An Assessment of the Prospects for European Federalism

But until the Great War, the ‘Concert of Europe’ prevailed, with no centralised form of governance for the continent other than the loose association of the Great Powers which intermittently met in ‘Conferences’ to solve the problems of the day, be they in African, Morocco, the Balkans or elsewhere. The peace conference at Versailles was the last dying ember of the Conference system which had erupted into fiery cataclysm with the events of July and August 1914. Yet despite the obvious need for some form of European system that was both more stable and more regular than the Concert, little practical was done outside the League of Nations, and any system of centralised European government or governance was confined to the discussions of the political philosophers. After the second great war to envelop Europe in less than 30 years, the need for some form of peaceable association was seen as paramount. Churchill said, in a speech he gave in Zurich: “We must now build a kind of United States of Europe”, and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman went so far as to call for a project, which was to become the European Steel and Coal Community, that would make ‘any war between France and Germany not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’.

In 1952, the European Coal and Steel Community – the ECSC – came into force, and began the great project of European unity that is still on-going. In 1952, the European Defence Community, the first abortive step towards a Europe with a common Army, and therefore Foreign Policy was taken, but failed in the ratification stage in front of the opposition of the Assemble Nationale in Paris. In 1958, the second attempt at a further integration of states in Europe was successfully taken in the form of the European Economic Community, known as the EEC. This provided for a single market within the six member states of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, as well as the European Social Fund, the common agricultural policy, and the free movement of labour. The 1958 Treaties of Rome also established the European Atomic Energy Agency, EURATOM, which the French had favoured. The stage was set for a further expansion.

But the ascension of De Gaulle to the Presidency of the newly created Fifth Republic after the abortive coup in Algeria changed the landscape of pan-European politics. Staunchly nationalist, De Gaulle vetoed any British accession to the EEC, and with it that of Ireland, Denmark and Norway, and sidelined EURATOM. Not until 1973, four years after De Gaulle stepped down and Pompidou came to power that Britain and the other countries would accede to the EEC, despite some internal opposition, especially from the Labour Party, which had become fiercely anti-EEC.

After the fall of the undemocratic regimes in Spain, Portugal and Greece, they too acceded to the Community – the Greeks in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986.

By 1992, a major reform of a system created for 6 Western European states, but now incorporating 12 states, from the economic powerhouses and democratic states of Germany, France and Britain to the economic laggards and new democracies of the likes of Greece and Spain. The need was sharpened by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, which had set loose former ComEcon and Warsaw Pact Members who were looking towards accession to the Community.

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 created the European Union, established the Parliament as a legislative body and provided for a single currency, and eventually came into force in November of the following year. It also provided for so-called ‘Intergovernmental Conferences’, or IGC’s, to make treaty revisions if deemed necessary. One of these took place in 1997 and concocted the Amsterdam treaty, which added a number of competences to the Union and extended the powers of the Parliament. This IGC was followed by a more important one in 2000, which set the ground for the accession of the ten new member states that were to join in May of 2004. It changed the number of commissioners and after much discussion settled on new vote weightings to reflect the accession of ten new states.

Thus we have seen how Schuman’s great project metamorphosed from the Coal and Steel Community to the Economic Community, to, finally, the Union. But further federalisation of the system has always had its opponents and problems.

After the creation of the Coal and Steel Community in 1951, there were moves towards a European Defence Community, a combined army, and therefore a common foreign policy, areas of ‘High Politics’ that essentially define sovereign statehood.  These moves went so far that a treaty was actually signed. West Germany and the Benelux countries ratified it, as did the Benelux countries. Italy was waiting to see what the French would do. And indeed, it would all depend on the French, as much did in those early days. The French could, and still can, make or break any plan proposed. In August of 1954, the National Assembly refused to ratify the European Defence Community Treaty, and the European Political Community Treaty that went with it. The first step towards a Federal Europe, with it’s own executive arm in form of an army, the ultimo ratio regnum that defined statehood, was defeated.

The Defence Community failed for a number of reasons. The greatest of these was the refusal of the National Assembly in Paris to ratify the treaty. Herriot, the veteran socialist and President of the National Assembly, summed up the feeling prevalent in the Assembly that caused it to reject the treaty:

“[The EDC] contravenes the French constitution since it entails an abandonment of national sovereignty without reciprocity. Certain advantages accrue to Germany but none to France”

And there lies the crux of the argument against the EDC, and slightly later, the EPC, the absence of which in itself was an argument against the EDC. The two points Herriot makes – the curtailment of sovereignty, and the fears of a resurgent Germany – effectively caused the EDC to be stillborn. The fact that the United Kingdom would not be a part of the Defence Community meant that many French statesmen, who had seen what a strong Germany could do to France in 1940 or 1914, were still very wary of allowing German re-armament, even in the context of a European Army.

The French also had certain technical objections to the treaty, concerning voting weights, which, because they were based on a countries contribution to the force, meant that France would be stretched to maintain parity with a Germany that had no colonial commitments. Restrictions on the removal of forces from the EDC for colonial uses were also objectionable to a France that had a revolution in Indo-China on it’s hands and a large North African Empire to police. For all these reasons, the EDC proved abortive – and considering the strength of the Community, it was unlikely to have proven successful even if it had been initiated.

After the demise of the EDC and EPC treaties, the next block to a more federalist Community was De Gaulle, who came into power six months after the establishment of the EEC and EURATOM. First, De Gaulle effectively sidelined EURATOM, as he wanted to keep the French nuclear industry in the service of the French state and its nuclear weapons ambitions. This was the beginning of the process of creation of what De Gaulle called the ‘Europe de patries’  - an essentially intergovernmental Europe, rather than a federalist one. It is to be noted that De Gaulle did not actually create the ‘Europe de patries’, or the intergovernmental Community. The Gaullists in France merely further emphasised it and prevented any widening or deepening of the extent or powers of the Community during the ten years they were in power, and some time after it. This included the famous press conference that was the culmination of British efforts to join the Community in 1963 – de Gaulle emphatically said ‘Non’ to a British entry into the community, to much condemnation from fellow Community members. It would not be until 1973 that Heath finally signed the Treaty of Accession.

Britain, then has long been a cause of restraint for a further federalisation of Europe, and she continues to be one. When the majority of the European Union joined the currency union provided for in the Maastricht Treaty, she, alone among the larger countries, stayed out. Her Majesty’s Governments ambivalence towards the Euro stems largely from a populace that seems set against a British entry to the single currency – 60% would vote not to join, and only 23% would vote to join the single currency, were there a referendum. British public opinion, shaped by the Thatcherite years of resistance to a ‘European Super-state’, and manipulated by the right-wing press, is now firmly against any further deepening of the powers of the Union. This is reflected by the relative successes of the UK Independence Party in the European Parliamentary elections of June 2004, which sent 12 MEP’s from the anti-European party to the Parliament in Brussels.

Britain will thus pose a formidable obstacle to any further federalisation of the European Union, as she has done ever since her accession to the community. The British view on the Union is closer to that of De Gaulle’s than that of Spinelli or Delors – a ‘Europe the Patries’ , rather than a ‘European super-state’. Britain’s long-term racial and cultural ties to the Unites States, and formerly, to the ‘white dominions’ has meant that she has often looked towards the sea more than towards the continent, imbuing in her people an insularity that has created a very ambivalent attitude towards Europe. Less than a third of Britons feel Europe is part of their identity – in contrast, 75% of Luxembourgers feel it is. She is ‘in it, but not of it’.

Britain is not the only problem the federalists will have to surmount to create a truly federal Europe. An enhanced sense of regionalism, in part fostered by European grants to the regions has meant that the rise of a people that feels truly European is impeded by the resurgence of Scots, Basques, Catalans Bretons and Württembergers where before there were just Britons, Spaniards, Frenchmen or Germans.

Further, while the absence of Britain from the single currency is an impediment, so is the complete absence from the Union of states such as Norway and Switzerland who, despite being democratic western market economies have decided to stay out of the Union, robbing it of some of its moral legitimacy, for are these Norwegians and Swiss not Europeans aswell?

Conversely, while the Euro has set Britain against Europe, it is probably also the Unions greatest hope for bringing it’s populace around to the idea of a Europe truly united. In Spring 2003, the second most frequently mentioned instance of ‘What it means to be a European’ was the Euro. The Euro is extending the European commonality of culture in regards to the European Union – it is the face of the Union that millions of Europeans deal with every day.

The free movement of people and labour has further led to a cultural merging of European peoples that means that there are an increasing minority of people that see themselves as ‘Europeans’.

Laws like European Convention on Human Rights, and less reputable ones such as the Common Agricultural Policy are also instrumental in binding Europe as a more united political entity.

It is this commonality of culture and political entity that will eventually lead to the acceptance of a federalised Europe by the majority of the populace of the Union.

Yet a federalised European Union, with its own executive, judiciary and legislature, to which national governments are subservient in all areas, does not necessarily mean that there is a ‘Federal Europe’. It was not until the expansion of the Union in 2004 that its name was even partially justifiable. Geographically, large areas of Europe are not, and never will be part of the European Union, as there can be no inclusion of European Russia without including the rest of Russia; and this means there will never be the inclusion of Russia. As mentioned earlier, Switzerland and Norway, unarguably ‘European’ states, are still not part of the Union, primarily through their own choice. This absence of many ‘Europeans’ from the European Union means it lacks a certain moral legitimacy.

Further there is the question of Turkey. Europe should not, in my opinion, be defined by religion – yet for many, and historically, it is. All the states of the European Union are, or were once in their not too distant history, Christian. France and Germany may be officially secular, the United Kingdom Anglican only in name, but it is undeniable that the majority of the population of the European Union, and almost all its ideals, come from a Judeo-Christian background. There is therefore some discussion as to whether a country that while it is officially secular, is unofficially as Muslim as Italy or Spain are Catholic, if not more so, should be allowed into what is effectively the continuation of the mediaeval idea of ‘Christendom’. The Union and its peoples have some years yet to unravel the cultural and religious conundrums the candidacy of Turkey brings with it, as there are currently perfectly defensible non-religious grounds for denying the Turks accession, based on their Human Rights, Democratic and Economic records. But the decision will have to be made.

In conclusion, there are a number of pre-requisites for a federal European state. Firstly, the people of Europe must feel truly European. Secondly, the governments of the continent must themselves feel ready to make the leap in the dark towards the ‘super-state’ - an anathema to Margeret Thatcher and the right-wing press in this country and others. Thirdly, Europe must decide what her identity really is – whether her identity is defined by religion, geography, culture, ideals or a combination of all these.

In the short term, when the continent has weathered the economic troubles she is facing and when Britain has made its collective mind up about its relationship to Europe, the stage will be set for the next step towards a federal Europe.

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Bibliography

• Beloff The General says No: Britain’s exclusion from Europe, London, 1963
• De Tocqueville Democracy in America, London 1966
• Fursdon The European Defence Community: A History, London, 1980
• Eurobarometer, Spring 2003
• The Economist, 25 October 1952
• ICM Guardian Poll, July 2003
• John Pinder The European Union – A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, 2001
• Pryce The Political Future of the European Community, London, 1962
• Larry Siedentop Democracy in Europe, London, 2001
• Thatcher Britain and Europe: Text of a Speech Delivered in Bruges by the Prime Minister on 20th September 1988, London 1988

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