Democracy is not possible in South Asia because of the military's political role. Discuss.

        The role of the army cannot be underplayed in Pakistani politics, the army is in fact at the “heart of the power structure in Pakistan,” the Pakistani army, as was indeed the case with the British Indian army played a role in the maintenance of law and order, a covert role to benefit the civil government when needed and also assisted the civil government through the distribution of foodstuff as well as carrying out an anti-smuggling drive. The roles the military had been assigned either overtly or covertly by the civilian governments, as well as the “transfer of further resources to the armed forces and ... a greater commitment to national security”, was a part of the process through which the army had become among the key powers in Pakistan and this posed a direct problem for democratic establishment in Pakistan because unlike the democratic vision of participation in politics “from below”, the army had its gaze fixed upon the political vision of strong leadership “on the top”. In fact to a large extent after the partition of India and Pakistan the army can be seen to have shaped the politics of Pakistan in several ways, indeed spanning from 1988 to 1996 successive Presidents have dismissed governments presumably on “behalf of the army”. This demonstrates the military’s influence upon civilian institutions and presidents can have the effect of uprooting democratically elected governments who had popular support and thus demonstrates how the military’s political role can slowly undo democratically elected institutions in Pakistan.

        The relationship between the military assuming a political role and the supposed inability for democracy to develop in Pakistan seems somewhat mutually conducive. Sattar states it is the failure to “evolve democratic institutions, to institutionalise the acquisition and exercise of state power, and to inoculate democratic norms and values among the masses” that has resulted in the vulnerability of civilian governments to military intervention in politics. He further asserts repeated interventions into politics by the military have had the effect of undermining civilian government authority through preventing the evolution of institutional process and having the cumulative effect of continuing the weakness of vital state institutions and a continual dependence on the military. This relationship of dependence of state institutions upon the military is at odds with the notion of western liberal democracy, whereby the military should be a neutral organ of the state and has no right to participate in the politics of a state. Aqil Shah is also of the view that without a full restructuring of civil-military relations, democratic transition will not be sustainable in Pakistan. This further gives weight to the notion that it is due to the Pakistani military’s political activities and influence that democracy cannot develop and consolidate within Pakistan.

        Pakistan faced a great territorial challenge in attempting to manage two different regions separated by neighbouring India after independence in 1947. A further problem was posed for the Pakistani elites in that East Pakistan contained an overall majority in the country, however power reserves were concentrated in the Western part of Pakistan, posing a possible challenge to the political and economic interests of civil and defence officials and their allies amidst notable West Pakistani landed and business families. To keep the looming Bengali threat at bay landlord politicians allied themselves with the unelected institution of the military, creating an uneasy alliance between civil bureaucrats and military officials and resulting in much involvement of the military in defining state imperatives. This alliance subsequently had the effect of undermining the role of parliament in entrenching itself in the structure of the state, seeing Pakistan without any national elections up until 1970. This civil bureaucratic and military alliance resulting in the stunting of any development of an effective legislative body made increasingly difficult the prospect to build and sustain a democratic state in Pakistan because it is apparent through the direct or indirect influence the military had upon Pakistan’s infrastructure the military had largely facilitated many years without effective key democratic institutions such as a legislative body. This further illustrates democracy in Pakistan was undermined due to the politicizing of the military.

        The democratic situation or lack of, in Bangladesh, like Pakistan has also been attributed to the political role the military has undertaken there. Bangladesh begun its political trajectory deeply committed to democracy, with the constitution being passed in under a year of independence and the holding of general elections after only six months, with the victor of the Awami League with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as Prime Minister. In fact Bengalis had also been at the “forefront of democratic movements in the 1920s and 1930s.” Soon after independence in 1971, parliament with the political elite as the supreme policy makers. However upon facing “economic crisis, social and political instability and deteriorating security” the government under the Awami League, who had strengthened the political infrastructure at the administrative level and invested greatest power in the prime minister, could not maintain their political setup and the democratisation process of the ardent Bengalis  was unable to develop. Under threats to the survival of the regime from revolutionary groups Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared a state of emergency in late December 1974 and also placed a ban on all other political parties and crushed the opposition. From an eager democracy Bangladesh was transformed into a one-party state with the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL) imposing stringent controls on the press and the self declaration of President Mujibur Rahman as “president for life” This reduced Mujibur Rahman’s support base in Bangladesh and effectively removed much of the legitimacy he had previously enjoyed. After initial disarray due to the small size of Bangladesh’s army, internal rival among repatriates from West Pakistan and the freedom fighters the military was delayed in their emergence as a dominant force. However Bangladesh soon followed the postcolonial state’s norm of developing a dominant military and the first overt sign of the armed forces desire to take on a political role was clear in the coup d’état against President Mujibur Rahman who was succeeded by army control turned civilian under Zia-ur Rahman in 1977, and followed by General Ershad who also civilianised once coming to power. 

        Furthermore both Pakistan and Bangladesh have seen a major discrepancy in the constitutional role of the armed forces and the role the armed forced perceive themselves to have. The Pakistani military has “arrogated to itself the right to define Pakistan’s supreme national interest, ... and take appropriate action ... from admonition to removal of the government” as it perceives itself to be the guardian of Pakistan’s ideology frontiers. Similarly, the military in Bangladesh was begrudged with the government having not had their facilities restored after damage from the war. It is evident in both the cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh that military intervention has to a large extent been to secure their own interests in the face of a civilian government which seeks to address the civil-military imbalance or where the military feels it has been wronged by the government. Such “reactive militarism” is evident in the coup d’état against Zulfiqar Bhutto after he reinforced “civil supremacy over the military in Pakistan”. 

        However, although there is weight to the argument of the military being an obstruction to the establishment and consolidation of democracy in Pakistan and Bangladesh, it must also be asked have civilian governments done much better in the cause of democracy than the military? In contrast to Pakistan however, the military has also taken steps towards renewing democracy in Bangladesh. General Zia once having come to power went through a process of “civilianisation”, whereby he was successful in laying down “foundations of a number of civilian institutions” including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Gram Saker and brought a multi-party political system as well as resigning as chief of army staff prior to the presidential elections in 1978. All these steps give an indication of the move back to democracy that was taking place under a leader who came to power through military intervention into politics where in fact President Mujib-ur Rahman a civilian had initiated the decline of democratic progress in Bangladesh through his undemocratic policies which did away with political competition and elections for ruling posts which are core features of a democracy. Moreover the creation of Gram Saker was an indication of devolution of democracy downwards to the village level, a South Asian appropriate step towards the establishing and entrenchment of democracy among the masses in a form that is understandable and not alien.

        This indicates the military’s political role in the case of Bangladesh at least did show remnants of improvement in the way of democracy, however it must be noted that the progress that was made can’t be described as progress in liberal democracy, nor should it have to be. Bhikhu Parekh asserts the degree to which a polity chooses to be liberal and democratic is dependent upon its history, traditions, values, problems and needs. He further states modern western societies were unable to replicate Athenian democracy in the modern age, and thus had to “evolve their own distinct forms of democracy”, perhaps the role the military has taken upon itself in the political realm is constitutive of Pakistan and Bangladesh’s distinct form of democracy. Thus the claim that liberal democracy is universal could be interpreted as denying the west’s own historical experience, and would as colonial times entail an imposition of systems of governments from that are unsuited to the talents and skills of a specific state. In this sense it could be suggested that the military in Bangladesh has aided the cause of democracy. However it is important to keep in mind, scholars have alleged General Zia’s steps towards democratization were among the reasons for his assassination in the abortive coup d’état of 1981. Thus it is also clear that as well as enabling steps towards democratization in Bangladesh, conversely the military as an establishment who has acquired a taste for political power remains in a position where it is yet an impediment in the path of democracy.

        Singling the causes for a lack of democracy in Pakistan and Bangladesh down to the role of the military however detracts from other useful explanations for this situation, which rather than casting blame upon the military implicates the civilian governments that were in power in these two countries as well as the role the international community has played in the region in the past. Indeed the level of economic development and the socio-economic condition of a state are a critical condition that facilitates the democratic transition and consolidation of a state or in its absence may well hinder democracy. Robert Dahl states the society and economic growth a market-capitalist economy generally produces are “highly favourable conditions for developing and maintaining democratic "political institutions.” Seymour Lipset further supports this assertion in stating in stating “perhaps the most widespread generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development.’ As well as an unfavourable political history and tradition for the development of a stable party system in Bangladesh, the socio-economic conditions are not conducive for the development of democracy. Bangladesh’s “endemic poverty” and the entrenchment of patron-client relationships at all levels of the system have created organizational weakness and institutional fragmentation.

        In addition, it is important to take into account the interaction of both Bangladesh and Pakistan with other states. Robert Dahl identifies the presence of a strong foreign control hostile to democratic development within the country as a condition that works against democracy in a state. In the case of Pakistan such a foreign influence can be attributed to the United States in their attempts to exert influence in Afghanistan, the United States required a level of cooperation with Pakistan. As a result President Musharraf’s regime which in many ways was undemocratic and contravened the interests of developing democracy in Pakistan gained international legitimacy. This indicates that not only the military being involved in politics but also the expressed or unexpressed legitimising of an undemocratic regime by a superpower can be detrimental for the prospects of democracy. Furthermore, Dahl states a democratic political culture is an important condition for the development of democracy. It is also evident in the case of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the hopes for democratic development in Pakistan the falling of these two political figures into corruption resulted in souring “many Pakistanis on democracy itself” reducing the democratic political culture and the values of democracy among the population thus making the development of democracy more difficult in Pakistan. The “sloth and inefficiency” of the Bengali bureaucracy can also be seen to dampen democratic political culture.

        In conclusion, it is clear that the political role the military has taken has not been conducive for the development of democratic political organisations such as parliament and the development of political parties in order for a competitive and multiparty political system to flourish. The long years of rule under martial law, and the periods of targeting political parties in order to maintain a one party state, as well as the lack of institutionalised and organized political parties can be seen to have arisen from the political role the military has assumed in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. However as has been demonstrated military political activism is not the only contributor to the unsuitable condition of democracy in these South Asian states, rampant corruption among the Pakistani governing elites has contributed to the lack of democratic political conviction and culture among the masses, periods of economic hardship and the relative inefficiency of the Bangladeshi bureaucracy and the disenchantment of the electorate in Pakistan is also responsible for explaining the lack of democratic development. If conditions in Pakistan and Bangladesh become more favourable as stipulated by Dahl it is possible that democracy emerges in these two states.

Bibliography

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