It could be argued then, that in certain cases, outcomes may be attributed to the incorrect cases of power relationships because certain power relationship outcomes come about as a result of seemingly unapparent occurrences. The argument that someone can possess power without actually using it; leads Morriss to take the view that power should be thought of as a capacity, rather than an exercise of influence. This implies that one should not limit the scope of power and take into account that it includes control of oneself and the environment. This is opposed to the view taken by Lukes, which states that power is a force that is dispensed over you and something which controls you in one way or another. Each of these views has compelling arguments. It has to be said that each is not wrong and do provide good descriptions of different kinds of power, but Morriss’ view does not offer a path that leads to an empirical outcome. It offers no way of explaining how power operates. It only exists to point out, albeit valid, but unsupportive points, to consider when conceptualising power. However, it still does show weakness in the model that Lukes provides and even though the three dimensional model could be used in defining specific power explanations that involve a force being exercised over some else that has a visible outcome; nonetheless there is still always the possibility that the data may be contaminated due to some power relationships resulting in no obvious or visible outcomes. The view that Lukes model does overlook certain aspects of power due to his narrow definition, this in turn implies that he can only apply his model to cases in which A someway affects B.
Clarissa Hayward criticises the three dimensional model of power for not including other factors that have power over us. She outlines the possible of other influences such as the environment in which we live in or the structural restraints brought upon us in terms of social factors such as class or legislation passed by governments often have considerable effect over an individual. Lukes’ view is more reductionist in terms of the focus on power that individuals within institutions have over people. Hayward believes that collective power and structural power are important aspects to consider. Theoretically individuals may hold much personal power within certain organisations; however there is a certain power that an institution has that accumulates the more it becomes ingrained into our society. This implies that there is a certain power that emulates from collective force that has no moral responsibility because it is not a specific individual. A main basis for Lukes’ thesis is cast around the idea of morals and the fact that it is possible to use power over someone as a positive phenomenon because the person dealing out the power is morally responsible and often accountable. This implies that there is a flaw in the three dimensional model because there is a certain influence and power that affects individuals which comes from an amoral agent. Hayward argues that there are influences and power over individuals coming from other sources that are often either void of responsibility or the lack the capacity to act in a moral way. Again this points to Lukes’ narrow view on power due to his connections he makes with moral responsibility and power, which doesn’t allow him to consider other potentially influential factors affecting how power operates. However, Hayward does make some concessions, in the sense that it is useful to tie in moral responsibility and use of power to create a working model. Although she does make well-founded claims that show that not all relations, actions and processes involving power are attributable to forces that can be not be specified.
Hayward does provide some insightful points to consider when considering how power operates and her argument does imply that Lukes has overlooked important aspects to how power operates. However, if Lukes had included aspects such as non-moral bodies like social structures, companies or governmental institutions it may have increased the analytical accuracy of the model, but it would weaken the models’ overall explanation and moral significance. Lukes’ recognises these criticisms in his latest edition of his thesis. However he still highlights the point that he is specifically concerned with power relationships that happen between individuals that have an observable outcome – those power aspects that most affect each and every one of us. This shows us that while Lukes’ model does have a narrow view on power and may overlook certain aspects of how power operate; it is not for good reason. This is because the non-moral influences are not accountable and therefore there is no way to provide a means to an end. Therefore only the aspects of power that we can compare morally and identify through individuals are worth considering and are therefore concentrated on in the three dimensional approach.
‘Steven Lukes performed a valuable service by emphasising that power can be exercised by manipulating people’s preferences, in addition to manipulating agendas and ordering people to do things. This quote from Shapiro’s review tell us that even Lukes critics are willing to accept the accomplishments and progress that Lukes has provided within the subject of political power. Although he goes on to call attention that his presentation of three different kinds of power are only three different possibilities that are potentially applicable to studying how power operates. Shapiro argues that environmental factors such as religion, gender, race and class are all human identifications that could possibly have an effect on a certain or specific power relation. He goes on to stress that the power relation may be subject to perceived real interests, which may in actual fact not be the real explanation. This implies that Lukes’ model has some fundamental flaws based around the rational choice approach of assuming that one’s optimum or best interests are their real interests. Shapiro’s claim that any of the mentioned human identifications could be used as a motivation or restraint has a strong argument because power relationships and therefore how power operates within our society have the potential to be very complex. This tells us that it would not be wise to oversimplify the basic assumptions of the three dimensional model – a fate that Lukes’ has been condemned for because it potentially considerably overlooks important features of how power operates by assuming them away.
However, if Lukes’ model was backed with complete and relevant knowledge of the relationship or exercise of power in question; one could imagine the third face of power, which involves the manipulation of the individuals’ human identifications, could operate successfully. Shapiro offers an alternative approach to discovering the real interests behind exercises of power. This involves starting with the complete knowledge of what influences affected a power relation, enabling one to work from empirically accurate foundations to reach a theorised thesis. Shapiro also points out that there are many varying types of power that are exercised. An example used to consider this point is the difficulty in differentiating between the use of illegitimate and legitimate power. Both have a great deal of influence in certain situations but it would be very difficult to establish when a particular course is taken due to illegitimate influences or otherwise. This implies that power as an area for research is a very intricate subject and Shapiro argues that Lukes’ overlooks this point by trying to oversimplify and over generalise the topic in order to produce more concise explanations. It seems with the argument brought forward by Ian Shapiro grouped with the more institutional and collective view held by those such as Clarissa Hayward implies that there are some key factors involved in how power operates that Lukes’ model has overlooked. Lukes defends and amends his original definitions and explanations in his new edition. However, even if he does claim that his model is designed for specific power operations involving domination over someone by another agent; it still cannot claim legitimacy without refining the assumptions and foundations concerning real interests. Once, solid, empirically backed knowledge of influences and restraints involved in a power exercise can be identified; the ability to use Lukes’ model to properly explain power relations accurately becomes much more likely.
Overall, it is clear to see that there has been much criticism thrown around, especially aimed at Steven Lukes. The three main areas of criticism that have been analysed thus far include the dispute of terms that Lukes uses, which as Peter Morriss argues, leaves out important power relations that include the power to do something; implying that power can be used as a positive force. Lukes’ focuses on the domination aspect of power, which consists of power referred to as a repressive force. Morriss makes an important point – a fact which Lukes acknowledged in his revised edition. However, he defends his position apologising for not mentioning other sub categories of power, but insists that his model is predominately interested in the most relevant and important sub category of power to the majority of society. This is a valid point and therefore, even though one could claim Lukes overlooks important aspects of how power is defined; the fact that he is interested in the most morally significant and relevant clause of power, in his opinion, along with his revisions in his latest edition rectifies this flaw somewhat. Hayward claims that Lukes’ three dimensional mode of power was too narrow minded, didn’t consider environmental or structural influences and that those entities themselves may have a certain amount of power – which contradicted Lukes association with morals and his faces of power model. These points do provide a convincing attack on the model in question. However they are narrow minded with the aim of identifying specific power relations – that have been identified by its author to be most relevant and useful, especially where a moral identification can be made (possibly with the aim of applying morality and responsibility to ensure power is conducted in a favourable manner).
Environmental factors are also address by Shapiro and this is probably the most fatal flaw in the three dimensional model of power. This is because there are always going to be external and often unknown factors that will affect a situation. Even the perceived reasoning for a power related issue may be incorrect. The dubious reliance on real interests provides a source for distress to any critic who does not approve of a rational choice approach. Certainly Shapiro is known to be one of those. Although it would be foolish to assume that Lukes intended to cover the whole subject of power with one model. Even with all this criticism Lukes’ Power; a Radical View is a classic piece of literature concerning important revelations and insightful progress in the realms of broadening our understanding of power and how it operates. It may lack solid foundations of sometimes doubtful real interests, but it all depends on what you put into the model. A researcher equipped with all the relevant information that enabled him to apply Lukes’ model without making such assumptions or not including other potential sources of influence would be in a far stronger position. It is also plausible to assume that one could build onto Lukes’ three faces to make a more complete picture and as Shapiro wisely states, at the end of his review, that Lukes and others like him should join him in such a pursuit.
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