Hence, Wortzel states that the future looks a great deal like a combination of cooperation, confrontation, and conflict depending on how the U.S.-China relationship will be managed, and on how the U.S. will perceive China. The most sensitive issues that bind U.S.-China are also the primary sources of U.S.-China conflict and confrontation. These include issues, such as technology transfer policy, the strength and scope of U.S. alliances in the world, participation in international organizations, types of CBMs, interpretation of the Law of the Sea, sovereignty matters, and policies concerning weapons proliferation and arms sales. In this context, Wortzel argues that it is dangerous for the United States to systematically minimize assessments of China’s military capabilities for two key reasons: (1) China’s rising dominant position of power in Asia, and (2) China’s accelerated intellectual and doctrinal building of a modern military, parallel to a slightly slower pace in its efforts to upgrade military technology and hardware. In the former case, he argues that based on comments by defense and foreign ministry officials in Seoul, Hanoi, Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur, China now exercises hegemony over a considerable portion of East Asia. In the latter case, Wortzel points to the awareness of Chinese military leaders to improve and develop military areas such as reconnaissance and sensor systems, electronic warfare and jamming, the use of information warfare, amphibious assault, and the missile capability. In short, the PLA leaders aim to develop a rapid reacting, information-based Army supported by sensor-to-shooter systems, precision weapons, and modern combat platforms. The want a world-class, secure and reliable command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) systems, logistics capability to support deployed forces within or outside China, without relaying on help from the local populate or foraging. This roadmap for future warfare, in combination with the nation’s size and geographical position, promises to make China a major regional power in the future.
Long Term Objectives of the U.S.
Two policy documents from the U.S. Government, the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy outline the U.S. intentions of its national security establishment to seek ways to exercise leadership, power and influence around the world in the 21st century. The underlying factor in both documents is the commitment by the U.S. to remain engaged in the world and to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state powers. The strategy also calls for the U.S. to promote democracy and human rights as a means to enlarge the community of free market democracies in the world. The instruments of U.S. national power under discussion include diplomatic, economic, military, informational, technological, and industrial capabilities. An important factor in exercising U.S. leadership, power, and influence will continue to be embedded in the U.S. forward deployed military forces around the world. The main purpose of these forces is three-fold: (1) to serve as a “trip-wire” designed to warn, and if necessary absorb any future attacks, (2) they are visible signs of the U.S. commitment to the peace and stability of the region (i.e. U.S. presence in South Korea, Japan, and South-east Asia), (3) they extend U.S. deterrence to allies, ensuring that no arms race nor weapons proliferation will take place. In the Chinese view, they resent the U.S. presence and its bilateral regional alliances; however, at the same time they realize that without a U.S. presence, China would need to devote significantly more resources to a potentially hostile Japan. China views the presence of U.S. forces as a necessary condition for maintaining regional status-quo; they realize that U.S. extended nuclear deterrence under the defense treaties with Tokyo and Seoul inhibits Japan the ROK from becoming nuclear powers, keeps a division on the Korean Peninsula with North Korea serving as a buffer state, and inhibits Japan from rebuilding its military.
With regard to China, the U.S. officially encourages China to seek its place in the region as a great power and hopes that China does so peacefully, however, the U.S. is concerned about possible weapons and technology proliferation on behalf of China to countries like Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea. In June 1998, former Presidents Jiang and Clinton met in Beijing to accommodate a series of CBMs to increase and deepen cooperation between the two countries. Principal among these was the confirmation of what is termed a common goal to halt the spread of WMD. Nonetheless, according to Wortzel, based on China’s strategy and past experience, the U.S. has a great deal of mistrust, ambiguity, and suspicion in this regard.
Long Term Objectives of China
Since 1998 China has annually published its White Paper, China’s National Defense. This document sets forth China’s national security goals and policies for the new century and provides Beijing’s vies of the international and regional security environment. While much of the writing contains language promoting China’s participation in both international and regional multilateral cooperation (China promoting CBMs, ASEAN, ARF), Beijing makes no compromises with respect to what it claims its own territory or its willingness to use force in that territory. The PLA is charged with maintaining the capability to defend all of Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin, the presence in the Spratly Islands. In the first paragraph of China’s White Paper, Beijing stated clearly its won goals for leadership in the region: “it is the aspiration of the Chinese government and people to lead a peaceful, stable and prosperous world into the new century.” Nonetheless, a considerable debate exists both on the Chinese and Western side on the interpretation of the Chinese term of “leadership”. First, among Chinese strategists and military leaders at the Academy of Military Science and among officers of the Military Intelligence Department, the term “leadership” (lingdao, or responsibility for leadership, lingdao de zeren) carries the Leninist understanding of strong, authoritarian direction, as in the “leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.” While other Chinese strategists prefer such term as “special responsibility” (teshude zeren) to state the obligations of a great power in the region.
However, in the Western view, Chinese style of leadership is synonymous with aspirations of regional hegemony (preponderance of influence or authority)- its implications will be the likely central source of tension between China and the U.S. in the next century. It is a concept of leadership that calls for a peace under specific terms, which include dominance over the territorial claims that China maintains in the South China Sea and over Taiwan. In particular, China expects other countries in the region to break their security ties with the U.S. in order to reshape the strategic balance in Asia in its own favor in a way that diffuses American power and leadership in a “multi-polar world.” Multilateral approach in this context is particularly important for China, since Beijing believes that China’s international position is more central in the web of relationships that characterize the multilateral context. Thus China prefers to engage in “strategic partnerships” with Central Asian republics, Russia, Japan, Korea, the U.S. and the EU. A web of “partnerships” around China conceptually places the Middle Kingdom at the center of the world, increasing China’s influence and status. Moreover, multilateralism undermines the U.S. bilateral alliances in Asia, one of Beijing’s main foreign policy goals and its efforts to reunite with Taiwan.
China also recognizes its deficiencies of its military and is very careful in revealing its actual capabilities to the outside world, and thus, according to Wortzel, it pursues a two-pronged approach to security relations. On the diplomatic front with the U.S., Beijing does the very minimum it must to avoid being perceived as an adversary and to gain access to U.S. doctrine and manuals, while at the same time China is engaged in a diplomatic effort designed to de-couple the U.S. from its allies, and in a military effort to improve its strategic and conventional forces. Wortzel argues that China has translated one of the maxims of Sun Tzu into a 21st century: (1) attack enemy’s strategy, (2) attack enemy’s alliances, (3) attack enemy’s forces.
In the final analysis, assuming that the United States seeks to maintain its power, leadership, and influence in the same region, and does not withdraw from East Asia, U.S.-Chinese relations will be characterized by tension and conflict. Although there are areas where the interests and objectives of the U.S. and China coincide, this tension and conflict will necessarily translate into difficulties that will manifest themselves in bilateral military ties. The respective military establishments of each country will initiate programs to support conflicting goals and to influence the other side. Acknowledging that there is a great deal of mutual distrust between the United States and China, Wortzel concludes with the need for increased direct communication and cooperative behavior on both sides that would build mutual understanding and defuse a crisis.
My Observation & Comments:
I disagree with Wortzel’s basic assumption that China is already the dominant power in much of East Asia. This assumption is based on subjective comments based on author’s interviews with government officials in the region, which stipulate that China’s distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities challenge the preponderance of the regional presence and capabilities of the United States. Based on the data and discussion that we had in our seminar, China has a long way to go to synchronize its military capabilities with its ambitious doctrine and foreign policy. Nevertheless, the difficulties in interpreting ambiguous nature of China’s intentions and capabilities do suggest that China is certainly aiming to become a future dominant power in the region, and challenge the United States and Japan. Achieving this vision will not be an easy task for China, especially under the current and impending structural domestic and international constraints that limit and modify Chinese behavior both in the foreign policy and military arena. Chinese and U.S. interests in East Asia are indeed on the conflicting or competitive paths, however the costs and risks associated with a conflict escalation on that path are high on both sides. Therefore, one could agree with Wortzel that U.S.-Chinese relations will exhibit hybrid characteristics of conflict, competition, and cooperation. However, in my view, much of that will depend not on how U.S. perceives China per se, but rather on the international perceptions of China’s willingness and actions in integrating into the international community. Clearly,
China has to cooperate with the international community including the EU, Japan, and other states in order to sustain its growth, and thus benign international relations with China are essential for its future prosperity. In other words, the Ball is on Chinese court, which means that China will not likely initiate any major military action whether vis-à-vis Taiwan or the United States that would undermine her role and standing in the international community; in particular, as Beijing prepares for 2008 World Olympics.
