Critically evaluate Mearsheimer and Walt's response to the War on Terror.

Critically evaluate Mearsheimer and Walt's response to the

War on Terror.

September 11, 2001 was a shocking day for Americans and citizens of all Western countries. Almost 3,000 innocent people died in terrorist attacks in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. After the attacks President George W. Bush said: 'America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.' (2001.) It was the moment when America declared a war against terrorism. Since then, the West, led by the United States, have been actively trying to put an end to terrorism.

The first major response to the attacks was the invasion of Afghanistan, less than a month after September 11. However, as we could see a few years later, the war in Iraq became a bigger focus for the United States and its allies. The reason for that was that, according to the Bush administration, Saddam Hussein was in possession of weapons of mass destruction so he was a serious threat to the region and America, too. However, many people argued that the real threat to the Western world were Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, and that Western countries should primarily focus on Afghanistan, not Iraq. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt a few months before the invasion of Iraq wrote that the United States should not go to the war against Iraq, which they called 'an unnecessary war' (2003, p. 51).

According to the Bush administration, Saddam was a reckless and unpredictable man, and in possession of nuclear weapons he would be a very serious threat to America. Mearsheimer and Walt, however, argue that Saddam was by no means incalculable or undeterrable. First of all, he started two wars (against Iran and Kuwait) during his regime, and this result was not worse than its neighbours', such as Israel or Egypt, who had fought several wars since 1948. Moreover, he attacked countries that were not significantly strong. He invaded Iran, which was weakened by a revolution, to put an end to its hegemony in the Middle East and defend Iraq's borders (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003, pp. 51-53). He even received aid from many countries, e.g. the United States (this policy resulted in deaths of thousands of Kurds and Iranians [Unger 2007, p. 114]). Before going to Iraq in 2003 the neo-conservatives said that getting rid of Saddam was necessary because he had always been suicidal. However, before he attacked Kuwait, he had approached the Bush, Sr., administration to find out how it would react if he invaded his neighbour. It responded that it did not have any defence or security commitments to Kuwait, which, to Saddam, was a signal that if he attacked Kuwait, America would not intervene. It proves that he was not suicidal at all – he did not want to risk having American troops all around him (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003, pp. 51-54).

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As I have said before, the Bush administration repeated many times that Saddam was likely to have weapons of mass destruction (in 2001, after September 11th, Colin Powell said: 'We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction and make more.' [Unger 2007, p. 286]). Mearsheimer and Walt believed Saddam had not and would not have WMDs, and even if he did, he could not use them against the United States. They said that blackmailing America could not work, and Saddam knew that if he had threatened it with using WMDs, he would have been the first one to see bombs over his head (2003, p. 56). Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, too, said it would be too risky for Saddam to invest in a nuclear program (Halper and Clarke 2004, p. 213). Francis Fukuyama admits that Iraq was a very serious threat to the Middle East but not America. He argues that: '… they [i.e. Iraq] were very far away from acquiring a nuclear weapon and there are a host of reasons for thinking that they would not turn such a weapon over to terrorists.' (2004, p. 59.) The neo-conservatives, however, believed it was necessary to go to Iraq to investigate and shut down a possible nuclear program. As we have found out, the neo-conservatives had been wrong because Saddam had no weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, they still believe that going to Iraq was the right thing to do. Frum and Perle (2003; the book was written after the invasion of Iraq) argued that it was obviously risky to start the war while not being certain of Saddam's possession of WMDs but it caused much less danger than if President Bush had not done anything about Saddam and would have later found out that he, indeed, had nuclear or biological or chemical weapons that he could use against the United States (p. 26).

The Bush administration also believed that Saddam probably had certain ties with Al-Qaeda and had something to do with the 9/11 attacks. In 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said that ties between Saddam and Al-Qaeda were 'accurate and not debatable' (Unger 2007, p. 264). George W. Bush has also said that there is 'no question that Saddam had Al-Qaeda ties' (Frum and Perle, 2003). Mearsheimer and Walt, however, argue that such ties were extremely unlikely to exist. Firstly, Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda terrorist are radicals, while Saddam was a secular leader, and there were no friendly relations between them at all. Secondly, even if Saddam had had any WMDs, he would have most possibly wanted to keep them. If he had given them to Al-Qaeda, he would have lost control over the Middle East and risked losing the regime and his own life (2003, pp. 57-58). The neo-conservatives never had and still do not have any proof of any Hussein-Al-Qaeda ties but they have at least two reasons to think that such ties were existent: probable meeting between Mohamed Atta (one of the 9/11 planes' hijackers) and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Czech Republic in April 2001, and Iraq's Czech embassy's plans to destroy the Radio Free Europe transmitter in Prague in 1998 (Frum and Perle 2003, pp. 45-46). However, as Unger says, the CIA never had any evidence of Saddam's links to the 9/11 attacks (2007, pp. 245-271). Halper and Clarke do not believe in any such ties either. They argue that Americans were misinformed when it comes to Saddam's involvement in the 9/11 attacks (according to a 2005 Washington Post poll 70 per cent Americans believed that Saddam had stood behind the attacks) (Halper and Clarke 2004, pp. 201-203). Francis Fukuyama writes: 'My reading of the evidence is that these linkages existed … but their significance was limited.' He argues that after 9/11 Al-Qaeda have not needed any support from countries like Iraq (2004, p. 62).

Another reason to go to the war was to establish democracy in Iraq. Mearsheimer questions the possibility to do so in a state which in fact has barely any history of democracy. He says: 'It was just assumed that democracy would sprout once Saddam Hussein and other tyrants were removed from power.' And, as the neo-conservatives thought, when all Middle Eastern countries became democracies, they would be no longer threats to America (2005, p. 3). Some opponents of the Iraq war called this way of spreading democracy as 'democracy at the point of a gun'. The neo-conservatives, however, claim that they do realize that it will take some time to establish democracy in Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries. But they argue it is necessary to try because the cultural effect of tyranny is 'poisonous', and in order to prevent another 9/11. Tony Blair also said: 'freedom, democracy … are not Western values, they are universal values … and anywhere … people are given the chance to choose, the choice is the same: freedom, not tyranny; democracy, not dictatorship.' (Frum and Perle 2003, pp. 158-163.) On the other hand, in 2005 the president of Americans for Tax Reform, Grover Norquist, a conservative who had been a supporter of the invasion of Iraq, regarding also the issue of democratization of Iraq said: 'Everything the advocates of war said would happen hasn't happened, and all the things the critics said would happen have happened.' (Unger 2007, p. 338). Fukuyama claims it is not impossible to democratize Iraq but he brings several reasons which make him doubt that it is likely to happen. These reasons are related to both the Iraqi society (e.g. a very quick transformation from totalitarianism to democracy, an important role of religion in politics, etc.) and the United States (its very little success in nation-building in the last century) (2004, pp. 60-61).

Mearsheimer and Walt write: 'If it [i.e. the war in Iraq] goes badly – whether in the form of high U.S. casualties, significant civilian deaths … or increased hatred of the United States in the Arab and Islamic world – then its architects will have even more to answer for [than if it goes well].' (2003, p. 59.) According to realists, the war did go badly. The country is in chaos, thousands of coalition soldiers have been killed, and depends on a source at least one hundred thousand civilians have died. Fukuyama argues that Americans are either hated or disliked in Islamic countries for what they have done (2004, pp. 65-66). On the other hand, the neo-conservatives argue that the war in Iraq has not been a failure. They claim that overthrowing the Saddam's regime in less than a month was a big success (Frum and Perle 2003, p. 11).

In my essay I tried to evaluate John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt's response to the war against terrorism. I wanted to show different views and position on the war on terror. Thus, I quoted some arguments used by opponents of the war in Iraq and its supporters. The Bush administration and other neo-conservatives' reasons for the Iraq war were strongly criticized by realists and liberals. Saddam Hussein did not and, according to the war opponents, could not have any WMDs. There is no evidence of any linkages between Al-Qaeda and Saddam. Saddam was in fact not a threat to America. Democratization of Iraq has failed. The war caused hatred towards the United States among Muslims. On the other hand, the neo-conservatives disagree with these arguments and try to show that the war in Iraq was the right decision and happened to be a success.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Bush, George W., (2001): Address to the nation. Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1539328.stm

Frum, David and Perle, Richard (2003): An End to Evil. New York: Random House.

Fukuyama, Francis (2004): The Neoconservative Moment. In The National Interest, 57, pp. 57-68.

Halper, Stefan and Clarke, Jonathan (2004): America Alone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mearsheimer, John (2005): Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus Neo-Conservatism. Retrieved from http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/all-pubs.html

Mearsheimer, John and Walt, Stephen (2003): An Unnecessary War. In Foreign Policy, pp. 51-59. Retrieved from:

Unger, Craig (2007): The Fall of the House of Bush. New York: Scribner.