In addition to self-inflicted political turmoil, it has become clear in recent years that American intervention, due to disapproval of a socialistic Chile, only served to exacerbate problems. Henry Kissinger, in a famed quote that summed up American policy on Chile said, "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves." The American plan was designed to strike on many fronts but in general was calculated to destabilize the Allende Administration. First, the CIA attempted to prevent the election of Salvador Allende all together, however when it became apparent that he would be constitutionally elected they resorted to more covert and divisive forms of subversion. Early on, the CIA was indirectly involved in the attempted kidnapping of General Rene Schneider. General Schneider, Chief of the Armed Forces, was a devout constitutionalist, a seemingly American ideological stance, however his support for constitutional rule was dissident to a potential military coup in the event of a Marxist administration, and thus counter to the Nixon administration’s stance on Chile. Consequently, the failed kidnapping attempt led to the murder of General Schneider. The military’s loyalty had been brought into question by the Schneider assassination. The plot against Schneider had demonstrated the enmity with which Allende was viewed, not only by a sector of the Right but within the military. Not only did it mark a brutal act of political violence and an effort to subvert the democratic system but it also raised questions about the political neutrality of the armed forces, the potential for military intervention of some type, and the degree of U.S. involvement in Chilean affairs (Oppenheim 39). Up until the 11 September coup the CIA carried out a mission of attacking Allende’s political legitimacy, wrecking havoc on the economy through strikes and aid reduction, and building descent in the middle class. In short, the Nixon administration, aided by the CIA attacked the sovereignty of Chile by exacerbating the three core problems of politics.
The Coup and Pinochet
Pinochet’s regime was the antithesis of Salvador Allende’s social reforms. It set out to replace not only democratic with authoritarian politics but also statists with aggressive market-driven economics. Pinochet relied on a coalition of capitalists, technocrats, and, above all, the military to control and manipulate Chile. In one of their first acts, a few days after the coup, members of the junta announced that they had “discovered” a secret Plan Zeta, a bloodbath prepared by Allende and his “henchmen” (Dorfman 2). Pinochet used this misinformation to destroy democratic institutions and clamp down on social organization, especially those representing the working class. Furthermore “the fear and hostility that divided Chilean society were deliberately exploited by the regime to justify the coup, counter foreign criticism, and foster domestic acceptance of prolonged military control” (Constable 152). The armed forces killed, imprisoned, tortured, and exiled thousands of Chileans. The military suppressed, dismantled, and purged not only political parties but also publications, unions, schools, and other bastions of the democratic opposition. Meanwhile, the right voluntarily suspended all public political activities. Ariel Dorfman reflects on why the right and centrists stood by and allowed flagrant persecution of fellow countrymen by saying “…fear, once it begins to eat away at a nation, once it is manipulated by a all-powerful government, is not easily eradicated by reason. To someone who feels vulnerable, who imagines himself as a perpetual victim, who detects enemies everywhere, no punishment to the potential perpetrators is too light and no measure to insure safety too extreme” (Dorfman 2). Fear left the public indifferent to atrocities that were perpetuated in democracy’s name, because despite the moral dilemma, Pinochet created stability and order out of chaos.
A new cadre of technocrats, dubbed the Chicago Boys, designed the laissez-faire economic policies that fostered dramatic growth, particularly of non-traditional exports, consumer imports, and foreign loans. That approach, however, also entailed grave social costs, especially in terms of unemployment and income distribution (Constable 168). It was likely no accident that the main victims of the economic “miracle” were also the primary political enemies of the regime, the urban workers (Drake 6). As Pinochet solidified his system of authoritarian capitalism, he held the first plebiscite in 1978. In response to international criticisms of widespread human rights atrocities, he called for a yes, or no vote in defense of his authority to forge a new institutional order. Consequently, the government totally controlled that referendum and claimed a 75 percent victory (Drake 5). To solidify power, Pinochet then authored a new constitution to institutionalize and further legitimize his regime and policies. The constitutional referendum of 1980, convened at the height of the economic boom was the regime’s second confirmation of public approval, consequently, it too passed primarily due to government control of the media and the illegal nature of opposition political party organization (Drake 51).
Chile’s new constitution contained 120 permanent articles and thirty-four transitional articles designed to create a "modern and protected democracy," basically an authoritarian version of representative government that guarantees "national security" by severely circumscribing the will of the people (Drake 52). Consequently, protected democracy institutionalized by the 1980 Constitution had little to do with democracy; it was implemented to protect authoritarianism. This was to be accomplished in three ways; first, through the establishment of a permanent role for the armed forces as "guarantors" of the nation's institutions; second, through the imposition of restrictions on political activity, including the banning of movements or ideologies hostile to democracy; and third, through the creation of institutional mechanisms that would limit popular sovereignty (Barros 170). Among the most disturbing articles is Transitional Article 24, which eliminated due process of law by giving the president broad powers to curtail the rights of assembly and free speech and to arrest or exile any citizen, with no rights of appeal except to the president himself (Oppenheim 126). Additionally the 1980 constitution limited the prerogatives of Congress, created a military controlled National Security Council, eliminated elected local governments, limited civilian control of the military, censured political activities of the left, and in short, put in place institutions to maintain personal power for Pinochet and for the right as a whole (Oppenheim 126). The Constitution of 1980 was Pinochet’s primary means of safeguarding authoritarian rule through quasi-democratic means (Vanden 456).
The role of the United States in backing Augusto Pinochet cannot be ignored as a factor prolonging his military rule. From the very beginning in 1973, the United States acknowledged and supported a morally defunct Cromwellian regime. The U.S. was so embroiled in aftermath of the red scare, that upon being confronted with a staunchly anti-communist regime, they immediately extended diplomatic recognition (Oppenheim 48). Besides turning a blind eye to the atrocities being committed by the military, the United States economically supported the regime through generous loans and increased trade. Additionally, Pinochet and the Nixon Administration created a haven for U.S. multinational corporations in Chile, which exploited poor workers and fermented support from middle class skilled labor and upper class management (LANIC). Secretary of State Colin Powell recently said he “regretted” the U.S. intervention in Chile when asked about the policy undertaken by President Nixon and Foreign Policy Advisor Kissinger, but the damage was done long ago and Chileans must live with the memory from 18 years of military rule.
Accidental Democracy
In the early 1980’s the international debt crisis helped burst the bubble of Pinochet’s much praised “economic miracle.” Rising international interest rates increase the cost of Chile’s debts and world prices of copper, its main export, plummeted; the country entered a severe two-year recession. With an unemployment rate as high as 50 percent in poor neighborhoods, Chile saw something that would have been unthinkable just a few years earlier, street protests. Pinochet was compelled to relax restrictions on the press and to allow some political dissent (Lagos 27). The economic crisis from 1981-1983 in Chile severely challenged the military regime’s pretensions to project radical economic policies and the possibility of Pinochet’s rule through the rest of the century. The extreme monetarist approach to an open economy contributed heavily to Chile’s worst economic depression since the early part of the century. Furthermore, mass mobilizations during 1983-1984, as a direct result of failing economic policies, called into question the regime’s timetable and its conditions for a political transition. Two problems emerged as a result of the 1980 debt crisis. First, they wanted to manage the economic crisis and restore growth with the framework of a liberal economic model. Second, they also needed to defuse the political opposition and create favorable electoral conditions for the planned 1988 plebiscite (Drake 98).
Consequently, the Pinochet regime ultimately sacrificed its control of the government in the quest for political legitimacy. All governments, including authoritarian regimes, desire legitimacy both within domestic society and on the international scene. Thus, Pinochet’s Chile was forced to address criticism of human rights abuses leveled by other governments and international human rights monitors in order to secure domestic and political legitimacy. In International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile, Darren Hawkins argues that international human rights pressure combined with a unique set of domestic conditions within Chile led to the downfall of military rule and the reestablishment of democracy (45). While Mr. Hawkins point is well founded and worthy of consideration, there is evidence to the contrary which also deserves thought. Hawkins contends that Pinochet’s quest to secure legitimacy for his regime by renouncing atrocities against Chile’s left led do the demise of military rule and the reemergence of democracy. Furthermore, international human rights pressures during the first several years of the Pinochet regime forced the government to adopt a discourse on human rights and abandon its most repressive practices (132). The domestic resonance of international human rights norms, coupled with the influence of “rule oriented” actors eager to secure international legitimacy, also drove Pinochet to announce a plan for the end of military rule and to develop a new constitutional framework for a “protected democracy” (88).
In contrast to the claims of former Pinochet regime members, it is obvious that democracy was reinstituted on a limited basis not because of an ideological commitment to democratic principles, but to secure legitimacy and strengthen control in a changing world. Realistically, international human rights pressures only constituted one of several influences propelling Chile’s return to democracy. While democratization certainly gained momentum from international human rights forces, international economic pressures for open markets, global democratization trends, and Chile’s desire for domestic economic stability and integration with global capital markets chiefly led Chile’s return to democracy (Hawkins ix).
Several crucial changes occurred between 1982 and 1990 that eventually led to the re-democratization of Chile. First, the economic collapse in 1982 provoked some adjustments to the neo-liberal model and sparked widespread protests against the regime. That recession was compounded by the international debt crisis, as previously mentioned (Drake 97). Second, although most of the regime's supporters in the business community and the armed forces did not budge, the 1980’s witnessed a weakening of their attachment to authoritarianism (Oppenheim 173). Third, civil society became more encouraged to express dissent. A series of demonstrations against Pinochet during 1983-85 spread from organized labor to the middle class and finally ended up among the urban grassroots (Oppenheim 172). Fourth, the previously repressed and dormant political parties came back to life. They took charge during the 1988 plebiscite that incapacitated the Pinochet regime and led to the subsequent 1989 elections for President and Congress (Oppenheim 181). Fifth, Pinochet became isolated as democratization swept the continent, and the United States and Europe began applying pressure for Chile to join the trend. Furthermore, the election of Jimmy Carter greatly changed the U.S. stance on Latin American relations (Constable 78).
While international conditions for re-democratization had to be present, the role of opposition political parties was by far the most important single factor in re-mobilizing the grassroots of society. Grassroots mobilization was essential to demonstrate that organized civil society could be a powerful player even though political parties were still relatively dormant (Oppenheim 178). On the contrary, it was the reemergence of organized political parties, working through the Chilean tradition of coalitions that brought about the “no” vote in the 1988 plebiscite. Leftist political parties were outlawed during most of the Pinochet regime, thus an underground movement existed. However, it was highly fragmented due to the organizational difficulties of operating covertly, had little to no financial backing, and was constantly faced with the systematic torture and execution of party leadership (Oppenheim 165). The success of political parties organizing for the 1988 plebiscite led to the eventual election of Patricio Aylwin in 1989, and a de facto return to democracy.
Pinochet’s Chile was a return to the feudal era of Latin American subjugation to the Spanish in many ways. The rich were kept rich and the poor and political dissidents were systematically oppressed (Constable 223). Even in the face of an international war crimes tribunal Pinochet has remained steadfastly in defense of his actions, those that he chooses to acknowledge that is. Despite the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was instituted by President Aylwin, Pinochet and his henchmen were given a free ride in Chile with the passage of the 1978 Amnesty Law, preventing the prosecution of participants in the purges of the early 70’s (Oppenheim 210). In a letter, former President Pinochet said, “We acted as the moral force in a disintegrating country…I never sought power, nor hung on to it…. I am absolutely innocent of all the crimes that I have been irrationally accused of…. I have never wanted anyone to die. I feel sincere sorrow for all who did” (Economist 45).
2003 has seen the election of three presidents to the post-Pinochet era, and a seeming return to democratic normalcy in Chile. Augusto Pinochet still has many supporters in Chile due to his radical neo-liberal economic policies, which did create a period of sustained economic growth in the aftermath of the failed socialist reforms of Salvador Allende including the promotion of non-traditional exports and the privatization of the Social Security system. Furthermore, in the eyes of the ultra-right, he saved Chile from the certain doom of socialist or even Communist rule. On a bleaker note, Pinochet was highly successful in cementing his authoritarian policies, including a lifetime seat for himself in the congress, within the 1980 Constitution. Consequently, even with the fall of the regime, Pinochet’s Constitutional articles remain as institutional roadblocks to a complete process of re-democratization. The Chilean government, for fear of disrupting their fragile democracy, has as of yet been unable to nullify undemocratic clauses in their own constitution. Chile’s progress towards re-democratization is strong, but there are many hurdles still to be overcome and the memories of a tragic past that will never disappear.
Works Cited
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Dorfman, Ariel. “Lessons of a Catastrophe.” Nation 227.9 (2003): 18.
Drake, Paul W., Ivan Jaksic. The Struggle for Democracy in Chile. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995.
Hawkins, Darren G. International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.
Lagos, Ricardo, Heraldo Munoz. “The Pinochet Dilemma.” Foreign Policy 99.114 (1999): 26-40.
Latin American Network Information Center. University of Texas, Austin. 01 Nov. 2003 <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/chile/#academic>.
Oppenheim, Lois Hecht. Politics in Chile: Democracy, Authoritarianism, and the Search for Development. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993.
“The Politics of Pinochet.” The Economist 19 Dec. 1998: 45+.
Rohter, Larry. “Letter From the Americas; Chile’s Wound, 30 Years Later, Is Still Inflamed.” New York Times 10 Sep. 2003, late ed.: A4.
Spooner, Mary. Soldiers in a Narrow Land. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Vanden, Harry E., Gary Prevost. Politics of Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Williamson, Edwin. The Penguin History of Latin America. London: Penguin, 1992.
