and the war was in this sense a true war of religion. For this reason, the French soldiers who were sent against the Spanish risked eternal damnation if they followed orders.

Saint-Cyran, a former supporter of Richelieu turned staunch opposition, was imprisoned in 1638. Richelieu regarded Saint-Cyran as ‘more dangerous than six armies.’ Richelieu and Louis XIII’s oppression of their critics in the 1630s illustrates the genuine concern they felt for strong opposition of their policies. The divide they were most afraid of widening, was a defamation of their foreign policy on religious grounds. Richelieu was well aware of the robust argument that the dévots presented; his frequent attempts to assert his political authority as a consequence of this condemnation continued until his death in 1642.

It is necessary to briefly consider the cost of war in an analysis of the political division in France over foreign policy after 1635. Richard Bonney has argued that the reason for Richelieu’s delay in entering the Thirty Years’ war was because of the need to improve France’s financial situation. War forced a dramatic change in French fiscal policy; total government expenditure rose from 41 million livres in 1630 to 88 million livres in 1639, and warfare accounted for 72 per cent of that expenditure. The dramatic increase in expenditure caused significant domestic upheaval; Richelieu and Louis XIII were continually faced with the threat of rebellion because of their expansionist foreign policies after 1635. The political and religious divide in France continued until Richelieu’s death in 1642, and it was not until 1659 that France achieved any sort of lasting peace.

Conclusion

Questions of foreign policy and foreign alliances were politically divisive during Richelieu’s ministry because of practical and religious issues. Richelieu’s policy of allying with Protestant states and defiance of the Catholic Church was a first in European history. His justification of foreign policy as a means of protecting Catholicism in Europe was widely condemned by his critics. The reason for this rejection was primarily because of the practicality of Richelieu’s foreign policy. The practicality of Richelieu’s foreign policy caused division because it simply did not complement the dévots’ idea of what was right for France. Richelieu’s secular foreign policy envisaged Europe as a part of a new international order, in which an anti-Habsburg alliance of France with small states, duchies and territories achieve peace in Europe. Richelieu saw this as neither a pro or anti-Catholic policy, whereas the dévots interpreted Richelieu’s idea as fundamental rejection of the idea of a future Catholic hegemony in Europe. The idea of Catholic hegemony in Europe was alien to Richelieu because he believed that it would never accommodate a lasting secure peace. The practicality of Richelieu’s foreign policy also caused political division because of enormous financial strain and the alienation of French subjects. Richelieu and Louis XIII, purposefully or not, isolated themselves from the rest of France because of their reluctance to conform with popular opinion.

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